Yihsing Tien aka Angela Tien v. United Airlines, Inc.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: February 2, 2026
• Docket: 4:23-cv-02622
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 YIHSING TIEN AKA ANGELA TIEN, Case No. 23-cv-02622-JSW

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 9 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

10 UNITED AIRLINES, INC., Re: Dkt. No. 74 Defendant. 11

12 13 This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of the motion for summary 14 judgment filed by Defendant United Airlines, Inc. (“United”). The Court has considered the 15 parties’ papers, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, and it HEREBY GRANTS 16 United’s motion. 17 BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiff Yihsing “Angela” Tien (“Ms. Tien”) claims that United violated her rights under 19 California’s Fair Housing and Employment Act (“FEHA”) by discriminating against her because 20 of a disability, by failing to reasonably accommodate her disability, and by failing to engage in the 21 good faith interactive process. She also claims United retaliated against her for taking leave under 22 the California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”).1 23 Ms. Tien worked for United as a flight attendant from June 6, 2013, to January 25, 2022. 24 (Declaration of Michelle Gehrke (“Gehrke Decl.”), ¶ 2, Ex. A (Deposition of Ms. Tien (“Tien 25

26 1 Ms. Tien also asserts a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, which 27 the parties agree is dependent upon her statutory claims. In light of the Court’s ruling on the statutory claims, United is entitled to summary judgment on this claim as well. 1 Depo.”), Vol. I at 39:3-11 & Tien Depo. Ex. 2 (Tien’s Employee Profile).)2 It is undisputed that 2 Ms. Tien was covered by a Joint Collective Bargaining Agreement (“JCBA”) between United and 3 the Association of Flight Attendants (“AFA”). (Gehrke Decl., Ex. A (Tien Depo. Vol. I at 35:23- 4 38:4, 109:10-19 & Tien Depo. Ex. 7 (JCBA).) 5 United’s flight attendants “are required to be able to perform a combination of physical 6 activities in the course of their work day,” including “standing, walking, climbing, stooping, 7 crouching, squatting, kneeling, reaching, twisting, and bending.” (Gehrke Decl., Ex. A (Tien 8 Depo. Vol. II at 372:11-25, Tien Depo. Ex. 5 (United Flight Attendant Job Description).)3 They 9 also are required to push or pull movable carts that can have an “initial push/pull” force of up to 10 45 pounds and frequently are required to “use force up to 25 lbs. to lift, push, or pull objects, such 11 as beverage stowage bins. … [and may be], required to use forces greater than 55 lbs. to lift, push, 12 or pull objects.” At times, these tasks “must be performed with the arms at or above shoulder 13 level.” (Id., Ex. A (Tien Depo. Ex. 5).) 14 On or around October 30, 2018, Ms. Tien injured “her knees, left elbow, left shoulder, and 15 left wrist” on a work trip. (Id., Ex. A (Tien Depo. Ex. 28 (Tien Resp. to Interrogatory No. 7).) 16 Neither party submitted any of Ms. Tien’s medical records, but Ms. Tien stated that she was 17 “restricted from crawling, bending over, bending at the knees, and heavy lifting.” (Id., Ex. A 18 (Tien Depo. Ex. 28 (Tien Resp. to Interrogatory No. 10).) Based on her injuries, Ms. Tien’s 19 doctors determined that she could not perform the duties required of a flight attendant. (Gehrke 20 2 Ms. Tien argues that neither she nor Robert Krabbe (“Mr. Krabbe”) authenticated exhibits 21 attached to their declarations, and she objects to Ms. Gehrke’s attestation that they did. The Court overrules that objection but will examine each exhibit to determine if it would be admissible at a 22 later stage of the litigation. Cf. Sandoval v. Cty. of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 2021) (“If the contents of a document can be presented in a form that would be admissible at trial—for 23 example, through live testimony by the author of the document—the mere fact that the document itself might be excludable hearsay provides no basis for refusing to consider it on summary 24 judgment.”). Ms. Tien also argues some evidence is irrelevant. Relevance objections “are generally unnecessary on summary judgment because they are duplicative of the summary 25 judgment standard itself.” Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 665 (cleaned up). Where the Court has relied on testimony or evidence to which any party raised a relevance objection, that objection is overruled. 26 Id.

