Yekimoff v. Seastrand CV-02-187-B 03/19/04 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Serge Yekimoff
Civil No. 02-187-B Opinion N o . 2004 DNH 052 David Seastrand, et a l ,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Serge Yekimoff has brought this civil rights action against
New London Police Chief David Seastrand, New Hampshire Police
Officer David Goldstein, Assistant County Attorney David Rotman,
former Public Defender Jeanne Herrick, the Town of New London,
and Merrimack County. He claims that defendants violated his
rights under the United States Constitution by: (1) arresting him
without probable cause; (2) making false promises to induce him
to surrender; (3) maliciously prosecuting him; (4) providing
false testimony and otherwise undermining the fairness of his
trial; (5) discriminating against him on the basis of his
ethnicity, sexual orientation, and perceived HIV status; (6)
engaging in a conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights; and (7) failing to provide him with adequate mental health and
dental care, denying him access to the courts and subjecting him
to illegal strip searches while he was incarcerated awaiting
trial. He also asserts a variety of state law claims.
Defendants have filed motions for judgment on the pleadings.
Because I determine that Yekimoff has not alleged viable federal
claims against any of the defendants, I grant defendants' motions
as to those claims and decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Yekimoff's state law claims.
BACKGROUND1
The events leading to the present litigation began on
December 13, 2000 when Yekimoff wrote a suicide note. Upon
reading it, a friend called the New London Police Department.
Patrolman Robert Thorp responded to the call and found Yekimoff
in the backyard of his friend's house. Thorp decided to take
Yekimoff into protective custody after a failed attempt to engage
him in conversation. At that point, Yekimoff took out a gun and
1 Unless otherwise noted, I draw the relevant facts from Yekimoff's allegations in the Second Amended Complaint ("Complaint") (doc. no. 29).
- 2 - pointed it at his own head, saying that he would rather kill
himself than surrender.2 Thorp drew his own pistol in response,
and Yekimoff ran inside his friend's house. An armed standoff
ensued, and Thorp sought assistance from other jurisdictions and
a SWAT team.
Over the course of the next several hours. New London Police
Chief David Seastrand and others negotiated by telephone with
Yekimoff. Troopers Spaulding and Mitchell, and perhaps others,
were at the scene. At some point, Seastrand offered Yekimoff
mental health care and immunity and told him that the State of
New York, which had issued a warrant for Yekimoff's arrest on a
probation violation, would not seek his extradition. In
response, Yekimoff demanded to speak to the prosecutor. New
Hampshire State Police Lieutenant David Goldstein called
Yekimoff, falsely identified himself as Dan Gordon, an Assistant
County Attorney, and confirmed Seastrand's immunity offer.
Yekimoff nevertheless refused to surrender until after tear gas
rounds were fired into the house approximately 10 hours after
2 The parties disagree as to whether Yekimoff also pointed the gun at Thorp.
- 3 - Thorp first arrived on the scene.3
Yekimoff was arraigned and charged on December 14, 2000,
with criminal threatening and being a fugitive from justice. New
London Police Officer Kinzer and Assistant County Attorney Rotman
prepared the complaint describing the charges. Assistant County
Attorney Helrich argued for $150,000 cash bail, but the court set
bail at $25,000 on the criminal threatening charge and ordered
Yekimoff to be held without bail on the fugitive from justice
charge.
On December 20, 2000, a probable cause hearing was held at
the New London District Court, where Attorney Herrick was
assigned to represent Yekimoff. At that time, Herrick and
Yekimoff discussed Yekimoff's version of the events. She advised
him to waive the probable cause hearing as it "would be more
advantageous to have it at 'a later date when more information be
[sic] discovered.'" (Compl. I 15). Yekimoff accepted her
advice.
3 Tear gas is mentioned only in the Answers filed by Seastrand and New London (doc. no. 36). However, this fact does not appear to be in dispute.
