Yolanda Navarro Flores v. Advanced Management Systems, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 6, 2004
• Docket: 01-02-01197-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued May 6, 2004

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-02-01197-CV

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YOLANDA NAVARRO FLORES, Appellant

V.

MARK T. SANDOVAL, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 10th District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 00CV0549

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Appellant Yolanda Flores contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss appellee Mark Sandoval’s claims without prejudice, pursuant to a non-suit. We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction and therefore affirm.

Facts

          In August 2001, Sandoval asserted a claim for attorney’s fees through a petition in intervention in a pending lawsuit. In the petition, he sought to enforce an alleged fee agreement that he entered into with Flores concerning the representation of the plaintiff in the lawsuit. Shortly after Sandoval filed his petition, all of the parties to the underlying lawsuit – except Sandoval – filed a “Final Agreed Judgment,” which the trial court signed on August 14, 2001. The judgment did not address Sandoval’s intervention, nor did it purport to dispose of all claims and all parties to the lawsuit. Sandoval did not file a motion for new trial, and did not appeal the agreed judgment. The court clerk administratively closed the file.

          A year later, Sandoval moved to reinstate the case for trial and to issue a scheduling order. In addition, in September 2002, Sandoval filed an amended petition in intervention in which he sought affirmative relief against both Flores and the parties to the agreed judgment. In response, Flores contended that the trial court’s plenary power had expired the previous year. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a, 329b; Tex. R. App. P. 26.1. Sandoval then filed a notice of non-suit without prejudice, coupled with a proposed order. The trial court signed Sandoval’s proposed order, from which Flores appeals.

StandingSandoval contends that Flores lacks standing to appeal because she was not a party to the 2001 agreed judgment. Sandoval, however, sued Flores as a party and named her as a defendant in his amended petition in intervention. Flores does not seek relief from the trial court’s 2001 judgment, but rather complains that – after Sandoval sued her and she appeared – the trial court signed an order after its plenary power had expired. If a trial court improperly acts after the expiration of its plenary power, then a party has standing on appeal to complain of the issue, or if necessary, to seek mandamus relief. Moore Landrey, L.L.P. v. Hirsch & Westheimer, P.C., 126 S.W.3d 536, 543 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (Although party affected by void order need not appeal to set void order aside, if appeal is taken, court of appeals authorized to declare order signed by trial court void); Estate of Howley v. Haberman, 878 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Tex. 1994) (mandamus). We therefore conclude that Flores has standing and address the merit of her claim.

Finality of the “Final Agreed Judgment”

          In general, an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment; that is, a judgment that disposes of all pending parties and claims. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192 (Tex. 2001). The intent to finally dispose of the case must be unequivocally expressed in the words of the judgment. Id. at 200. If that intent is clearly expressed in the judgment, it is final and appealable, even if the record does not provide an adequate basis for rendition of judgment. Id. In determining whether the trial court intended to render a judgment disposing of all pending claims and parties, we may also look to the record from the trial court, “aided on occasion by the conduct of the parties.” Id. at 203.

          Flores contends that the judgment here is final because it is entitled “Final Agreed Judgment,” and recites at its conclusion that “This is a FINAL JUDGMENT.” (Emphasis in original). Flores further relies upon the following language:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the court that any and all cross claims and third-party claims, including but not limited to any and all claims for contribution and indemnity which were or could be asserted or could have been asserted herein are dismissed with prejudice to refiling.

(Emphasis added).

          In contrast, Sandoval relies both on Lehmann and on Guajardo v. Conwell, 46 S.W.3d 862, 864 (Tex. 2001), to contend that the agreed final judgment neither actually disposed of every pending claim and party, nor did it purport to be a final judgment as to “all claims and all parties.”

          We agree. Absent a conventional trial on the merits, a judgment is final if the judgment states that it actually disposes of all claims and parties, or if the record evidences the intent that the judgment dispose of all claims and all parties. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192; Conwell, 46 S.W.3d at 863–64. In Lehmann, the Texas Supreme Court held that a final judgment is not required to be in any particular form, and that whether a judicial decree constitutes a final judgment must be determined from its language and the record in the case. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195.

          The agreed final judgment in this case includes language that indicates finality as to the parties to it. The parties in agreement, however, did not include all of the parties to the case. Nor does the judgment purport to dispose of all parties and all claims, but instead disposes only the agreeing parties’ claims, cross-claims, and third party claims. Sandoval’s petition in intervention fits within none of these categories. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 60, 61. Moreover, as the trial court signed this judgment pursuant to a settlement agreement, absent Sandoval’s agreement, the judgment cannot be construed to apply to him. Cary v. Cary, 894 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (“It has long been the law of this state that a court cannot render a valid consent judgment unless at the time of rendition, all parties consent to the agreement underlying the judgment.”); See also Burnaman v. Heaton, 150 Tex. 333, 338, 240 S.W.2d 288, 291 (1951).

          The record in this case supports the interlocutory nature of the agreed judgment. It does not show that the trial court even was aware that Sandoval had intervened in the ongoing lawsuit two weeks before it signed the agreed judgment. The parties to the judgment did not bring Sandoval’s claim in intervention to the attention of the trial court, and the judgment neither expressly nor impliedly refers to his claim. Thus, the parties gave no indication that they intended to dismiss Sandoval’s intervention – and could not do so, by agreement, absent his consent. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 203 (determining whether trial court intended to render a judgment disposing of all pending claims and parties, court may be aided by conduct of the parties). Based on the language of the judgment and the record presented, we hold that the judgment was not final with respect to Sandoval’s claim. Thus, the trial court had jurisdiction over the remaining piece of the pending case at the time it signed the non-suit order.

Conclusion

          The trial court had jurisdiction over the case when it signed the non-suit order dismissing Sandoval’s intervention without prejudice. We therefore affirm the dismissal order.

                                                             Jane Bland

                                                             Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Alcala and Bland.