Yetman v. Stoneridge Farms, Inc.

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: October 3, 2007
• Docket: YORre-05-81
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION YORK, ss. DOCKET NO. RE-05-81 c; Ii e::,- 'y 0 R',-/0/;/,;2 DO 7 , i

KEVIN W. YETMAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs

v. ORDER

STONERIDGE FARMS, INC., et al., DONA'" lL, ,'ARE;RfCHT LA W t , 1-; I;"~ [J' Defendants JAN 3 u 2008

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Kevin Yetman, Donna Yetman,

Steve Pelletier and Lori Pelletier (collectively the "Plaintiffs") Motion to Strike portions

of Affidavit of Fred and Laura Stone pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56(e) and Defendant's

Stoneridge Farms, Inc., Fred Stone, Laura Stone, Clifton E. Temm, IL, D.V.M. and Sol

Fedder (collectively the "Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to

M.R. Civ. P. 56 (c).

BACKGROUND The case involves a dispute regarding the existence of a public or express

easement over Defendants' property. Plaintiffs and Defendants own parcels of land

situated around Curtis Road in the Town of Arundel, Maine. Plaintiffs own two parcels

and Defendants own a single parcel known as Stoneridge Farm.

Plaintiffs acquired their properties from Eben E. and Irene A. Jones (Plaintiffs

Yetmen's deed is dated 2/4/97; Plaintiffs Pelletier's deed is dated 3/13/95).

Defendants Fred and Laura Stone became the owners of Stoneridge Farm on February

18, 1977. In 1999, Stoneridge Farm was deeded to owners Stoneridge Farm, Inc., Clifton E. Temm, IL, D.V.M, and Sol Fedder. Fred and Laura Stone are Officers and Directors

of Stoneridge Farm, Inc.

Plaintiffs claim that a public easement exists across Stoneridge Farm granting

them access to their property. This easement exists, they assert, pursuant to 23 M.R.S.A.

§ 3026, because the critical portion of the Curtis Road was discontinued in 1978, after

the effective date of the statute. Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue an express easement was

granted in their deeds. 1

On June 24, 2005, Plaintiffs were sent a written demand to cease crossing over

Stoneridge Farm. The Plaintiffs refused. This lawsuit ensued.

Both parties agree that the Curtis Road was established by the Town of Arundel

in 1802. In 1954 the town voted to discontinue the road. Defendants claim that the road

was discontinued entirely and reverted in fee simple to the owners of the land it

crossed. Plaintiffs contend that only a portion of the Curtis Road was discontinued in

1954, while the remainder was discontinued in 1978. That portion, they contend,

remains a public way that provides Plaintiffs an easement across Stoneridge Farm to

their properties.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion for Summary Judgment

a. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where there exist no genuine issues of material fact

such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c);

see also Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, ~ 4,770 A.2d 653,655. A genuine issue is

raised "when sufficient evidence requires a fact-finder to choose between competing

versions of the truth at trial." Parrish v. Wright, 2003 ME 90, ~ 8, 828 A.2d 778, 781. A

This argument appears to have been abandoned in subsequent pleadings.

2 material fact is a fact that has "the potential to affect the outcome of the suit." Burdzel v.

Sobus, 2000 ME 84, err 6, 750 A.2d 573, 575. "If material facts are disputed, the dispute

must be resolved through fact-finding." Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, err 7, 784 A.2d 18,

22.

When a defendant seeks summary judgment, a "plaintiff must establish a prima

facie case for each element of her cause of action." Champagne v. Mid-Maine Med. Ctr.,

1998 ME 87, err 9, 711 A.2d 842, 845. At this stage, the facts are reviewed "in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party." Lightfoot v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35,2003 ME

24, err 6, 816 A.2d 63, 65.

b. Was the Curtis Road Discontinued in its Entirety in 1954?

