Ying Li v. Holder

415 F. App'x 261
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedJanuary 31, 2011
DocketNo. 10-88-ag
StatusPublished

This text of 415 F. App'x 261 (Ying Li v. Holder) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ying Li v. Holder, 415 F. App'x 261 (2d Cir. 2011).

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner Ying Li, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a December 14, 2009 order of the BIA, affirming the January 22, 2008 decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Brigitte Laforest, which denied his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ying Li, No. A099 539 852 (B.I.A. Dec. 14, 2009), aff'g No. A099 539 852 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 22, 2008). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA’s decision. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well-established. See Salimatou Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir.2008); Shu Wen Sun v. BIA, 510 F.3d 377, 379-80 (2d Cir.2007). Where, as here, the application is governed by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on an asylum applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in his statements, without regard to whether “an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii); see also Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.2008); Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 260, 265 (BIA 2007). Here, we conclude that the agency’s adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence.

In finding Li not to be credible, the agency reasonably relied on several inconsistencies in his testimony. First, the agency noted that Li’s testimony was inconsistent with respect to whether he had reported to the police following his release from detention every month, as they had requested, or only once. Although Li, when questioned by the IJ as to this inconsistency, explained that he might not have heard or understood the question, the agency was entitled to disregard this explanation, as it would not necessarily be compelling to a reasonable factfinder. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that an agency need not credit an applicant’s explanations for inconsistent testimony unless those explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to do so). Although Li attempts to resolve this apparent discrepancy in a different way before this Court, arguing that the Chinese words for “awhile” and “once” are similar, we decline to address this argument because, as the Government points out, Li failed to raise it before the BIA. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 122 (2d Cir.2007).

Next, the agency noted discrepancies in Li’s testimony as to how he obtained his national identification card while in hiding. Li testified that he went into hiding in Shandong — which is a two-hour plane flight from his village — for three months, beginning in October 2005. He also testified that he had personally applied for his identification card at his local police station about a month before he obtained the card, which states that it is valid beginning on December 20, 2005. Thus, Li’s testimony that he obtained the card in November 2005 raised the question of how he could have applied for the card in person at his [263]*263local police station when he was ostensibly in hiding in Shandong during this time.

Contrary to Li’s argument that the IJ and the Government failed to “probe” for details with respect to this discrepancy, when the IJ questioned Li about this inconsistency, Li responded that a friend picked up the identification from the police station on his behalf, because Li was working as a cook in Fujian at the time. Then, when questioned by the Government’s counsel, Li indicated that he personally went to the police station to apply for the card, but was unable to explain how he applied for his card at his local police station given his prior testimony that he was in hiding in Shandong at the time. The agency properly referred to these discrepancies to support its adverse credibility finding. Moreover, as the BIA observed, Li’s responses when pressed on this apparent contradiction were themselves inconsistent, further supporting such a finding.1

In addition, the agency noted that although Li testified that the police had come to his house and questioned his mother as to his whereabouts five or six times after he fled his hometown, his mother failed to mention these visits in a letter she wrote in support of his claim. Although Li attributed the omission to his mother’s lack of education, the agency was not required to credit that explanation. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80-81. Moreover, contrary to Li’s assertion that the omission in his mother’s letter is not a proper basis for an adverse credibility determination, the agency did not err in relying, in part, on this ground. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 n. 3 (noting that an “omission in a document submitted to corroborate the applicant’s testimony, like a direct inconsistency ..., can serve as a proper basis for an adverse credibility determination”).

Finally, the agency noted that Li’s asylum application did not mention that he was in hiding for three months in Shan-dong, as he testified at the hearing. Although Li argues that he omitted this fact because three months is a short period of time, under the REAL ID Act, the agency did not err in basing its adverse credibility determination in part on this inconsistency, because the “totality of the circumstances” supported its finding. Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 166 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(l)(B)(iii) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In light of the agency’s reasonable adverse credibility finding, it did not err in denying Li’s applications for relief based on his Falun Gong claim. See id. at 167; Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the agency need not analyze separately a withholding of removal claim based on the same facts as an applicant’s asylum claim); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 523 (2d Cir.2005) (same, with respect to CAT).

Li also asserts before this Court that his asylum claim is based on his fear of sterilization. As he failed to raise this claim before the BIA, however, we decline to address the issue. See Lin Zhong, 480 [264]*264F.3d at 122.

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Related

Bah v. Mukasey
529 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2008)
Yan Chen v. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, 1
417 F.3d 268 (Second Circuit, 2005)
Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey
534 F.3d 162 (Second Circuit, 2008)
Shu Wen Sun v. Board of Immigration Appeals
510 F.3d 377 (Second Circuit, 2007)
J-Y-C
24 I. & N. Dec. 260 (Board of Immigration Appeals, 2007)
Mu-Xing Wang v. Ashcroft
320 F.3d 130 (Second Circuit, 2003)
Mu Xiang Lin v. United States Department of Justice
432 F.3d 156 (Second Circuit, 2005)

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Bluebook (online)
415 F. App'x 261, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ying-li-v-holder-ca2-2011.