Yoel Gruen v. Ahuva Gruen

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: August 8, 2024
• Docket: 23-3080
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 23-3080 __________

YOEL GRUEN, Appellant

v.

AHUVA GRUEN; CIPORA WINTERS, Esq.; JUDGE LISA PUGLISI, J.S.C. ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 3-21-cv-17224) District Judge: Honorable Georgette Castner ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) August 6, 2024 Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 8, 2024) ___________

OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Pro se Appellant Yoel Gruen alleged in his amended complaint that Defendants

New Jersey Superior Court Judge Lisa Puglisi, Gruen’s ex-wife Ahuva Gruen, and her

attorney Cipora Winters “conspired together to deny [him] due process by having court

with [him] not being notified, [and] took everything [from him].” He further alleged that

the Defendants, along with other unnamed individuals, “conspired together to use

trickery tactics in the court system to deprive men of Custody, Livelihood and having

them falsely arrested . . . [and] to deny men of due process.” He also alleged that Judge

Puglisi “knowingly made a judgment against [him] while [he] was hospitalized, being

unable to attend,” and that the judgment gave “all that [he] owned” to his ex-wife. Along

with his amended complaint, Gruen filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”). The District Court granted Gruen’s IFP’s application and dismissed his

amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). This appeal followed.

As discussed herein, to the extent that we have subject matter jurisdiction, we

exercise it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox

Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 n.3 (3d. Cir. 2010). We exercise plenary review over

a district court’s dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Allah v.

Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). “We may affirm the district court on any

ground supported by the record.” Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir.

1999).

The District Court dismissed Gruen’s claims after citing to the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, which prevents parties from “complaining of injuries caused by state-court

judgments[,] rendered before the district court proceedings commenced[,] and inviting

2 district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of

State, 938 F.3d 453, 458 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). A finding of Rooker-Feldman applicability

divests the District Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the claims to which the

doctrine applies. See Great W. Mining & Min. Co., 615 F.3d at 165.

The District Court determined that: (1) Gruen’s alleged injuries arose out of a state

court judgment as he was asking for the Court to return assets and/or property seized as a

result of the judgment and (2) Gruen was asking the District Court to review and reject

the judgment. The District Court then concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

applied to Gruen’s case, and that it therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction. It further

concluded that, even were this not so, the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against

Judge Puglisi in her official capacity. For these reasons, the District Court dismissed

Gruen’s complaint with prejudice.

In his brief, Gruen does not present any new legal arguments, and instead merely

labels the District Court’s conclusions as “pure treason.” He also contends that he “is

entitled to this appeal due to the fact that the Superior Court of Ocean County as [sic] a

policy of denying men due process of law and favor woman [sic] over men in divorce

proceedings.”

Upon review, we concur with the District Court’s conclusion regarding Judge

Puglisi’s immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Maliandi v. Montclair State

Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 2016). As to the claims through which Gruen asked the

District Court to review and reject the state court judgment against him, the Rooker-

3 Feldman doctrine divested the District Court of jurisdiction. See Great W. Mining &

Min. Co., 615 F.3d at 165. However, Gruen’s conspiracy, fraud, denial of equal

protection, and denial of due process claims are independent of the state court judgment

and therefore lie outside of the purview of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 167–68,

172–73.

Reviewing these claims, we find that Gruen failed to present sufficient factual

matter to support them and therefore did not meet the requisite standard of plausibility.

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Since Gruen only provided bare assertions and conclusory

statements to support his claims, dismissal was warranted. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555–56. For the same reason, allowing for yet another amendment would be futile. See

Great W. Mining & Min. Co., 615 F.3d at 175.

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. We also deny

Gruen’s motion for default judgment.