- 4 - Herrick and Yekimoff did not speak again until January 14,
2001, when he was brought to Merrimack County Superior Court for
a hearing to increase his bail. There, Herrick informed him that
the fugitive from justice charge had been dismissed but that the
state wanted to raise his bail on the criminal threatening
charge. At the hearing, Rotman described the state's version of
events. Neither Rotman nor Herrick informed the court of the
immunity ruse. Bail was raised to $100,000.
On January 26, 2001, Herrick wrote to Yekimoff, stating that
she would file a motion for bail reduction. However, she never
filed the motion. On February 1, 2001, Yekimoff filed a pro se
motion to appear before the grand jury. Although Rotman notified
Yekimoff that he would be allowed to testify before the grand
jury. County Attorney Johnson later decided that because Yekimoff
was incarcerated, he would only be allowed to testify via a
written statement to be reviewed in advance by Rotman. The court
ultimately denied Yekimoff's motion to appear before the grand
jury.
Seastrand, Goldstein, and Thorp were complaining witnesses
at the grand jury hearing, and Rotman presented the case to the
- 5 - grand jury. Yekimoff asserts that the witnesses perjured
themselves and that Rotman knowingly suborned their perjury. On
February 15, 2001, the grand jury returned an indictment charging
Yekimoff with reckless conduct, criminal threatening, and being a
felon in possession of a firearm. Although Herrick promised to
obtain a transcript of the grand jury proceedings, she made no
attempt to do so.
On February 28, 2001, Yekimoff learned that Herrick had left
the public defender's office and withdrawn from his case.
Yekimoff then filed a motion to proceed pro se. He was arraigned
on March 12, 2001, and entered a not guilty plea. The court
initially denied his reguest and appointed Michael Davidoff as
his new attorney. On March 15, 2001, Yekimoff renewed his motion
to proceed pro se, and on April 19, 2001, the court granted it.
Yekimoff claims that Rotman acted unscrupulously in
prosecuting him. He states that Rotman offered him an
opportunity to change his plea to insanity, which Yekimoff
"categorically rejected." (Compl. 5 19). Later, however, Rotman
"vigorously opposed" Yekimoff's motion to appoint a psychiatric
- 6 - expert. Additionally, on May 30, 2001, after Yekimoff rejected
Rotman's offer to change his plea again, Rotman served him with a
Notice of Intent to Seek an Extended Sentence.
Yekimoff challenges the conditions of his pretrial custody.
He was subjected to visual body cavity inspection searches
following visits and trips to the library. Yekimoff claims that
"as part of the search, corrections officers inspected the inside
of plaintiff's mouth and soles of his feet, he was also ordered
to lift his testicles to fully expose his groin, and to spread
his buttocks, at which time officers visually inspected his body
cavity." (Compl. 5 22).
Yekimoff received no mental health assistance while he was
in custody. Nor did he receive dental or other medical care. He
further asserts that the jail's conditions provided "unreasonable
food rationing," "hazardous air quality," and "overcrowding."
(Compl. 5 22). He also complains of limitations on his access to
the New Hampshire Supreme Court law library, which was designated
as the library available for pro se criminal defendants.
Yekimoff was acquitted of all charges at his criminal trial.
- 7 - STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard for reviewing a motion for judgment on the
pleadings is essentially the same as the standard for reviewing a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Collier v.
City of Chicopee, 158 F.3d 601, 602 (1st Cir. 1998); Cooper v.
Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 109, 112 (D.N.H. 1998).
Accordingly, in reviewing such a motion I "accept as true the
well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint, draw all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, and
determine whether the complaint, so read, sets forth facts
sufficient to justify recovery on any cognizable theory."