At issue is whether the Curtis Road was discontinued in its entirety in 1954, or if

portions remained public. Both parties agree that the Curtis Road was established in

1802 and that it began near the Kennebunk River and ended at the Cox Hall line.

Neither party disputes that, in 1954, a town meeting was held wherein the town

discontinued at least a portion of the Curtis Road. Nor does either party dispute that if

a road was discontinued prior to the enactment of 23 M.R.S. § 3026 it reverted to private

property.

The Defendants assert that the minutes from the 1954 Town Meeting indicate

that the entire Curtis Road was discontinued based on an entry in the minutes stating,

"Article 24: Voted to close the curtis road." Plaintiffs argue that the 1954 Warrant for

that same meeting clearly states in Article 24 that the Town "will vote to close the Curtis

Road leading from Downing Road to the former Taylor Place now owned by Arthur

Jones." Thus, it is argued, only the portion of the road designated in the warrant was

discontinued in 1954. The above facts are not in dispute, thus, as a matter of law, the

Court can resolve the issue by way of summary judgment.

3 Under Maine law, a warrant "shall state in distinct articles the business to be

acted upon at the meeting... [and] ... [n]o other business may be acted upon." 30-A

M.R.S. § 2523(2) (2007). Though technical precision is not required in drafting a

warrant, its "sole function ... is to provide reasonably certain notice of the subject­

matter to come before the town meeting. /I State v. Town of Franklin, 489 A.2d 525, 528

(Me. 1985). Thus, subject-matter notice is a requirement under 30-A M.R.S.A. § 2523(2).

Id. A predecessor statute, largely unchanged, was similarly construed in 1869. See

Austin vs. Inhabitants of York, 57 Me. 304, 305. In that case, considering Civil War soldier

pay, the court held that "[t]he object of the statute is to secure to the inhabitants of the

town, previous intelligible notice of the subjects to be acted upon./I Id.

Maine law supports plaintiffs' argument that only the portion of the road

described in the warrant could be voted on at the 1954 town meeting, otherwise subject­

matter notice would not have been given to those property owners situated above the

"former Taylor Place./I

c. Does That Portion of the Curtis Road Not Discontinued in 1954 Cross

Stoneridge Farm Thus Creating a Public Way or Easement?

The actual location of the Curtis Road is disputed and thus cannot be decided by

way of summary judgment. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have not set forth a

prima facie case for the elements of their action. However, incorporated by reference to

Plaintiffs' statement of material facts is a deposition of Plaintiffs' designated expert,

Robert A. Yarumain, a registered land surveyor. (See PSMF ~ 10). Mr. Yarumain

opines that the Curtis Road was discontinued as far as the Old Taylor Farm in 1954 but

that the remainder of the Road (to the Irving Road) remained a public way. (See

Yarumain Deposition p. 52 attached to PSMF). According to Yarumain, in 1978 the

Town voted to discontinue the section of the Curtis Road between the Old Taylor Farm

4 and Meade Stone's house. The rest remains a public way. Yarumain tracks the Curtis

Road above the Old Taylor Farm as passing over Stoneridge Farm. Thus, Plaintiffs

have demonstrated that genuine issues of fact remain in dispute

CONCLUSION

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied. Plaintiffs' Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment is Granted.2 As a matter of law, the language of the warrant

controls over the minutes of a town meeting. Consequently, the Court concludes that

only the portion of the Curtis Road described to in the 1954 warrant was discontinued.

The status and location of the Curtis Road in its entirety are disputed questions of fact

that survive summary judgment.

Dated: October ~ , 2007

G. Arthur Brenn Justice, Superior Court

Thomas Danylik, Esq. -PLS Michael O'Toole, Esq. - PLS Stoneridge Farms, Inc. - DEF (pro se) Frederick Stone - DEF - (pro se) Laura Stone - DEF - (pro se) Sol Fedder - DEF - (pro se) Clifton E. Temm, II, DVM - DEF - (pro se)

This motion was incorporated into Plaintiffs' opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment.