Yoder v. Prince

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedJune 12, 2023
Docket3:22-cv-02004
StatusUnknown

This text of Yoder v. Prince (Yoder v. Prince) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Yoder v. Prince, (S.D. Ill. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

CHARLES DOUGLAS YODER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 22-cv-2004-NJR

PRINCE, JONATHAN WINTERS, OWENS, KIM JOHNSON, DANIEL MONTI, MARGARET MADOLE, ROB JEFFREYS, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATEWIDE COMMISSARY COMMITTEE,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge: Plaintiff Charles Douglas Yoder, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) who is currently incarcerated at Robinson Correctional Center, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivations of his constitutional rights while at Shawnee Correctional Center (“Shawnee”). In the Complaint, Yoder alleges he was denied access to a “body puff” in violation of his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Complaint

In his Complaint, Yoder makes the following allegations: On October 12, 2021, Yoder submitted a commissary order for numerous items including a “body puff” (Doc. 1, p. 4). The puff was advertised on the inmate commissary price list as being for sale to all inmates in general population (Id.). Yoder alleges that there is only one products list and that the prison does not have separate products list for certain groups of

individuals (Id.). On October 13, 2021, Yoder went to the commissary to pick up his order and noted that the order was missing some items, including the “body puff”. The commissary supervisor informed Yoder that the puff was only available for transgender inmates (Id. at p. 5). A commissary worker made a joke about the request and other inmates began calling Yoder names (Id.). Yoder alleges that the policy allowing only

transgendered individuals access to a “body puff” violates his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and amounts to gender and/or reverse discrimination (Id. at p. 7). He also alleges the policy violates several state-created rights. On October 14, 2021, Yoder submitted a grievance about the policy preventing him from obtaining a “body puff”. Counselor Jonathan Winters responded that the puff is

only approved for transgender individuals per guidelines set by the statewide commissary committee (Id. at p. 6). Grievance officer Kim Johnson, Chief Administrative Officer Monti, and Rob Jeffreys denied his grievance (Id.). Discussion

Simply put, Yoder fails to state any claim. An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Yoder alleges that Defendants violated his equal protection rights and that he was

subjected to sex discrimination. He alleges that he was discriminated against because he was not allowed to purchase a “body puff” because the puffs were only for transgendered inmates. To establish an equal protection discrimination claim, a plaintiff must “show that he is a member of a protected class, that he is otherwise similarly situated to members of the unprotected class, and that he was treated differently from members of the

unprotected class.” Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 916 (7th Cir. 2005). A “prison administrative decision may give rise to an equal protection claim only if the plaintiff can establish that ‘state officials had purposefully and intentionally discriminated against him.’” Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 415 n.7 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987) (citing Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1104 (7th Cir.1982)). To state a claim for

unconstitutional discrimination, the Complaint must suggest that a prison official “singled out a particular group for disparate treatment and selected his course of action at least in part for the purpose of causing its adverse effects on the identifiable group.” Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 453–54 (7th Cir. 1996) Yoder simply fails to state an equal protection claim. First, there is no constitutional right to purchase items (food or non-food) from a commissary at all. See

Brown v. Gulash, Case No. 07-cv-370-JPG, 2009 WL 2144592, at *5 (S.D. Ill. July 16, 2009) (collecting cases); see also Tokar v. Armontrout, 97 F.3d 1078, 1083 (8th Cir.1996) (“we know of no constitutional right of access to a prison gift or snack shop”). Further, he has not identified himself as part of a protected class and there are no allegations to suggest that the lack of access to a “body puff” constitutes disparate treatment. He also fails to allege that he was singled out for disparate treatment because of his membership in any

protected class. Although Yoder takes issue with the policy to only offer “body puffs” to transgender inmates, rather than general population inmates, there are simply no allegations to suggest that this decision was made for the purpose of discriminating against cisgender inmates. The Complaint also fails to state a class-of-one equal protection claim. To state such

a claim, an individual must allege that he was “intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Swanson v. Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 784–85 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)); Forgue v. City of Chicago, 873 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 2017). Even if access to a “body puff” could give rise to such a claim—an

assumption this Court is reluctant to entertain even for this hypothetical—Yoder must suggest that he is similarly situated to those at Shawnee who had access to a “body puff”. He has not alleged that similarly situated inmates had access to a “body puff”. In fact, he acknowledges that the “body puff” was only available to transgendered inmates and not the general population at Shawnee.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Lavarita D. Meriwether v. Gordon H. Faulkner
821 F.2d 408 (Seventh Circuit, 1987)
Rudolph Lucien v. Diane Jockisch
133 F.3d 464 (Seventh Circuit, 1998)
David Brown v. Timothy Budz
398 F.3d 904 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech
528 U.S. 562 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Karl Swanson v. Jerry Whitworth
719 F.3d 780 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Ronald Forgue v. City of Chicago
873 F.3d 962 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
Shango v. Jurich
681 F.2d 1091 (Seventh Circuit, 1982)

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