Donovan v. City of Haverhill, 311 F.3d 74, 76 (1st Cir. 2002)
(citation omitted). "Judgment on the pleadings under Rule 1 2 (c)
may not be entered unless it appears beyond a doubt that the
nonmoving party can prove no set of facts in support of her claim
which would entitle her to relief." Feliciano v. Rhode Island,
160 F.3d 780, 788 (1st Cir. 1998); Int'l Paper Co. v. Town of
Jay, 928 F.2d 480, 482-83 (1st Cir. 1991) . Although the standard
for judgment on the pleadings is difficult to satisfy, it is not
unattainable. The standard does not reguire "that a court must (or should) accept every allegation made by the complainant, no
matter how conclusory or generalized." United States v. AVX
Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Wash. Legal
Found, v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir. 1993)
("[b]ecause only well-pleaded facts are taken as true, we will
not accept a complainant's unsupported conclusions or
interpretations of law"). Nor will I engage in speculation to
find a factual basis for unsupported conclusory allegations. I
also am mindful that a complaint filed by a pro se litigant must
be held to "less stringent standards" than one drafted by a
lawyer. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) . I note,
however, both that Yekimoff appears to be a fairly experienced
pro se litigant (see, e.g., Yekimoff v. Sup, of Merrimack County
House of Corr., Civ. No. 01-224 (dismissed without prejudice))
and that the current motions challenge Yekimoff's second amended
complaint, which is his third attempt to produce an adeguate
complaint.
ANALYSIS
Yekimoff asserts a series of federal and state claims for
unlawful arrest, malicious prosecution, unlawful abuse of process, and conspiracy against a number of individual and
municipal actors. For ease of consideration, I discuss each
federal claim in turn. Because I ultimately conclude that the
facts asserted do not support a viable claim against any of the
defendants under federal law, I grant defendants' motions for
judgment on the pleadings as to Yekimoff's federal claims and
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state
claims.
A. Probable Cause for the Arrest
Yekimoff claims that his arrest was illegal because
defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him. See, e.g.,
Meehan v. Town of Plymouth, 167 F.3d 85, 88-89 (1st Cir. 1999);
Rivera v. Murphy, 979 F.2d 259, 263 (1st Cir. 1992). I disagree.
Taking as true the facts as stated in the complaint, it is clear
that the defendants had ample grounds to arrest Yekimoff on
several charges.
Probable cause exists when "'the facts and circumstances
within the [police officers' ] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a
prudent [person] in believing that the [defendant] had committed
- 10 - or was committing an offense.'" Rivera, 979 F.2d at 263 (Quoting
United States v. Figueroa, 818 F.2d 1020, 1023 (1st Cir. 1987)
alterations in original). The test is objective, but looks to
the facts and evidence of the particular case. Here the evidence
available to Seastrand and other police officers was clearly
sufficient to support a reasonable belief that Yekimoff had
committed several offenses.
Yekimoff admits that: (1) he had a gun that he represented
was loaded; (2) he asserted that he would rather kill himself
than be taken into custody; (3) he took out the gun in Thorp's
presence; (4) he refused to be taken into custody even though he
was repeatedly instructed to surrender; (5) he was wanted by the
New York authorities on an outstanding probation violation
warrant; and (6) he had been convicted of a felony in the State
of New York.4 (Compl. 5 13-14, 23). These admitted facts gave
defendants ample cause to believe that Yekimoff was a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
159:3, a fugitive from justice under N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
612:2, and was guilty of resisting arrest under N.H. Rev. Stat.
4 The police were aware of his outstanding arrest warrant in New York during the standoff.
- 11 - Ann. § 594:5, and criminal threatening under N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 631:4. The fact that a jury later acquitted him of these
charges does not undermine the validity of his arrest. Roche v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 254 (1st Cir. 1996)
("[t]he inquiry into the existence vel non of probable cause is
not to be undertaken from the perspective of hindsight but from
the perspective of a hypothetical 'reasonable man' standing in
the reporting person's shoes at the time when that person
acted"). I therefore determine that none of the defendants are
liable for arresting Yekimoff without probable cause.
B. False Promise to Induce Surrender
Yekimoff asserts that defendants violated his constitutional
rights when they offered him immunity and mental health
assistance as a ruse to get him to surrender. I disagree.
