Young Mi Hwang v. Vasconez-Vallejo

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Young Mi Hwang v. Vasconez-Vallejo

124 A.D.3d 769, 2 N.Y.S.3d 521

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 21, 2015

Docket2014-04604

StatusPublished

This text of 124 A.D.3d 769 (Young Mi Hwang v. Vasconez-Vallejo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Young Mi Hwang v. Vasconez-Vallejo, 124 A.D.3d 769, 2 N.Y.S.3d 521 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (McDonald, J), entered April 15, 2014, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In support of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiffs spine, to the plaintiff’s left shoulder, and to the plaintiffs left knee did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]), and that, in any event, these alleged injuries were not caused by the subject accident (s ee Jilani v Palmer, 83 AD3d 786, 787 [2011]). The defendants further submitted evidence establishing, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/ 180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see generally Karpinos v Cora, 89 AD3d 994, 995 [2011]).

The plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Skelos, J.E, Leventhal, Hinds-Radix, Duffy and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (McDonald, J), entered April 15, 2014, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In support of their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiffs spine, to the plaintiff’s left shoulder, and to the plaintiffs left knee did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]), and that, in any event, these alleged injuries were not caused by the subject accident (s ee Jilani v Palmer, 83 AD3d 786, 787 [2011]). The defendants further submitted evidence establishing, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/ 180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see generally Karpinos v Cora, 89 AD3d 994, 995 [2011]).

The plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Skelos, J.E, Leventhal, Hinds-Radix, Duffy and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

124 A.D.3d 769, 2 N.Y.S.3d 521, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/young-mi-hwang-v-vasconez-vallejo-nyappdiv-2015.

Opinion

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