NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0779-24
YOJAYRA MORILLO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CARLOS BORRERO, a/k/a CARLOS BORERO,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Submitted December 16, 2025 – Decided December 31, 2025
Before Judges Chase and Augostini.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. DC-014725-23.
Kristina Bergsten (The Animal Law Firm) attorney for appellant.
Cohen Law NJ, PC, attorneys for respondent (Leonard B. Cohen, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Plaintiff Carlos Borrero appeals from an October 23, 2024 Special Civil
Part order denying his motion to reopen his case after final judgment. We
affirm.
I.
The underlying dispute before us concerns the custody of Luna, a dog
purchased in 2018 by Borrero, who asserts that he did not gift Luna to defendant
Yojayra Morillo. After the couple separated in January 2022, they initially
agreed to share Luna, alternating custody each week. This arrangement broke
down after Morillo secured a job in Massachusetts and Borrero refused to
continue sharing custody, expressing concerns about Luna's adjustment to
different environments.
In October 2023, Morillo filed several pleadings to repossess Luna
including a verified complaint for wrongful distraint, seeking return of personal
property and restraints; an order to show cause for return of personal property
and restraints with a certification to support; a verified complaint to restore
plaintiff to possession of premises and other relief; an order to show cause for
return to premises with restraints; and a certification in support of the order to
show cause along with an exhibit of a certificate of Luna's rabies certificate.
A-0779-24 2 After Borrero filed a response claiming that he did not gift Luna to
Morillo, the Special Civil Part held a summary hearing in November 2023.
Having received evidence and the testimony of both sides, the court ordered
joint custody to be exercised by a transfer every three months.
Borrero filed a motion to amend the judgment. This motion was denied
because Borrero failed to serve Morillo. In February 2024, Borrero filed a
motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied in March after the
parties had an opportunity to be heard. In June, Morillo filed a motion to enforce
litigants' rights, which was granted. The order included a daytime warrant for
Borrero's arrest.
In August, Borrero filed a "Motion to Reopen the Case." Morillo then
filed a cross-motion. On September 27, 2024, the court denied Borrero's motion
to reopen. On the same date, the court granted Morillo's cross-motion, ordering
Borrero to transfer custody of Luna to Morillo and for the Essex County Sheriff's
Office, or any other law enforcement agency, to execute the warrant issued by
the court on May 28, 2024. Each of these orders were filed by the court on
October 23, 2024.
This appeal followed.
A-0779-24 3 II.
We review a motion to vacate final judgment under Rule 4:50-1 for an
abuse of discretion. 257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Roberto, 259 N.J. 417,
436 (2025); BV001 REO Blocker, LLC v. 53 W. Somerset St. Props., LLC, 467
N.J. Super. 117, 124 (App. Div. 2021). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the
trial court's decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably
departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. '"
Savage v. Township of Neptune, 472 N.J. Super. 291, 313 (App. Div. 2022),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 257 N.J. 204 (2024) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty.
Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)). "When examining a trial court's exercise
of discretionary authority, we reverse only when the exercise of discretion was
'manifestly unjust' under the circumstances." Newark Morning Ledger Co. v.
N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App. Div. 2011)
(quoting Union Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J. Super. 141,
149 (App. Div. 2007)).
Rule 4:50-1 is "designed to reconcile the strong interests in finality of
judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should
have authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case." Mancini v. EDS,
132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993) (quoting Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 392
A-0779-24 4 (1984)). "[T]he rule is a carefully crafted vehicle intended to underscore the
need for repose while achieving a just result." D.M.C. v. K.H.G., 471 N.J.
Super. 10, 26 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting DEG, LLC v. Township of Fairfield,
198 N.J. 242, 261 (2009)).
"Rule 4:50-1 provides for relief from a judgment [or order] in six
enumerated circumstances[,]" Ibid. (quoting In re Est. of Schifftner, 385 N.J.
Super. 37, 41 (App. Div. 2006)), and provides:
On motion, with briefs, and upon such terms as are just, the [judge] may relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a final judgment or order for the following reasons: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence which would probably alter the judgment or order and which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under R[ule] 4:49; (c) fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the judgment or order is void; (e) the judgment or order has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or order should have prospective application; or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.
[Rule 4:50-1.]
A-0779-24 5 Equitable principles should guide the court's analysis regardless of the
subsection. MTAG v. Tao Invs., LLC, 476 N.J. Super. 324, 333 (App. Div.
2023) (quoting F.B. v. A.L.G., 176 N.J. 201, 207 (2003)).
III.
