Yiwu Jieya E−Commerce Co. Ltd. v. Liang Xu et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: November 18, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01595
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 YIWU JIEYA E−COMMERCE CO. LTD., CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01595-LK 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 12 v. AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR ALTERNATIVE 13 LIANG XU et al., SERVICE 14 Defendants. 15

16 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Yiwu Jieya E-Commerce Co. Ltd.’s Motion 17 for Alternative Service. Dkt. No. 30. Defendants Liang Xu and JUDYBRIDAL have not responded 18 to the motion. For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion in part and denies it in part. 19 I. BACKGROUND 20 The Court adopts the factual background set forth in its September 29, 2025 Order, Dkt. 21 No. 25, with the additional relevant facts below. 22 Plaintiff filed its complaint in this case on August 20, 2025, Dkt. No. 1, followed by a 23 motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) on September 8, 2025, Dkt. No. 7. On 24 September 19, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO prohibiting Defendants from 1 submitting further infringement complaints to online platforms and ordering Defendants to retract 2 their prior patent infringement complaints against Plaintiff’s rotating desk organizers on the 3 Amazon platform. Dkt. No. 25 at 12. On October 3, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for 4 a preliminary injunction providing the same relief. Dkt. No. 29. This motion for alternative service

5 followed on October 23, 2025. Dkt. No. 30. 6 II. DISCUSSION 7 Plaintiff seeks an order authorizing alternative service of process via email on 8 Defendants—who are located in the People’s Republic of China—pursuant to Federal Rule of 9 Civil Procedure 4(f)(3) and 4(h)(2), or in the alternative, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 10 4(e)(1) and 4(h)(1)(A) “as incorporated through Washington Civil Rule 4(d)(4).” Id. at 1. Plaintiff 11 avers that service through email is warranted because (1) “[p]roceeding through the Hague 12 Convention would be unduly burdensome and time-consuming,” and (2) the email address at 13 which Plaintiff seeks to serve Defendants is “an effective channel of communication for both 14 Defendants,” as demonstrated by the fact that both Defendants appeared through counsel after

15 Plaintiff sent its TRO motion and supporting papers to that email address (i.e., 16 orientdress2014@hotmail.com, the email address identified in Amazon’s infringement notice as 17 the contact for “JUDYBRIDAL”). Id. Should the Court “decline to authorize” Plaintiff to serve 18 Xu at that address, Plaintiff proposes in the alternative to serve him through (1) the emails of 19 Defendants’ counsel of record or (2) the “addresses of record for the ’337 Patent, 20 services@hemisphere-law.com and us@hoyi-ip.com, as reflected in USPTO records.” Id. at 2. 21 Defendant Xu “is an individual residing in Jiangsu Province, People’s Republic of China,” 22 while Defendant JUDYBRIDAL “is an entity or alias name used in connection with the assertion 23 and enforcement of the ’337 Patent on the Amazon.com platform.” Dkt. No. 14 at 3–44; see also

24 1 Dkt. No. 23 at 1 (describing JUDYBRIDAL as an “Amazon.com storefront”).1 Federal Rule of 2 Civil Procedure Rule 4(f), which is directed to “serving an individual in a foreign country,” 3 provides that an individual “may be served at a place not within any judicial district of the United 4 States” in one of three ways:

5 (1) by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service 6 Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents; 7 (2) if there is no internationally agreed means, or if an international agreement allows but does not specify other means, by a method that is reasonably calculated 8 to give notice: 9 (A) as prescribed by the foreign country’s law for service in that country in an action in its courts of general jurisdiction; 10 (B) as the foreign authority directs in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request; or 11 (C) unless prohibited by the foreign country’s law, by: 12 (i) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the 13 individual personally; or 14 (ii) using any form of mail that the clerk addresses and sends to the individual and that requires a signed receipt; or 15 (3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders. 16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(2) provides that service on a foreign corporation, if done 17