27 3 Ms. Tien objects to Exhibit 5 on the basis that it lacks foundation, was not authenticated, is 1 Decl., Ex. A (Tien Depo. Vol. II at 372:19-23, 25; see also id. at 393:10-15 (testifying that flight 2 attendants were required to perform those duties if working on an airplane).) 3 Ms. Tien filed a worker’s compensation claim, which United accepted. Ms. Tien also used 4 some of her sick bank hours to obtain paid leave. (Gehrke Decl., Ex. A (Tien Depo. Vol. I at 76:1- 5 10, 77:3-25).) In January 2019, Ms. Tien requested a medical leave of absence, which United 6 granted. (Id., Ex. A (Tien Depo. Vol. I at 89:2-7, 313:25-314:6, Tien Depo. Vol. II at 380:19-25).) 7 On or about January 25, 2019, Ms. Tien received a letter from United in which it stated: 8 The purpose of this letter is to advise you that our records indicate you have been placed on a leave of absence effective 1/25/2019. If 9 you remain medically unable to return to work, in accordance with Section 15E of the Joint Collective Bargaining Agreement, you will 10 be administratively separated on 1/25/2023. 11 (Gehrke Decl., Ex. A (Tien Depo. Vol. I at 91:12-14 & Tien Depo. Ex. 6 (“Leave Letter”) 12 (emphasis in original).) 13 Section 15.E of the JCBA provides that: 14 1. Leaves of absence required due to illness or non-occupational injury shall be granted upon written verification of disability 15 from a qualified medical doctor. Any such leave may not exceed the lesser of: (a) The period of disability, or (b) Three (3) 16 years, or (c) The Flight Attendant’s total length of active service. 17 2. At the end of the maximum period, the Flight Attendant will be administratively terminated and removed from the System 18 Seniority List… 19 (JCBA, Section 15.E (emphasis added).) In August of 2017, the AFA and United agreed that 20 “occupational medical leaves are meant to be covered by the provisions of Section 15.E of the 21 [JCBA] (which governs non-occupational medical leaves), except that a Flight Attendants [sic] on 22 occupational medical leave will accrue vacation[.]” (Gehrke Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. B (Deposition of 23 Robert Krabbe (“Krabbe Depo.”) at 20:20-22:23, 49:20-50:17, & Krabbe Depo. Ex. 3).)4 24 Under the terms Section 15.E of the JCBA, the separation date cited in Ms. Tien’s Leave 25 Letter was incorrect. Although the employee who initially calculated Ms. Tien’s maximum leave 26

27 4 Ms. Tien objects to Krabbe Depo. Ex. 3 based on hearsay and foundation issues. The 1 date notified Ms. Tien’s base of the error, it is undisputed that United did not issue Ms. Tien a new 2 Leave Letter. (Declaration of Tessa King (“King Decl.”), ¶ 7, Ex. F (Deposition of Danelle Berry 3 at 11:15-12:20, 13:12-14:10, 17:23-19:3, 19:15-20:4, 21:18-22:4, 23:2-6, 23:23-24:18, 29:2-30:8, 4 30:21-31:1, & Berry Depo. Ex. 5.) 5 On January 27, 2022, United sent Ms. Tien a letter that stated: 6 This letter is regarding your inactive status with United Airlines. On September 29, 2016, you were sent a business letter indicating 7 changes to the leave of absence policy, including, but not limited to the maximum length of some leaves per the [JCBA]. The JCBA states 8 in relevant part: 9 [Section 15.E 1&2 quoted.] 10 Company records indicate that you have been off work non-paid since January 25, 2019. As indicated in the September 29, 2016 business 11 letter if you do not return to work prior to the expiration of your Medical leave, your employment with United Airlines will be 12 administratively terminated in accordance with Section 15.E.2. 13 You have exceeded the contractual inactive status effective January 24, 2022. Therefore you have been removed from the United Airlines 14 Flight Attendant System Seniority List in accordance with the [JCBA] and you have been released from your employment with United 15 Airlines effective, January 25, 2022. 16 (Gehrke Decl., Ex. A (Tien Depo. Vol. I at 198:4-13; Tien Depo. Ex. 11 (“Separation Letter”) 17 (emphasis in original)).) 18 Ms. Tien testified that she had not been cleared to return to work and had not asked to be 19 assigned another position at the time United terminated her. According to Ms. Tien, she did not 20 return to work because she relied on the fact that the Leave Letter stated she could remain on leave 21 until January 25, 2023. (Id., Ex. A (Tien Depo. Vol. I at 277:8-10).) After Ms. Tien learned 22 United terminated her employment, Ms. Tien wrote to Nancy Byun-Reidel and stated that “[h]ad I 23 been asked to return to work by January 25, 2022, I would have agreed. I can return to my 24 original position with some accommodation for my hand injury or to another position where I am 25 qualified.” (Id., Ex. A (Tien Depo. Vol. I at 85:3-7, 86:10-17, 223:2-3, 226:17-227:2; Tien Depo. 26 Vol. II at 444:19-22; Tien Depo. Ex. 16 (Email from Ms. Tien to Nancy Byun-Reidel dated 27 1 2/7/22)).)5 2 The Court will address additional facts in the analysis. 