York v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Co.

37 So. 2d 68, 1948 La. App. LEXIS 581
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 5, 1948
DocketNo. 3039.
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 37 So. 2d 68 (York v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
York v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Co., 37 So. 2d 68, 1948 La. App. LEXIS 581 (La. Ct. App. 1948).

Opinion

This is a suit brought by the plaintiff, James Oliver York, for compensation for total and permanent disability as a result of an accident he suffered while in the employ of the defendant, and in which he alleged that he sustained a ruptured intervertebral disc. Plaintiff alleged that he was employed by defendant to work in its manufacturing plant and that on or about the 10th day of January, 1945, while so employed as a T. E. L. operator, he suffered a severe injury to his back; that he was accidentally injured while engaged in moving heavy alloy hoppers, which was a part of the duties of his employment, and that while pulling and straining and moving said hoppers, he suffered the damage to the lower region of his back which resulted in the rupture of an intervertebral disc which necessitated a major fusion operation.

Plaintiff further alleged that at the time of the accident he considered that he had suffered only a strained back and that, for this reason, he did not immediately complain to his employer but continued working in an attempt to perform the duties required of him, thereby suffering increasing pain and disability; that within a few days thereafter his back became so painful that he was required to take a sick leave for several weeks, and that, at this time, he reported to the First Aid Station maintained by his said employer upon the premises, and told the employees there of this back condition; that he remained away from the job for a period of about twelve weeks and was placed in traction and given other treatment by Dr. Anderson and other physicians in New Orleans and Baton Rouge; that within a few weeks following the accident, plaintiff alleges that he reported the condition to Dr. Beam, the regularly retained physician of defendant, but that he did not make any claim for compensation at that time as he did not understand the nature and extent of his injury and did not know what the prognosis of his condition would be, and, in the meantime, he was receiving his full salary.

Defendant entered a general denial and particularly denied that plaintiff suffered any such injury or accident in its employ.

The case was duly tried and, without written reasons, the trial judge dismissed plaintiff's suit at his cost. Plaintiff has appealed from the judgment of the Lower Court.

Attorney for the plaintiff, in his brief, states: "The Trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to show as a cause for his condition an accident arising out of and within the scope of his employment."

Counsel for defendant, in their brief, state that: "In dismissing the suit, the trial judge, in his oral reasons for judgment, stated that plaintiff-appellant had not only failed to prove an accident but also that he had, by his own testimony, entirely disproved the occurrence of a compensatory *Page 70 accident and that the witnesses to whom he allegedly complained failed to corroborate any of his versions."

Both counsel for plaintiff and defendant, therefore, agree that the Trial Judge dismissed the plaintiff's suit for the reason that he had failed to prove an accident arising out of and within the scope of his employment. This is the main question in the case.

Counsel for plaintiff in his brief, page 2, made the following admission: "* * * Admittedly the plaintiff did not show a single accident that could have caused the ruptured disc * * *."

Again on page 9 of plaintiff's brief, he states: "Plaintiff did manifest confusion as to dates, and it is otherwise evident that there is nothing in the record that would justify this court in saying that any single accident produced his condition."

It is, therefore, unnecessary to discuss the testimony as to the alleged accident on or about January 10, 1945. Plaintiff contends that, taking all the testimony in the case, it conclusively shows that plaintiff's injury was caused by a series of strains or repeated injuries which were caused by the nature of the duties he was required to perform for the defendant and that, therefore, plaintiff's condition was due to an accident arising out of and within the scope of his employment, within the intent and meaning of the compensation laws.

The facts disclosed by the record in this case showed that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant on January 11, 1940; that he remained in their employ until September, 1945, doing rather heavy manual work, but experienced no difficulty in performing his duties until approximately the middle of 1944. Plaintiff was employed on the fourth floor in the lead building as a laborer by the defendant. After approximately one year six months, plaintiff then went to work on the third floor, which is known as the "still floor", where, he testified, that when things were running good it was easy but that when things did go wrong it would necessarily make the work harder. In the process of this work, each still had a manhole on top of it with a lid on it that was held down by eight bolts and nuts. It was necessary to unscrew these nuts on the bolts and pull the lid up in order to look into the still to see that it was clean and ready to re-charge, and, further, at times the alloy would come into the still so fast that the agitator in the still would not work and it would then be necessary to chip this alloy out by hand with a chisel about twelve feet long. During this period of plaintiff's employment, he stated that a line (which he called the "sludge line") would get blocked up and that this would require quite a bit of heavy work as it would be necessary to take a sledge hammer and beat on the line and, if this didn't unstop the line, sometimes he would have to take a section of the line apart and chip it out, all of which, plaintiff testified, required heavy manual labor.

Plaintiff continued to work on the third floor performing manual labor for about two years and then went to the fifth floor in the same building. This work was not so hard but plaintiff was required to pull what is referred to as a hopper, which plaintiff described as being a device that sits on four legs, about three and one half feet in diameter and about three feet in depth. Each hopper weighed 4,250 pounds gross. They are pulled by means of a hydraulic jack or hopper truck. This hopper truck is on four wheels, each wheel being about ten inches in diameter with hard rubber tires, and the truck is run under the hopper and when you push the hopper truck handle down, it raises the hopper off the floor; in other words, it works like a hydraulic jack for an automobile. Plaintiff testified that starting and stopping these hoppers required considerable strength and at times, the employee would have to strain.

After six or eight months on the fifth floor, plaintiff was put to work in the chloride bulk storage. At the chloride bulk storage there were sixteen chloride tanks and when plaintiff came to work he would check all sixteen tanks, and, in doing this, he had to climb a ladder on each tank. At the end of his work period he had to repeat the same climbing process. On this particular job, he was also required to carry acetone which, he stated, would be carried about three hundred yards in two *Page 71 five-gallon cans. The company asked that they carry one five-gallon can but the men usually carried two at a time, and would make such a trip every three or four hours. These five-gallon cans of acetone would weigh about 40 pounds each. Plaintiff did not have any difficulty performing the labor in the chloride bulk storage plant. After eight months of work in the bulk storage plant, he went to work in the wash room some time after September, 1944.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
37 So. 2d 68, 1948 La. App. LEXIS 581, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/york-v-e-i-du-pont-de-nemours-co-lactapp-1948.