18 1 Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) because (1) Plaintiff’s claim arises under federal law, (2) the record does not suggest that Defendants are subject to jurisdiction 19 in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction, and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process, as Defendants purposefully directed their activities at the United States by obtaining a United States patent and enforcing 20 the ensuing patent rights in this country through infringement complaints to Amazon. See Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com de Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285, 1293–94 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Campbell Pet Co. v. Miale, 542 F.3d 879, 886–87 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding jurisdiction over a patentee whose “extra-judicial patent enforcement”— 21 namely, enlisting a third party to remove defendant’s products from a trade show that was being held in the forum state—went beyond merely informing the defendant of its alleged infringement); Shenzhen Wanfan Tech. Co. v. 22 Orbital Structures Pty Ltd., No. 23-CV-02330, 2024 WL 325339, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2024) (foreign defendant had sufficient contacts with the United States under Rule 4(k)(2) through registering its patent here and making an 23 infringement complaint through Amazon, resulting in the takedown of plaintiff’s product listings); Genetic Veterinary Scis., Inc. v. LABOKLIN GmbH & Co. KG, 933 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“[Defendant]’s enforcement of a U.S. patent, as well as the interest of [plaintiff] in determining whether it could be potentially liable for infringement, 24 weigh in favor of finding jurisdiction reasonable”). 1 outside of the United States, shall be effected “in any manner prescribed by Rule 4(f) for serving 2 an individual, except personal delivery under [subsection] (f)(2)(C)(i)],” unless “federal law 3 provides otherwise[.]” Although a party is not required to attempt service by other methods before 4 petitioning the court for alternate service of process pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3), whether “the

5 particularities and necessities of a given case require alternate service of process under Rule 6 4(f)(3)” is “commit[ted] to the sound discretion of the district court[.]” Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l 7 Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002). 8 The Hague Convention applies in civil or commercial cases in which judicial or 9 extrajudicial documents are transmitted for service abroad. See Convention on the Service Abroad 10 of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (“Hague Convention”), 11 Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638. Under the Hague Convention, to which both 12 China and the United States are signatories, each member state provides a “central authority” that 13 is responsible for receiving and effecting service from abroad consistent with the member state’s 14 domestic policies. See HCCH, Status Table (Mar. 21, 2024), available at

15 https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=17 (last visited Nov. 17, 16 2025); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 698–99 (1988). 17 As relevant to JUDYBRIDAL, the Convention expressly does not apply “where the address 18 of the person to be served with the document is not known.” Hague Convention art. 1. The record 19 before the Court reflects that the only contact information available for JUDYBRIDAL is (1) the 20 email address listed on Amazon, Dkt. No. 7-13 at 2, and (2) JUDYBRIDAL’s United States 21 counsel’s information, Dkt. No. 23 at 10. Thus, the Hague Convention does not apply to that 22 Defendant, and service is proper under any subsection of Rule 4(f). Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1015 23 & n.4. This Court concludes that service upon United States counsel for JUDYBRIDAL—to the

24 extent it is an entity capable of being sued—at counsel’s physical addresses is appropriate under 1 Rule 4(f)(3). See id. at 1016 (“[T]rial courts have authorized a wide variety of alternative methods 2 of service including . . . delivery to the defendant’s attorney[.]”). This method of service of process 3 also comports with constitutional notions of due process because it is “reasonably calculated, under 4 all the circumstances, to apprise [the] interested part[y] of the pendency of the action and afford

5 [it] an opportunity to present [its] objections.” Id. at 1016–17 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover 6 Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). JUDYBRIDAL has appeared and submitted a brief 7 in this case through counsel located in both Washington and Illinois, and as required by the Local 8 Rules, counsel listed their addresses in their signature blocks and their CM/ECF information. See 9 LCR 10(f); see also, e.g., Dkt. No. 23 at 10. Service of JUDYBRIDAL’s counsel is reasonably 10 calculated to formally apprise JUDYBRIDAL of the action. See Eagles Nest Outfitters, Inc. v. 11 Taomore, Inc., No. CV 23-466-GW-EX, 2023 WL 11814256, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2023) 12 (finding that service of defendant who resided in China through counsel comported with due 13 process); Wang v. Ehang Holdings Ltd., No. 20-CV-00569-BLF, 2020 WL 11891323, at *4 (N.D. 14 Cal. June 29, 2020) (“The Court can reasonably infer that attorneys are likely to apprise their client