3 ANALYSIS 4 A. Applicable Legal Standards and Burdens of Proof. 5 “A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense … on which 6 summary judgment is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A principal purpose of the summary 7 judgment procedure is to identify and dispose of factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. 8 Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment, or partial summary judgment, is 9 proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 10 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court may not weigh evidence 11 or make determinations of credibility. Rather, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, 12 and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 13 242, 255 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying 14 those portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine 15 issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 16 An issue of fact is “genuine” only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder 17 to find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. A fact is “material” if it may 18 affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 248. If the party moving for summary judgment does not 19 have the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, that party must produce evidence which either 20 negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s claims or shows that the non-moving party 21 does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at 22 trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). 23 Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party must “identify with 24 reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 25 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). “A mere scintilla of evidence will not be sufficient to defeat a 26 5 Ms. Tien objects to Ms. Byun-Reidel’s response to Ms. Tien’s email and argues it is 27 hearsay, lacks foundation, and lacks authentication. The Court has not considered the first 1 properly supported motion for summary judgment; rather, the nonmoving party must introduce 2 some significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” Summers v. Teichert & 3 Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997) (cleaned up). If the non-moving party fails to point 4 to evidence precluding summary judgment, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 5 law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. 6 B. Ms. Tien’s Claims Are Not Entirely Preempted. 7 United argues that each of Ms. Tien’s claims is a “minor” dispute preempted by the 8 Railway Labor Act (“RLA”). “Congress’ purpose in passing the RLA was to promote stability in 9 labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for resolving labor 10 disputes.” Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994) (“Norris”). The RLA 11 creates a process for arbitrating two types of disputes: “major” and “minor.” Id. “Minor” disputes 12 are disputes about “duties and rights created or defined by” a collective bargaining agreement 13 (“CBA”). Alaska Airlines v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 919 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Norris, 512 U.S. 14 at 258). The Ninth Circuit has established a two-part test to determine if claims are preempted 15 under the RLA. First, the Court must “evaluate the legal character of the claim by asking whether 16 it seeks purely to vindicate a right or duty created by the CBA itself.” Schurke, 899 F.3d at 920- 17 21. If the answer to that question is yes, the claim is preempted. If the answer is no, the Court 18 evaluates whether the claim requires interpretation of the CBA, which means the Court must do 19 more than “consider, refer to, or apply” the CBA. Id. at 921 (cleaned up). If the Court must 20 interpret the CBA, the claim is preempted. 21 The RLA does not generally preempt claims under FEHA or under the CFRA “because the 22 right is defined and enforced under state law without reference to the terms of any collective 23 bargaining agreement.” Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 24 1989) (addressing preemption under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 25 (“LMRA”)); see also Quigley v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 21-cv-00538-WHO, 2021 WL 26 1176687, at *6-*7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2021) (noting discrimination and harassment claims 27 generally are not preempted because they are based on independent state law duties); Leaea v. 1 motion to dismiss concluding that claims for violation of FEHA and CFRA did not “seek to 2 vindicate a right that is purely created by the CBA” governing the plaintiff’s employment).6 3 The Court still is not persuaded by United’s argument that all of Ms. Tien’s claims arise 4 from or necessarily require the Court to interpret the JCBA. For example, the finder of fact would 5 not be required to interpret the JCBA to resolve the issue of whether United had a legitimate, non- 6 discriminatory reason to terminate Ms. Tien. See, e.g., Tanaka v. United Parcel Serv., No. 22-cv- 7 5476-TLT, 2024 WL 4993585, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2024) (finding defendant’s reliance on 8 the terms of a CBA sufficient to show non-pretextual reason for termination). Further, Ms. Tien 9 need not need to rely on the JCBA to demonstrate that United’s reason for terminating her was 10 pretextual. 11 However, Ms. Tien does argue that because she relied on the date in the Leave Letter, she 12 believed she did not need to return to work until January 25, 2023. (Gehrke Decl., Ex. A (Tien 13 Depo. Vol. I at 203:1-8); see also King Decl. Ex. A (Tien Depo. Vol. I at 215:1-11); King Decl., 14 Ex. B (Tien Depo. Vol. II at 424:6-425:4).) To the extent Ms. Tien argues that United should be 15 estopped from applying the terms of the JCBA to her or that Section 15.E does not apply to her, 16 claims based on those theories would seek to vindicate a right created by the JCBA or would 17 require the Court to interpret the JCBA. Cf. Audette v. Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s 18 Union, 195 F.3d 1107, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding promissory estoppel claim based on 19 alleged breach of a settlement agreement was preempted, where resolution of the claim would 20 require interpretation of CBA terms). 21 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS, IN PART, AND DENIES, IN PART, United’s motion 22 for summary judgment based on RLA preemption. 23 C. United Is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Ms. Tien’s Discrimination Claim. 24 FEHA prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee because of a physical 25 disability, unless “the employee … is unable to perform the employee’s essential duties even with 26

27 6 In Norris, the Supreme Court adopted the standard applicable to LMRA preemption “to 1 reasonable accommodations, or cannot perform those duties in a manner that would not endanger 2 the employee’s health or safety or the health or safety of others even with reasonable 3 accommodations.” Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a)(1). To prevail on this claim, Ms. Tien is required 4 to prove she “(1) suffered from a disability or was regarded as suffering from a disability, (2) 5 could perform the essential duties of a job with or without reasonable accommodations, and (3) 6 was subjected to an adverse employment action because of the disability or perceived disability.” 7 Glynn v. Sup. Ct. 42 Cal. App. 5th 47, 53, fn. 1 (2019). There is no dispute about the first element. 8 Ms. Tien relies on her termination and failure to reinstate her as adverse employment actions. 9 Although California “has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting test established by the 10 United States Supreme Court for trying claims of discrimination,” the Court does not 11 automatically apply that test in a claim for disability discrimination. Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 12 Cal. 4th 317, 364 (2000) (citing, inter alia, McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 13 (1973)); see also Glynn, 42 Cal. App. 5th at 53. That is because claims for disability 14 discrimination “often involve direct evidence of the role of the employee’s actual or perceived 15 disability in the employer’s decision to implement an adverse employment action.” Wallace v. 16 Cty. of Stanislaus, 245 Cal. App. 4th 109, 123 (2016). If there is no direct evidence of 17 discrimination, the Court applies the McDonnell- Douglas test. That test requires Ms. Tien to 18 establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifts to United to offer a 19 legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action. If United meets that burden, Ms. 20 Tien must show United’s proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination or that there is other 21 evidence to show its motive was discriminatory. See, e.g., Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 354-56. 