Yeong Sun Koo v. Cheng Jin Dai

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Yeong Sun Koo v. Cheng Jin Dai

120 A.D.3d 1408, 993 N.Y.S.2d 149

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedSeptember 24, 2014

Docket2013-07164

StatusPublished

This text of 120 A.D.3d 1408 (Yeong Sun Koo v. Cheng Jin Dai) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Yeong Sun Koo v. Cheng Jin Dai, 120 A.D.3d 1408, 993 N.Y.S.2d 149 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2014).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Strauss, J.), entered May 28, 2013, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that neither plaintiff sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

The defendant met his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiffs, Yeong Sun Koo and Chae Hong Chung, did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to Yeong Sun Koo’s spine and left shoulder, and the alleged injuries to Chae Hong Chung’s spine and right shoulder, did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

*1409 In opposition, however, Yeong Sun Koo raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained serious injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of her spine and to her left shoulder, and Chae Hong Chung raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained serious injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of his spine and to his right shoulder (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]). Therefore, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Skelos, J.E, Leventhal, Hinds-Radix, Duffy and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Strauss, J.), entered May 28, 2013, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that neither plaintiff sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.

The defendant met his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiffs, Yeong Sun Koo and Chae Hong Chung, did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to Yeong Sun Koo’s spine and left shoulder, and the alleged injuries to Chae Hong Chung’s spine and right shoulder, did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

*1409 In opposition, however, Yeong Sun Koo raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained serious injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of her spine and to her left shoulder, and Chae Hong Chung raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained serious injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of his spine and to his right shoulder (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]). Therefore, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Skelos, J.E, Leventhal, Hinds-Radix, Duffy and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

120 A.D.3d 1408, 993 N.Y.S.2d 149, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/yeong-sun-koo-v-cheng-jin-dai-nyappdiv-2014.

Opinion

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