Yekimoff did not give up any constitutional rights by relying on
the immunity and mental health assistance offers, and he had no
right to resist arrest, regardless of whether the arrest was
lawful. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 642:2. Thus, the ruse did
not cause him any harm. Moreover, the ruse was no more egregious
than similar conduct in other cases that did not give rise to
- 12 - viable constitutional claims. See, e.g.. United States v.
Renqifo, 858 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1988) (permissible for police to
secure custody by deceit). While it would have been preferable
if Yekimoff had surrendered immediately as Thorp demanded,
thereby making misrepresentations of this sort unnecessary, an
immunity ruse was a reasonable method of securing his safe
surrender after hours of failed negotiations in an armed
standoff. I therefore dismiss all claims against all defendants
related to the immunity ruse.
C. Malicious Prosecution
To the extent Yekimoff asserts a § 1983 claim for malicious
prosecution, it fails. New Hampshire provides an adequate remedy
for the common law tort of malicious prosecution. MacRae v.
Brant, 108 N.H. 177 (1967). The availability of this state law
remedy defeats any procedural due process claim for malicious
prosecution. Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d
249, 256 (1st Cir. 1996) ("a garden-variety claim of malicious
prosecution garbed in the regalia of § 1983 must fail."); Meehan
v. Town of Plymouth, 167 F.3d 85, 88 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[a] § 1983
claim for malicious prosecution as a deprivation of procedural
- 13 - due process is barred where, as here, the state's tort law
recognizes a malicious prosecution cause of action").
D. False Testimony and other Misconduct During Trial
Yekimoff asserts that various aspects of his trial and
pretrial proceedings violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair
trial. In pertinent part, the Sixth Amendment ensures criminal
defendants a fair and impartial jury, a speedy trial, information
about the charges against him, and assistance of counsel. See,
e.g.. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471 (1965); Doggett v.
United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S.
159, 170 (1985). Yekimoff fails, however, to allege sufficient
facts to support a Sixth Amendment claim against any of the
defendants.
Yekimoff claims that Seastrand perjured himself and
reguested that other police officers perjure themselves, too.
Nowhere in his complaint, however, does he identify the
perjurious statements. Without these factual allegations, his
claims against Seastrand fail. See, e.g.. Wash. Legal Found, v.
Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir. 1993) . In any
event, Seastrand is entitled to absolute immunity. See Briscoe
v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983).
- 14 - Yekimoff asserts that Rotman perjured himself when he denied
in testimony that he was "unaware of the police officers [sic]
falsehoods until after the standoff had concluded, and that he
was helping police to draw an arrest warrant." (Compl. 5 13).
This claim fails because Rotman is entitled to absolute immunity.
Briscoe, 460 U.S. 325. Rotman is therefore entitled to dismissal
of all claims that are based on testimony he gave as a witness.
Yekimoff also asserts that Rotman obtained a false report to
from Goldstein which purported to be from a psychological expert
and indicated that Yekimoff would be eligible for an enhanced
sentence. Since Yekimoff was acguitted, however, he was not
subjected to any increased sentence, and therefore he suffered no
compensable harm as a result of this alleged misconduct.
Yekimoff appears to claim that public defender Herrick
denied him effective assistance of counsel. He also asserts that
Herrick was motivated by race and national origin bias, as well
as sexual orientation bias. He concedes, however, that because
Herrick is not a state actor, she cannot be held liable on a §
1983 claim unless she conspired with public officials.
Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704, 710 (1st Cir. 1986)
(per curiam) (private attorney, sued for actions taken as a
- 15 - court-appointed counsel, is not acting under color of state law);
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). However, Yekimoff
fails to allege any facts to support his conspiracy theory.
Yekimoff also claims that Rotman violated his trial rights
by breaching a promise to allow him to testify before the grand
jury. This allegation, however, would not support a
constitutional claim even if it were true. There is no specific
provision in the Constitution that protects the public from
governmental deceit, nor does Yekimoff point to one. I therefore
analyze this claim under the substantive due process standard.