Preliminarily, we note that Borrero only appeals from the October 23,
2024 orders denying his motion to reopen. "[I]t is only the judgments or orders
or parts thereof designated in the notice of appeal which are subject to the appeal
process and review." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 6.1
on R. 2:5-1 (2025); see also Campagna ex rel. Greco v. American Cyanamid
Co., 337 N.J. Super. 530, 550 (App. Div. 2001) (refusing to consider an order
not listed in the notice of appeal). Although Borrero raises several arguments
regarding the November 2023 summary hearing, March 2024 motion for
reconsideration, and June 2024 motion to enforce litigants' rights, these claims
are each time-barred because the forty-five-day period to appeal under Rule 2:4-
1(a) has passed. Consequently, we only address Borrero's challenge that the
court erred in declining to reopen the matter.
Borrero asserts that his motion to reopen should have been granted under
Rule 4:50(a), (d), and (f). Although not a model of clarity, Borrero's argument
rests on the notion that he was denied due process.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0779-24
YOJAYRA MORILLO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CARLOS BORRERO, a/k/a CARLOS BORERO,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Submitted December 16, 2025 – Decided December 31, 2025
Before Judges Chase and Augostini.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. DC-014725-23.
Kristina Bergsten (The Animal Law Firm) attorney for appellant.
Cohen Law NJ, PC, attorneys for respondent (Leonard B. Cohen, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Plaintiff Carlos Borrero appeals from an October 23, 2024 Special Civil
Part order denying his motion to reopen his case after final judgment. We
affirm.
I.
The underlying dispute before us concerns the custody of Luna, a dog
purchased in 2018 by Borrero, who asserts that he did not gift Luna to defendant
Yojayra Morillo. After the couple separated in January 2022, they initially
agreed to share Luna, alternating custody each week. This arrangement broke
down after Morillo secured a job in Massachusetts and Borrero refused to
continue sharing custody, expressing concerns about Luna's adjustment to
different environments.
In October 2023, Morillo filed several pleadings to repossess Luna
including a verified complaint for wrongful distraint, seeking return of personal
property and restraints; an order to show cause for return of personal property
and restraints with a certification to support; a verified complaint to restore
plaintiff to possession of premises and other relief; an order to show cause for
return to premises with restraints; and a certification in support of the order to
show cause along with an exhibit of a certificate of Luna's rabies certificate.
A-0779-24 2 After Borrero filed a response claiming that he did not gift Luna to
Morillo, the Special Civil Part held a summary hearing in November 2023.
Having received evidence and the testimony of both sides, the court ordered
joint custody to be exercised by a transfer every three months.
Borrero filed a motion to amend the judgment. This motion was denied
because Borrero failed to serve Morillo. In February 2024, Borrero filed a
motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied in March after the
parties had an opportunity to be heard. In June, Morillo filed a motion to enforce
litigants' rights, which was granted. The order included a daytime warrant for
Borrero's arrest.
In August, Borrero filed a "Motion to Reopen the Case." Morillo then
filed a cross-motion. On September 27, 2024, the court denied Borrero's motion
to reopen. On the same date, the court granted Morillo's cross-motion, ordering
Borrero to transfer custody of Luna to Morillo and for the Essex County Sheriff's
Office, or any other law enforcement agency, to execute the warrant issued by
the court on May 28, 2024. Each of these orders were filed by the court on
October 23, 2024.
This appeal followed.
A-0779-24 3 II.
We review a motion to vacate final judgment under Rule 4:50-1 for an
abuse of discretion. 257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Roberto, 259 N.J. 417,
436 (2025); BV001 REO Blocker, LLC v. 53 W. Somerset St. Props., LLC, 467
N.J. Super. 117, 124 (App. Div. 2021). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the
trial court's decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably
departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis. '"
Savage v. Township of Neptune, 472 N.J. Super. 291, 313 (App. Div. 2022),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 257 N.J. 204 (2024) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty.
Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)). "When examining a trial court's exercise
of discretionary authority, we reverse only when the exercise of discretion was
'manifestly unjust' under the circumstances." Newark Morning Ledger Co. v.
N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 423 N.J. Super. 140, 174 (App. Div. 2011)
(quoting Union Cnty. Improvement Auth. v. Artaki, LLC, 392 N.J. Super. 141,
149 (App. Div. 2007)).
Rule 4:50-1 is "designed to reconcile the strong interests in finality of
judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should
have authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case." Mancini v. EDS,
132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993) (quoting Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 392
A-0779-24 4 (1984)). "[T]he rule is a carefully crafted vehicle intended to underscore the
need for repose while achieving a just result." D.M.C. v. K.H.G., 471 N.J.
Super. 10, 26 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting DEG, LLC v. Township of Fairfield,
198 N.J. 242, 261 (2009)).
"Rule 4:50-1 provides for relief from a judgment [or order] in six
enumerated circumstances[,]" Ibid. (quoting In re Est. of Schifftner, 385 N.J.