22 United argues Ms. Tien fails to show that it terminated her because of a disability rather 23 than because of the terms of the JCBA. It also argues she has not put forth evidence that United 24 failed to reinstate her because of her disability. The Court agrees. United cites Tanaka for the 25 proposition that relying on the terms of a CBA is a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for 26 terminating employment. See Tanaka, 2024 WL 4993585, at *11. In Tanaka, the court denied 27 cross-motions for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim for disability discrimination, in part 1 duties with or without reasonable accommodations. Id. 2 The court also concluded that the defendant’s “own statements indicate that it placed [the 3 plaintiff] on leave because of his disability.” Id. United has not engaged with some of the 4 similarities between the facts in Tanaka and the facts in this case, but the Court concludes Tanaka 5 is distinguishable and does not dictate the outcome here. First, it is not clear that the plaintiff in 6 Tanaka asked to be placed on leave. Here, it is undisputed that Ms. Tien requested to be placed on 7 unpaid medical leave. Second, although the plaintiff in Tanaka attempted to return to work, he 8 was told to go home and told that he “would not be able to return until he was 100% healed.” Id., 9 at *3. There are no similar facts here. (King Decl., Ex. A (Tien Depo. Vol. I at 218:8-11).) 10 “[T]he great weight of federal and California authority holds that an employer is entitled to 11 summary judgment if, considering the employer’s innocent explanation for its actions, the 12 evidence as a whole is insufficient to permit a rational inference that the employer’s actual motive 13 was discriminatory.” Guz, 34 Cal. 4th at 361. Ms. Tien argues that Talia Espinoza and Nancy 14 Byun-Ridel made negative comments to her, but she has not cited any specific statements that are 15 discriminatory. After she was terminated, Ms. Tien wrote to a different union representative and 16 stated she thought United was trying to get rid of her because of her disability. She also testified 17 she had heard from other flight attendants that United “hate[s] employees who are on medical 18 leave” and testified that “other flight attendants complained they were given hard time because 19 they took medical leave.” (King Decl., Ex. A (Tien Depo. Vol. I at 217:10-24.) 20 Ms. Tien’s subjective beliefs are not sufficient to create disputed issues of material fact 21 about United’s motives for its decision to terminate her or for its reasons for not reinstating her. 22 See, e.g., Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028-29 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). 23 In February 2020, union representative Sheila Schultz advised Ms. Tien that she could “be on a 24 medical leave of absence for up to three years.” (Tien Depo. Ex. 18.) There, is no evidence that 25 United has made an exception to the terms of the JCBA for other disabled individuals or for non- 26 disabled individuals. Looking at the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Tien, the Court 27 concludes the record “as a whole is insufficient to permit a rational inference that” United’s 1 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS United’s motion for summary judgment on Ms. Tien’s 2 disability discrimination claim. 3 D. United Is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Ms. Tien’s Claims for Failure to Accommodate and Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process. 4 5 FEHA requires employers “to make reasonable accommodation for the known physical or 6 mental disability of an applicant or employee.” Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(m)(1). FEHA also 7 requires employers to “engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee … to 8 determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any….” Cal. Gov. Code § 12904(n). The 9 relevant regulations require an employer to start an interactive process when an “employee with a 10 known physical or mental disability or medical condition requests reasonable accommodations[.]” 11 Cal. Code Regs. § 11069(b). This good faith interactive process “requires communication and 12 good-faith exploration of possible accommodations between employers and individual 13 employees….” Humphrey v. Mem’l Hospitals Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001). 