In order to find a constitutional violation, Rotman's conduct
would need to be extreme or outrageous, which it clearly was not.
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973).
Yekimoff also asserts that defendants improperly interfered
with his bail proceedings and denied him his "right to be free
from excessive bail." (Compl. 5 29). In order to assert a claim
for bail impropriety, Yekimoff must show among other things that
the defendant "help[ed] to shape" and "exercis[ed] significant
influence over" the bail decision. Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d
196, 212 (1st Cir. 1987).
Here, there is no indication that Seastrand, Rotman, or any
- 16 - other defendant actively participated in the first bail hearing.
Nor does the complaint otherwise explain how any of the
defendants influenced the bail decision that was made at that
hearing. At the second bail hearing, Rotman asked the court to
increase bail, and Herrick represented Yekimoff. The facts
asserted state only that
Rotman recited a police concocted version of the incident, asking the state court to increase cash bail to $100,000 - because the plaintiff did obtain assurances of his friends to secure $25,00 cash bail and because he previously 'dared' to fight extradition. At the hearing, Herrick failed to inform the court about the immunity proffer or to raise issues of plaintiff's mental condition during the incident. She was unwilling (because of her personal bias towards the plaintiff), unprepared and incompetent to oppose bail increase that resulted in a $100,000 cash bail which the plaintiff was unable to meet."
(Compl. 1 16). Taking these assertions as true, I do not find
that either Herrick or Rotman engaged in actionable misconduct.
Yekimoff also alleges in a bare conclusory form that
Merrimack County is liable for Rotman's actions, stating that it
hired an incompetent prosecutor, failed to train him, and
negligently supervised him. He does not allege, however, that
Merrimack County has a policy of doing any of these things. Nor
does he sufficiently plead a failure to train claim. Therefore,
- 17 - Merrimack County does not bear any liability for Rotman's
allegedly improper conduct. See Meehan v. Town of Plymouth, 167
F .3d 85, 92 (1st Cir. 1999)
E. Discrimination Based on Ethnicity, Sexual Orientation, or Perceived HIV Status
Yekimoff asserts that he was denied equal protection of the
law because Seastrand thought he "was not good enough, [] because
of his national origin and because of his sexual orientation and
then-perceived HIV status."5 (Compl. 5 2 6) . Nowhere in the
complaint, however, does Yekimoff identify his national origin,
his sexual orientation, or his HIV status. Nor does he assert or
allege facts to support an implication that Seastrand or anyone
else was aware of his national origin, sexual orientation, or HIV
status. Furthermore, he does not allege any facts to show that
he was treated differently from anyone else. His bare conclusory
statements are insufficient.
Yekimoff makes similar unsupported allegations regarding
Rotman. He points to a series of actions taken by Rotman in
5 Yekimoff has some unmatched quotation marks in this portion of his complaint, but lacks citations or attribution. I therefore treat this as an assertion rather than a quotation and I will not speculate on the source.
- 18 - relation to his psychiatric evaluation and sentencing, but these
do not establish that Rotman intended to discriminate against
him. Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906 (1st Cir. 1995) (mere
recitation of coincidences does not establish improper motive).
Therefore his claims that he was denied egual protection
necessarily fail, first because he has not alleged that the
defendant knew of his status, and second because he has not
alleged any facts showing that he was treated differently from
anyone else. Judge v. City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 67, 74 (1st Cir.
1998) (stating that "district judges may dispose of [claims
against public officials on egual protection grounds] prior to
permitting any discovery where a plaintiff, having been provided
the opportunity to do so, fails to allege specific, nonconclusory
factual allegations that establish improper motive") (internal
guotation omitted); c f ., Calderon-Ortiz v. Laboy-Alvarado, 300
F.3d 60, 64-66 (1st Cir. 2002).
F. Conspiracy
Yekimoff asserts that each individual defendant acted in
conspiracy with the others to deprive him of constitutional
rights. A civil rights conspiracy under § 1983 is
a combination of two or more persons acting in
- 19 - concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the principal element of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict a wrong against or injury upon another, and an overt act that results in damages.
