Young Ex Rel. Young v. Caribbean Associates, Inc.

358 F. Supp. 1220, 9 V.I. 510, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13942
CourtDistrict Court, Virgin Islands
DecidedApril 23, 1973
DocketCiv. No. 395/1970
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 358 F. Supp. 1220 (Young Ex Rel. Young v. Caribbean Associates, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, Virgin Islands primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Young Ex Rel. Young v. Caribbean Associates, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1220, 9 V.I. 510, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13942 (vid 1973).

Opinion

YOUNG, Judge

*512 MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a tort and breach of warranty action tried by the Court without a jury. A father and his ten-year-old son seek recovery for mental anguish suffered by the father and bodily injuries suffered by the son brought about in unusual circumstances. The son, Francis Howard Young, was staying with his parents at the defendant Caribbean Beach Hotel. On New Year’s Eve, 1969, the family was having dinner in the hotel dining room. At the end of the meal, the son volunteered to go through the dessert serving line to bring a Cherries Jubilee for his father. As the son reached the head of the serving line, the waiter in charge of flaming and serving the Cherries Jubilee found it necessary to kindle the flames by adding more rum to the chafing pan. He took a bottle of hundred-and-fifty-one-proof rum, which was stoppered with a narrow “slow pour” spout, and proceeded to pour the rum directly into the pan. As he did so, the spout either dropped out or was popped out by an internal combustion in the rum bottle and a quantity of volatile rum gushed out. An abnormally high flame resulted, which reached out to touch the boy, setting his shirt on fire. The boy suffered severe burns and has undergone considerable treatment for skin and flesh grafts and plastic surgery. The several ad damnum clauses in the multiple counts of the amended complaint request $200,000 compensatory damages and $100,000 exemplary damages for the son and $19,912 medical specials and $25,000 mental anguish damages for the father. The complaint bottoms recovery principally upon negligence of all defendants, but the breach of warranty and products’ liability allegations were aimed primarily at Sears, Eoebuck & Company, the vendor of the allegedly highly flammable boy’s shirt.

Initially, and regrettably, I must disallow the father’s claim of damages for mental anguish. The anguish *513 of seeing one’s ten-year-old son in flames must be horrible and nightmarish and the continuing anguish of seeing, hearing and sympathetically feeling the child’s ensuing pain and suffering must be, to say the least, debilitating and depressing. However, the general rule is that where the defendant is guilty of no more than negligence, a third party may recover only if he had some fear for his own safety. See 29 A.L.R.3rd 1337 §§ 10-19 (1970), 38 Am.Jur.2d, Fright, Shock, § 36. Perhaps the basis for the rule is a belief that the defendant otherwise owed (and breached) no duty to an unthreatened bystander; or, as a secondary but perhaps preferable explanation, a fear that the causal chain to the bystander will grow so attenuated that liability will be out of proportion to the wrong. For these reasons the rule applies even where the bystander is a parent of the victim, and so might be expected to suffer particularly deep and genuine anguish. The Restatement has adopted this majority view. See Restatement, 2d of Torts § 313(a) and comment (d). Since the law of the Virgin Islands is guided by the Restatement, the father has no recovery for what I believe to be an experience of genuine anguish.

The father’s right to recover his expenditures for medical specials and the son’s right to recover compensatory damages for his bodily injuries are clear. The hotel is, at the very least, accountable for its serving waiter’s negligence in using an improperly stoppered bottle, which permitted the “slow pour” spout either to fall out or pop out, thereby discharging a large quantity of volatile rum. Moreover, as the evidence tended to show, the hotel’s serving waiter was negligent in the first place in pouring the rum, directly from the bottle and not from an intermediary bowl or pitcher. An experienced maitre d’ hotel and chef testified that to pour directly from a bottle was to invite the flame to catch onto the stream of rum and leap from *514 the chafing pan to ignite the vaporous gases inside the bottle, blowing out the cork and turning the bottle into a veritable “flame thrower” or “blowtorch,” capable of throwing a flame ten to fifteen feet. Although I need not decide that this in fact did happen, I do find'that it was negligent to pour directly from the bottle and not from an intervening bowl or wide mouth pitcher. In a sense, the dessert waiter does not seem morally culpable for he had not been trained in the proper handling of flames. Nonetheless, he and his employer should be responsible for the injuries caused to the boy, no matter how inadvertently they came about.

I further find that the negligence of the hotel and its serving waiter was the sole and proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. The hotel for a time relied in part on the theory that the boy’s shirt was itself highly flammable as evidenced by the vigor with which it burned and that this was an important intervening cause of the holocaust that developed. With this theory in mind, as well as the thought of allocation of damages between joint tort-feasors, the hotel impleaded Sears, Roebuck & Company as a third-party defendant. At the trial, however, a written statement of the waiter was produced which indicated that a substantial quantity of the rum had gushed directly onto the boy’s shirt. This itself would be more than enough to support the combustion, no matter what the flammability of the shirt fabric might be. The third-party complaint against Sears was therefore dismissed upon the motion of plaintiff and Sears’ counsel, with no objection raised by defendants’ counsel. The action then proceeded against the serving waiter and the hotel alone. I also find that the boy was not guilty of contributory negligence. Although there was some testimony indicating that he was warned to stand back, the warning would have been, at *515 the very best, an insufficient caution to a normal boy of plaintiff’s years.

With the question of liability settled, I must now address myself to the matter of damages. The father’s medical expenses, and reasonably related outlays, have totaled some $12,352.08 to date. In addition, some further surgery will be needed in order to minimize the burn scars on the boy’s face and body. Although it is difficult for the medical experts to estimate the costs of these future contemplated operations, the uncontroverted estimate given at trial of $6,000 appears reasonable. The father’s total “special” damages would therefore come to approximately $18,352.08.

The most important and troublesome issue of damages is the award of compensable damages that must be granted to the son for his pain, suffering, permanent disfigurement and the effect thereof upon his psyche and social adjustment. That his pain was considerable is unquestioned. The boy was on fire for more than several seconds before any one of the astonished bystanders came to his rescue. Before falling to the floor, he tried desperately to tear his shirt off. Finally, after perhaps a full half minute of time, one of the waiters came to his rescue with a tablecloth to snuff out the fire. The father actually saw his son on fire but was unable to rush to his side because of the crowded dining room. When he reached his son, the waiters were already carrying the boy out of the dining room to the hotel office. An ambulance was called and soon the boy and his father were taken to the KnudHansen Memorial Hospital Emergency Room. Supportive and anti-shock treatment was rendered.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hartzog ex rel. Perez v. United Corp.
59 V.I. 58 (Superior Court of The Virgin Islands, 2011)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
358 F. Supp. 1220, 9 V.I. 510, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13942, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/young-ex-rel-young-v-caribbean-associates-inc-vid-1973.