NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 21 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YEVGENIY V. SIDOROV, No. 18-16876
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00002-KJM-DB v.
TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE MEMORANDUM* COMPANY, FKA Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company; TRANSAMERICA OCCIDENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Kimberly J. Mueller, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 19, 2020** San Francisco, California
Before: HAWKINS, N.R. SMITH, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Yevgeniy Sidorov brings a host of claims against Transamerica Life
Insurance Co. (TLIC) for its conduct in managing a life insurance policy for
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Sidorov’s mother before and after she was murdered by his stepfather. However,
his substantive claims are all barred by res judicata or failure to file within the
statutes of limitations, and his claim for declaratory relief was based on those
barred claims. Therefore, we will affirm the district court’s order granting TLIC’s
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.1
We review de novo rulings on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Coto Settlement v.
Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2010). We will reverse a 12(b)(6)
dismissal only “if, taking all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, [the
complaint] contains enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
1. Res judicata bars Sidorov’s claims for breach of contract and breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing insofar as they are based on
allegations of delay or underpayment of insurance proceeds. The doctrine “applies
when [an] earlier suit: (1) reached a final judgment on the merits; (2) involved the
same cause of action or claim; and (3) involved identical parties or privies.” Leon
v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2006). However, “cause of action”
is construed broadly to mean “the right to obtain redress for a harm suffered,
regardless of the specific remedy sought or the legal theory . . . advanced.” Boeken
1 The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). We have jurisdiction to review a district court’s final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2 v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 230 P.3d 342, 348 (Cal. 2010). In practice, this means
res judicata bars claims against an insurer for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing when the claim “might have been raised and litigated
in” a prior action concerning a policy breach. Lincoln Prop. Co., N.C. v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 45 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Mattson v. City of
Costa Mesa, 164 Cal. Rptr. 913, 916 (Ct. App. 1980)).
Here, the probate court made a final decision regarding the sum of life
insurance proceeds TLIC was required to pay out to Sidorov by agreeing to the
parties’ stipulated amount, including “applicable interest” and “premiums paid
following” the insured’s death. If Sidorov wanted to seek additional interest or
proceeds from the premiums, or if he wanted to bring additional claims against
TLIC for breaching implied covenants of the policy by delaying payment to
Sidorov, those claims “might have been raised and litigated in” the probate court.
See Lincoln Prop. Co., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 45; see also Estate of Kraus, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 760, 766 (Ct. App. 2010) (a probate court can hear “causes of action, or
matters that are normally raised in a civil action to the extent that the matters are
related factually to the subject matter of a petition”). Instead, Sidorov again seeks
a monetary award from TLIC for the same alleged underpayment of the life
insurance policy proceeds, but from another court. Thus, his claims for breach of
contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, insofar
3 as they are based on the insurance proceeds, are barred by res judicata.
2. Sidorov’s remaining claims were all appropriately dismissed for
failure to abide by the relevant statutes of limitations. The negligence, negligence
per se, and wrongful death claims needed to be brought within the relevant two-
year statutes of limitations. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 335.1, 339. His remaining
contract claims have four-year statutes of limitations. Id. § 337(1). And his
remaining claims for implied breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
had to be brought within four years if based on an implied contractual promise and
two years if seeking tort remedies. See Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 271 Cal. Rptr. 246,
249 n.4 (Ct. App. 1990). To be timely, Sidorov needed to bring all these claims
within either two or four years after “the cause[s] of action [were] complete with
all of [their] elements.” Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 981 P.2d 79, 83 (Cal. 1999).
But he was too late. The final elements of the wrongful death and
negligence claims would have been complete when the insured was murdered on
January 22, 2010. The remaining breach of contract and breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims are based on TLIC allegedly over-
insuring Sidorov’s mother in 2003 and failing to investigate the false report of her
death in 2007. And Sidorov did not bring this lawsuit until December 30, 2016.
While he contends various exceptions to the statues of limitations should
apply, they cannot save his late claims.
4 First, Sidorov argues the delayed discovery rule, which “postpones accrual
of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the
cause of action,” should apply. Id. But Sidorov was in possession of the
documents necessary to discover his claims that are not barred by res judicata in
2011, making his 2016 lawsuit too late.2
Second, he argues the continuous accrual doctrine should allow him to bring
claims for TLIC’s post-murder conduct because a claim does not accrue until “the
occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action.” El Pollo Loco, Inc.
v. Hashim, 316 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting April Enters., Inc. v.
KTTV, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421, 432 (Ct. App. 1983)). However, as stated above, the
last alleged elements for the negligence and wrongful death claims were complete
upon the insured’s 2010 murder.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 21 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YEVGENIY V. SIDOROV, No. 18-16876
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-00002-KJM-DB v.
TRANSAMERICA LIFE INSURANCE MEMORANDUM* COMPANY, FKA Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company; TRANSAMERICA OCCIDENTAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Kimberly J. Mueller, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 19, 2020** San Francisco, California
Before: HAWKINS, N.R. SMITH, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Yevgeniy Sidorov brings a host of claims against Transamerica Life
Insurance Co. (TLIC) for its conduct in managing a life insurance policy for
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Sidorov’s mother before and after she was murdered by his stepfather. However,
his substantive claims are all barred by res judicata or failure to file within the
statutes of limitations, and his claim for declaratory relief was based on those
barred claims. Therefore, we will affirm the district court’s order granting TLIC’s
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.1
We review de novo rulings on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Coto Settlement v.
Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2010). We will reverse a 12(b)(6)
dismissal only “if, taking all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, [the
complaint] contains enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
1. Res judicata bars Sidorov’s claims for breach of contract and breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing insofar as they are based on
allegations of delay or underpayment of insurance proceeds. The doctrine “applies
when [an] earlier suit: (1) reached a final judgment on the merits; (2) involved the
same cause of action or claim; and (3) involved identical parties or privies.” Leon
v. IDX Sys. Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2006). However, “cause of action”
is construed broadly to mean “the right to obtain redress for a harm suffered,
regardless of the specific remedy sought or the legal theory . . . advanced.” Boeken
1 The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). We have jurisdiction to review a district court’s final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2 v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 230 P.3d 342, 348 (Cal. 2010). In practice, this means
res judicata bars claims against an insurer for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing when the claim “might have been raised and litigated
in” a prior action concerning a policy breach. Lincoln Prop. Co., N.C. v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 45 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Mattson v. City of
Costa Mesa, 164 Cal. Rptr. 913, 916 (Ct. App. 1980)).
Here, the probate court made a final decision regarding the sum of life
insurance proceeds TLIC was required to pay out to Sidorov by agreeing to the
parties’ stipulated amount, including “applicable interest” and “premiums paid
following” the insured’s death. If Sidorov wanted to seek additional interest or
proceeds from the premiums, or if he wanted to bring additional claims against
TLIC for breaching implied covenants of the policy by delaying payment to
Sidorov, those claims “might have been raised and litigated in” the probate court.
See Lincoln Prop. Co., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 45; see also Estate of Kraus, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 760, 766 (Ct. App. 2010) (a probate court can hear “causes of action, or
matters that are normally raised in a civil action to the extent that the matters are
related factually to the subject matter of a petition”). Instead, Sidorov again seeks
a monetary award from TLIC for the same alleged underpayment of the life
insurance policy proceeds, but from another court. Thus, his claims for breach of
contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, insofar
3 as they are based on the insurance proceeds, are barred by res judicata.
2. Sidorov’s remaining claims were all appropriately dismissed for
failure to abide by the relevant statutes of limitations. The negligence, negligence
per se, and wrongful death claims needed to be brought within the relevant two-
year statutes of limitations. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 335.1, 339. His remaining
contract claims have four-year statutes of limitations. Id. § 337(1). And his
remaining claims for implied breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
had to be brought within four years if based on an implied contractual promise and
two years if seeking tort remedies. See Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 271 Cal. Rptr. 246,
249 n.4 (Ct. App. 1990). To be timely, Sidorov needed to bring all these claims
within either two or four years after “the cause[s] of action [were] complete with
all of [their] elements.” Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 981 P.2d 79, 83 (Cal. 1999).
But he was too late. The final elements of the wrongful death and
negligence claims would have been complete when the insured was murdered on
January 22, 2010. The remaining breach of contract and breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims are based on TLIC allegedly over-
insuring Sidorov’s mother in 2003 and failing to investigate the false report of her
death in 2007. And Sidorov did not bring this lawsuit until December 30, 2016.
While he contends various exceptions to the statues of limitations should
apply, they cannot save his late claims.
4 First, Sidorov argues the delayed discovery rule, which “postpones accrual
of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the
cause of action,” should apply. Id. But Sidorov was in possession of the
documents necessary to discover his claims that are not barred by res judicata in
2011, making his 2016 lawsuit too late.2
Second, he argues the continuous accrual doctrine should allow him to bring
claims for TLIC’s post-murder conduct because a claim does not accrue until “the
occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action.” El Pollo Loco, Inc.
v. Hashim, 316 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting April Enters., Inc. v.
KTTV, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421, 432 (Ct. App. 1983)). However, as stated above, the
last alleged elements for the negligence and wrongful death claims were complete
upon the insured’s 2010 murder. The breach of contract and breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims are based on conduct either
completed in 2003 or 2007, or they are barred by res judicata.
Third, Sidorov argues equitable estoppel should apply as he relied upon
TLIC’s actions taken after being notified of the insured’s death in 2014, which
allegedly “lulled [Sidorov] into a sense of security preventing him from instituting
proceedings before the running of the statute . . . .” See Holdgrafer v. Unocal
2 Sidorov suggests his claims were not discoverable until the probate court’s July 2014 order, which named him as the life insurance beneficiary. Even under his theory, the December 2016 suit was too late.
5 Corp., 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 216, 231–32 (Ct. App. 2008). But his reliance argument is
of no use to his negligence and wrongful death claims, where the last elements
would have been complete in 2010, before Sidorov even knew of TLIC. Likewise,
his contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims relate to
conduct prior to his knowledge of TLIC, except for those barred by res judicata.3
3. The district court also properly dismissed Sidorov’s claim for
declaratory relief. The claim was entirely based on the tort and contract claims
previously discussed. As those claims were appropriately dismissed, so too was
his claim for declaratory relief.
AFFIRMED.
3 Finally, his argument for equitable tolling is directed towards his breach of contract claim. But that argument is once more based on the contract claims concerning TLIC’s post-death conduct, which are barred by res judicata.