15 of this action because they hold themselves out as [defendant’s] agent or counsel on public 16 documents.”); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Jammin Java Corp., No. 2:15-cv-08921-SVW-MRW, 17 2016 WL 6650849, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2016) (service of a foreign defendant through 18 domestic counsel comported with due process where there was “sufficient evidence that 19 [defendant] [wa]s in contact with his U.S.-based counsel and [wa]s aware of the instant case”). 20 Therefore, Plaintiff may serve JUDYBRIDAL at its U.S.-based counsel’s physical addresses. 21 As relevant to Xu—whose address is known, see Dkt. No. 1 at 3—the Convention applies. 22 In contrast to JUDYBRIDAL, though, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that “the particularities and 23 necessities of [this] case require alternate service of process” for Xu under Rule 4(f)(3). Rio Props.,

24 284 F.3d at 1016. Plaintiff does not indicate that it has made any effort to serve Xu, instead 1 asserting in conclusory fashion—with no supporting facts or declaration as required by Local Civil 2 Rule 7(b)(1)—that service through the Hague Convention would be “unduly burdensome and 3 time-consuming.” Dkt. No. 30 at 4. Nor does Plaintiff show that other extenuating circumstances 4 warrant the Court’s intervention, such as evasion of service or a need for urgent service. See Rio

5 Props., 284 F.3d at 1015–16; see also, e.g., Akerson Enters. LLC v. Shenzhen Conglin E-Com. 6 Co., No. 24-CV-00506, 2024 WL 3510934, at *4 (W.D. Wash. July 23, 2024) (denying motion 7 for alternate service where movant “failed to demonstrate that the facts and circumstances of this 8 case warrant special service” and “the record suggest[ed] that [movant] ha[d] made no attempts to 9 serve Defendants through the Hague Convention or otherwise”); Rubie’s Costume Co., Inc. v. Yiwu 10 Hua Hao Toys Co., No. 2:18-CV-01530-RAJ, 2019 WL 6310564, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 25, 11 2019) (denying motion for alternative service on defendants “where Plaintiff ha[d] identified 12 physical addresses in China,” but had not attempted service or demonstrated that defendants were 13 “elusive or otherwise striving to evade service of process”).2 On this record, it appears that Plaintiff 14 “requests alternative service merely because it is easier and quicker than other means of service,

15 but the desire for expedience and efficiency alone is not sufficient to justify alternative service.” 16 Akerson Enters., 2024 WL 3510934, at *4 (citation modified); see also Molloy v. Triwin, Inc., No. 17 CV 23-4317-GW-ASX, 2023 WL 11979757, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2023) (“The Hague 18 Convention exists for a reason. If a plaintiff could avoid its effect simply because of an assertion— 19 justified or not—that service pursuant thereto would be impractical, expensive, or would take time, 20

2 The Court struck from the record Plaintiff’s “Request for Prompt Ruling on Pending Motion for Alternative Service, 21 or, in the alternative, Motion to Extend Service Deadline,” which incorrectly asserted that Plaintiff’s deadline to serve Defendants will expire on November 18, 2025. Dkt. No. 31 at 1. Despite Defendants’ appearance in this case, Dkt. 22 Nos. 17–19, Plaintiff improperly noted its motion for the same day. LCR 7(d)(1) (listing categories of motions for which same-day noting is permitted); see also LCR 7(j). Moreover, “a prompt ruling” is not a cognizable category of 23 relief. Finally, the Court notes that when defendants have no valid address for service in the United States and the plaintiff seeks to serve them pursuant to Rule 4(f), Rule 4(m)’s 90-day time limit for service does not apply. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (“This subdivision (m) does not apply to service in a foreign country under Rule 4(f), 4(h)(2), or 24 4(j)(1)[.]”); Lucas v. Natoli, 936 F.2d 432, 432–33 (9th Cir. 1991). 1 it would be little more than an internationally agreed-upon dead letter.”). Plaintiff’s motion for 2 alternative service upon Xu is accordingly denied. 3 III. CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion, Dkt. No. 30, is GRANTED IN PART and

5 DENIED IN PART as described above. Should Plaintiff renew its motion at a later date with 6 respect to Xu, it must demonstrate that service by alternate means is necessary and that its proposed 7 alternative form of service would be permitted under the Hague Convention or one of its 8 exceptions, and by other applicable law. See, e.g., Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1014–15 & n.4 (“A 9 federal court would be prohibited from issuing a Rule 4(f)(3) order in contravention of an 10 international agreement, including the Hague Convention referenced in Rule 4(f)(1).”). 11 Dated this 18th day of November, 2025. 12 A 13 Lauren King United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23