14 Whether an employer fails to provide reasonable accommodation or fails to engage in the 15 interactive process generally is a question of fact. See Wilson v. Cty. of Orange, 169 Cal. App. 4th 16 1185, 1193 (2009). 17 There is no evidence in the record that Ms. Tien asked for any accommodation other than 18 medical leave, and there is no dispute that United granted that request. The record shows United 19 asked Ms. Tien if she was interested in transferring to a different position, but Ms. Tien declined. 20 (Gehrke Decl., Ex. A (Tien Depo. Vol. I at 226:17-227:2, Tien Depo. Vol. II at 382:14-384:2, 21 385:15-24, 393:21-24; Tien Depo. Ex. 28 (Tien Resp. to Interrogatories 8-9.).) Taking all facts in 22 the light most favorable to Ms. Tien, the Court concludes no reasonable juror could find that 23 United failed to reasonably accommodate her disability. 24 The obligation to engage in the interactive or obligation to engage in the interactive 25 process is a continuing duty and “extends beyond the first attempt at an accommodation and 26 continues when the employee asks for a different accommodation or where the employer is aware 27 that the initial accommodation is failing and further accommodation is needed.” Humphrey, 239 1 plaintiff’s interactive process claim because the defendant reassigned him to a new position 2 without his input. There also was no evidence that the defendant considered the plaintiff’s 3 alternative requests for accommodation. The court also concluded there were disputed factual 4 questions about who bore responsibility for the breakdown of the interactive process. 2024 WL 5 4993585, at *8-10. 6 The Court again finds Tanaka distinguishable. As noted, there is no evidence in the record 7 that Ms. Tien asked United for an accommodation other than medical leave. There is no evidence 8 that Ms. Tien gave notice to United that she needed a different accommodation, which United then 9 ignored. While Ms. Tien was on leave, United continued to send her letters advising her that it 10 had a reasonable accommodation program. (See, e.g., Gehrke Decl., Ex. A (Tien Depo. Exs. 30- 11 31)7.) Ms. Tien argues that she had no reason to ask for another accommodation because she 12 relied on the date in the Leave Letter, which she argues United should have honored. For the 13 reasons discussed in Section B, a claim based on that theory is preempted. 14 The Court concludes Ms. Tien fails to meet her burden to show there are disputed issues of 15 fact that United failed to engage in or was responsible for any breakdown in the interactive 16 process. 17 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS United’s motion for summary judgment on these claims. 18 E. United Is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Ms. Tien’s CFRA Claim. 19 The CFRA makes it an “unlawful employment practice for any employer … to refuse to 20 grant a request by any employee with more than 12 months of service with the employer, and who 21 has at least 1,250 hours of service with the employer during the previous 12-month period … to 22 take up to a total of 12 workweeks in any 12-month period for family care and medical leave.” 23 Cal. Gov. Code § 12945.2(a). 24 Ms. Tien’s “only request for leave under CFRA was made in or around January 2019[.]” 25 (Gehrke Decl., Ex. A (Tien Depo. Vol. I, at 320:13-3219:19, Tien Depo. Ex. 28 (Tien Resp. to 26 Interrogatory No. 11).) United did not terminate Ms. Tien until 2022. Based on the lack of 27 ] temporal proximity between her request for medical leave and her termination and based on the 2 || statutory duration of CFRA leave, the Court concludes no reasonable juror could find that United 3 || terminated Ms. Tien because she exercised her right to take CFRA leave. Cf Kadiyan v. 4 || Medtronic, No. CV 10-05921 MMM (MANx), 2011 WL 13142145, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 5 || 2011) (‘The Ninth Circuit has held that periods as short as four months are too attenuated to prove 6 || causation for purposes of the prima facie case.”’) (citing cases), aff'd sub nom. Kadiyan v. 7 || Medtronic, Inc., 510 Fed. Appx. 649 (9th Cir. 2013). 8 CONCLUSION 9 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS United’s motion for summary judgment. 10 || The Court shall enter a separate judgment, and the Clerk shall close this file. 1] IT IS SO ORDERED. a | «3 12 || Dated: February 2, 2026 f i f Nite | JEEFREY $. WHIT; 14 Uplted flalesDis ct Judge

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