Yolani Castillo v. Radames Antonio Camacho Aldahondo

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: June 27, 2025
• Docket: 6D2023-1694
• Status: Published

Opinion

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________

Case No. 6D2023-1694 Lower Tribunal No. 2022-CC-016873-O _____________________________

YOLANI CASTILLO,

Appellant,

v.

RADAMES ANTONIO CAMACHO ALDAHONDO,

Appellee. _____________________________

Appeal from the County Court for Orange County. Andrew L. Cameron, Judge.

June 27, 2025 GANNAM, J.

Yolani Castillo and Radames Antonio Camacho Aldahondo shared a home

that Camacho 1 owned. Castillo obtained a temporary domestic violence injunction

against Camacho in the circuit court, which awarded Castillo temporary, exclusive

possession of the home. Camacho stipulated to an extension of the temporary

injunction pending a full hearing on Castillo’s injunction petition. In the meantime,

however, Camacho filed a county court eviction action to obtain possession of the

1 Both parties refer to Appellee as Mr. Camacho. home. Castillo appeals the county court’s final judgment granting Camacho

possession while the circuit court injunction was in effect, following the county

court’s conclusion that it had exclusive jurisdiction over eviction matters. Because

the county court did not have jurisdiction to award possession to Camacho contrary

to the circuit court’s domestic violence injunction, we reverse.

When Camacho filed his eviction action, Castillo was in possession of the

home under both a verbal month-to-month rental agreement, which Camacho claims

he terminated, and the temporary domestic violence injunction entered by the circuit

court. As pleaded by Camacho in the eviction action, section 83.59, Florida Statutes

(2022), authorizes the county court to grant possession of a dwelling to a landlord

when the tenant does not vacate the dwelling upon termination of the rental

agreement. As pleaded by Castillo in defense, however, section 741.30 authorizes

the circuit court to award a petitioner who is a victim or in danger of domestic

violence at the hands of a respondent exclusive use and possession of a dwelling

they share. § 741.30(5)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2022). Section 83.59 contains no exception

for a tenant who obtains a domestic violence injunction against the landlord, and

section 741.30 contains no exception for a respondent and petitioner who are

landlord and tenant. In the absence of a textual tiebreaker, who decides?

The county court was correct in deciding that it had “exclusive jurisdiction

over eviction matters,” but only partially. The county court’s “exclusive jurisdiction

2 of proceedings relating to the right of possession of real property” under section

34.011(2), Florida Statutes (2022), is subject to several exceptions where the right

of possession relates to an amount in controversy or specific subject matter within

the jurisdiction of the circuit court under section 26.012. 2 And the Legislature

created another exception to county courts’ “exclusive” jurisdiction over possession

proceedings by vesting only circuit courts with jurisdiction to issue domestic

violence injunctions, including injunctions awarding a petitioner exclusive

possession of a dwelling shared with a respondent. See § 741.30(1)(a), Fla. Stat.

(“Any . . . victim of domestic violence . . . or [person] in imminent danger of

becoming the victim of any act of domestic violence, has standing in the circuit court

to file a verified petition for an injunction for protection against domestic

violence.”); § 741.30(5)(a)2. (“[T]he court may grant a temporary injunction ex

parte, pending a full hearing . . . [a]warding to the petitioner the temporary exclusive

use and possession of the dwelling that the parties share . . . .”);

§ 741.30(6)(a)2. (“Upon notice and hearing . . . the court may grant such relief as

2 See § 34.011(2) (“[T]he circuit court also has jurisdiction if the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the county court or the circuit court otherwise has jurisdiction as provided in s. 26.012.”); see also, e.g., § 26.012(2)(f), (g), Fla. Stat. (2022) (vesting circuit courts with “exclusive original jurisdiction” in “actions of ejectment” and in “all actions involving the title . . . of real property.”); Toledo v. Escamilla, 962 So. 2d 1028, 1030 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (“[W]hen Ms. Toledo asserted in her answer that she was not a tenant and that she had an equitable interest in the property, ejectment, not eviction, was the proper remedy, and the matter should have been transferred to the circuit court.”).

3 the court deems proper, including an injunction . . . [a]warding to the petitioner the

temporary exclusive use and possession of the dwelling that the parties share . . .

.”). 3 And the circuit court, alone, has jurisdiction to enforce, modify, or dissolve

domestic violence injunctions. See § 741.30(9)(a) (“The court may enforce a

violation of an injunction for protection against domestic violence through a civil or

criminal contempt proceeding . . . .”); § 741.30(10) (“The petitioner or the

respondent may move the court to modify or dissolve an injunction at any time.”).

Thus, the county court had jurisdiction to adjudicate Camacho’s and Castillo’s

respective rights of possession of the home under section 83.59 only to the extent

such rights derived from a rental agreement and its termination. The court did not

have jurisdiction to adjudicate their respective rights of possession to the extent those

rights derived from a domestic violence injunction under section 741.30, the

issuance, enforcement, modification, and dissolution of which are within the circuit

court’s exclusive jurisdiction. Camacho was entitled to a full hearing in the circuit

3 The Legislature has constitutional authority to create statutory causes of action for injunction and to vest jurisdiction over such actions in the circuit court. See Cowan v. Skinner, 42 So. 730, 732 (Fla. 1907) (“It is competent for the Legislature to give a new right to an injunction . . . .”); Art. V, § 5(b), Fla. Const. (“The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction not vested in the county courts . . . .”); Art. V, § 6(b), Fla. Const. (“The county courts shall exercise the jurisdiction prescribed by general law.”); Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enters., Inc., 641 So. 2d 858, 861 (Fla. 1994) (“Absent a constitutional prohibition or restriction, the legislature is free to vest courts with exclusive, concurrent, original, appellate, or final jurisdiction.”).

4 court on Castillo’s injunction petition, where he could have challenged Castillo’s

possessory rights under the temporary injunction. See § 741.30(5)(c), Fla. Stat.

Instead, Camacho agreed to continue the circuit court hearing, which extended the

temporary injunction, see id., and sought to obtain possession by county court

eviction. But the county court did not have jurisdiction to modify Castillo’s

possessory rights awarded in the circuit court injunction. Thus, it was error for the

county court to dispossess Castillo of the home while the injunction was still in

effect.

We reverse the final judgment for possession and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 4

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions.

WOZNIAK and BROWNLEE, JJ., concur.

Adam H. Sudbury, of Apellie Legal, Orlando, for Appellant.

Radames Antonio Camacho Aldahondo, Orlando, pro se.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED

4 Camacho pleaded only an action for possession in his complaint. We do not decide what remedy besides possession the county court could have granted under chapter 83, if pleaded, while the section 741.30 domestic violence injunction was in effect.