Super. 37, 41 (App. Div. 2006)), and provides:
On motion, with briefs, and upon such terms as are just, the [judge] may relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a final judgment or order for the following reasons: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence which would probably alter the judgment or order and which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under R[ule] 4:49; (c) fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the judgment or order is void; (e) the judgment or order has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or order should have prospective application; or (f) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.
[Rule 4:50-1.]
A-0779-24 5 Equitable principles should guide the court's analysis regardless of the
subsection. MTAG v. Tao Invs., LLC, 476 N.J. Super. 324, 333 (App. Div.
2023) (quoting F.B. v. A.L.G., 176 N.J. 201, 207 (2003)).
III.
Preliminarily, we note that Borrero only appeals from the October 23,
2024 orders denying his motion to reopen. "[I]t is only the judgments or orders
or parts thereof designated in the notice of appeal which are subject to the appeal
process and review." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 6.1
on R. 2:5-1 (2025); see also Campagna ex rel. Greco v. American Cyanamid
Co., 337 N.J. Super. 530, 550 (App. Div. 2001) (refusing to consider an order
not listed in the notice of appeal). Although Borrero raises several arguments
regarding the November 2023 summary hearing, March 2024 motion for
reconsideration, and June 2024 motion to enforce litigants' rights, these claims
are each time-barred because the forty-five-day period to appeal under Rule 2:4-
1(a) has passed. Consequently, we only address Borrero's challenge that the
court erred in declining to reopen the matter.
Borrero asserts that his motion to reopen should have been granted under
Rule 4:50(a), (d), and (f). Although not a model of clarity, Borrero's argument
rests on the notion that he was denied due process. We are not persuaded.
A-0779-24 6 "The United States Supreme Court has recognized the due process
guarantee expressed in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution includes 'the requirement of "fundamental fairness"' in a legal
proceeding." In re Adoption of Child ex rel. M.E.B., 444 N.J. Super. 83, 88
(App. Div. 2016). While the New Jersey Constitution "does not expressly refer
to the right to due process of law," the Supreme Court "has engrafted these
protections upon Article I, Paragraph 1 of the State Constitution, con cluding it
also 'protect[s] against injustice and, to that extent, protect[s] values like those
encompassed by the principle[s] of due process . . . .'" Ibid. (quoting Crespo v.
Crespo, 408 N.J. Super. 25, 34 (App. Div. 2009)) (third alteration in original).
The right to due process entitles a civil litigant to, inter alia, a fair hearing.
Ibid. "Fundamentally, due process requires [notice and] an opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Doe v. Poritz, 142
N.J. 1, 106 (1995). Ultimately, due process is a flexible concept that depends
upon the particular facts and circumstances of the case. Ibid.
Borrero's testimony was heard at the summary hearing in November 2023
and during his motion for reconsideration in March 2024. Furthermore, he had
the opportunity to appeal the respective decisions. In sum, he was afforded all
procedural due process to which he was entitled. There was no "mistake,
A-0779-24 7 inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" by the court, R. 4:50-1(a), and no
credible reason why this judgment would be void. R. 4:50-1(d).
Borrero also fails to show that relief is warranted pursuant to Rule 4:50-
1(f). Rule 4:50-1(f) relief is only granted when "truly exceptional circumstances
are present[.]" Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 395 (1984). Four factors are
to be considered in determining if exceptional circumstances warrant relief from
judgment: "(1) the extent of the delay [between dismissal of case and motion to
reopen], (2) the underlying reason or cause, (3) the fault or blamelessness of the
litigant, and (4) the prejudice, that would accrue to the other party." Jansson v.
Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 198 N.J. Super. 190, 195 (App. Div. 1985). Borrero
fails to show that any one of these factors exists. The trial court provided clear
reasoning regarding its denial of Borrero's motion to reopen and there has been
no abuse of discretion shown.
Lastly, Borrero's argument that he was unduly prejudiced by the trial
court's failure to timely file the September 2024 order until October 23, 2024, is
without merit. Time for Borrero to appeal began when the order was entered
into the docket rather than when the order was signed. Rule 2:4-1(a)'s plain
language is clear; the timeline for a party's appeal begins on the date of court's
entry of the order rather than the date that the order was written on. "[R]unning
A-0779-24 8 of the time periods prescribed by R. 2:4-1(a) for appeal . . . is expressly triggered
by the date the order is entered pursuant to Rule 4:47. [ ]Until an order—not a
decision nor an opinion nor any other indication of disposition—is entered,
neither time period starts to run." Beck v. Beck, 239 N.J. Super. 183, 189 (App.
Div 1990). Borrero has not shown any prejudice by the October filing of the
order from the end of September as his appeal has been addressed on the merits.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed any other contentions
raised by plaintiff, they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-0779-24 9