Yingfeng Miao v. Merrick Garland
This text of Yingfeng Miao v. Merrick Garland (Yingfeng Miao v. Merrick Garland) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 22 2022 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YINGFENG MIAO, No. 18-73309
Petitioner, Agency No. A087-718-853
v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted February 17, 2022** San Francisco, California
Before: McKEOWN and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT,*** District Judge.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation. Petitioner Yingfeng Miao (“Miao”) petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) dismissal of her appeal from an Immigration
Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
Miao entered the United States in 2009. She applied for asylum and was referred
to an Immigration Judge for adjudication in removal proceedings. The
proceedings were terminated after Miao married a United States citizen and her
husband’s I-130 visa petition was approved. In 2017, Miao was convicted of
engaging in money laundering. She was again placed in removal proceedings. In
these proceedings, Miao sought only relief under CAT.
The IJ denied relief on the ground that Miao was not credible. The IJ also
denied relief on the ground that, even if Miao were credible, she had not
sufficiently shown that “it is more likely than not that she would be tortured if
removed to the country of China” in the future. The BIA assumed without
deciding that Miao was credible. It nonetheless dismissed her appeal on the
ground that she had not shown a likelihood of torture.
We have jurisdiction to review Miao’s petition for review under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(1), and we review agency findings for substantial evidence. Iman v.
Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020).
2 Substantial evidence in the record supports the BIA’s determination that
Miao’s evidence, even if believed, does not support a likelihood that she will face
torture if returned to China. Miao testified that she had been subjected to a forced
abortion in China. However, China no longer has a one-child policy, and a
presumption of future torture does not arise based on past torture alone. See Konou
v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2014). Miao also testified that she fears
torture based on her Christian beliefs, but she presented insufficient evidence to
compel a conclusion that she would likely be tortured on that ground. See Guo v.
Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1217 (9th Cir. 2018).
PETITION DENIED.
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