Earle v. Benoit, 850 F.2d 836, 844 (1st Cir. 1988) (internal
guotations omitted). For a conspiracy to be actionable under §
1983, the conspiracy must have resulted in an "actual deprivation
of a right secured by the Constitution and Laws." Brennan v.
Hendrigan, 888 F.2d 189, 195 (1st Cir. 1989) . As described
above, Yekimoff has failed to show any facts that would establish
that his rights were infringed in any way. I therefore dismiss
his conspiracy claims.6
G. Access to the Courts, Mental Health Assistance, and Body Cavity Searches
Yekimoff also asserts that Rotman, in concert with others,
denied him meaningful access to the courts by eliminating his
weekly visits to the library for a period of time. To establish
standing to litigate this claim in federal court, Yekimoff must
show that he has suffered an actual injury, i.e., that the
limitations on his access to the law library "hindered his
6 His conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 fails for similar reasons.
- 20 - efforts to pursue a legal claim." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,
349-51 (1996); see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403,
413-15 (2002). Since Yekimoff ultimately prevailed in his pro se
defense and was acquitted, he has not alleged any injury.
Yekimoff asserts that the defendants violated his
constitutional rights by failing to provide him with mental
health treatment after his arrest.7 To state a claim for
inadequate medical care Yekimoff must allege facts demonstrating:
(1) a serious medical need; and (2) the defendants' purposeful
indifference thereto. See Sires v. Berman, 834 F.2d 9, 12 (1st
Cir. 1987); see also, Mahan v. Plymouth County House of Corr., 64
F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1995) (deliberate withholding of specifically
requested prescribed antidepressants cannot be the basis for
liability if the prison officials were not subjectively aware of
a serious medical need for them). Even in this, his third
attempt at drafting an adequate complaint, Yekimoff has failed to
allege any facts that establish that the prison officials either
7 Yekimoff asserts that he was incarcerated at the Merrimack County House of Corrections. Because he has not sued any of the individual employees of the House of Corrections, the only defendant that could be held liable for conditions of confinement claims is Merrimack County.
- 21 - knew or should have known that Yekimoff had any serious medical
needs that were going unmet. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825
(1994) (subjective knowledge reguired to show deliberate
indifference).
Yekimoff asserts that his need for mental health assistance
was so obvious that the fact that he did not receive it
"manifested reckless and callous disregard . . . and 'deliberate
indifference.'" (Compl. 5 72). Beyond the relevant facts
already discussed (that Yekimoff had threatened suicide and that
he had been offered mental health assistance by others not at the
prison), Yekimoff does not assert any additional facts that would
suggest that he had any serious medical need for mental health
care. Finally, even if Yekimoff had alleged facts that might
support a claim against one or more prison employees, he has not
alleged facts that would permit a claim to be asserted against
the County on this basis.8
8 For the same reasons, I find no liability regarding the failure to provide emergency dental care. Yekimoff has not asserted anything beyond the fact that he was denied it. Nowhere in his complaint (or other court submissions) does he state whether he had a dental emergency, whether he informed anyone or whether anyone was aware of his need for treatment. In the absence of such allegations, Merrimack County is entitled to judgment on the pleadings.
- 22 - Yekimoff also asserts that Merrimack County violated his
constitutional rights by subjecting him to visual body cavity
searches after visits and trips to the library. He adeguately
asserts that the searches were the result of municipal policy or
custom. See, e.g., Monell v. Dept, of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 690 (1978); Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d
576, 58 (1st Cir. 1994). Because Yekimoff was accused of
criminal threatening through the use of a firearm, however, he
cannot complain that he was improperly strip searched after
visits and trips to the library. Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239
F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 2001) ("courts have given prisons
latitude to premise searches on the type of crime for which an
inmate is convicted or arrested. The reasonable suspicion
standard may be met simply by the fact that the inmate was
charged with a violent felony") (citing Dufrin v. Spreen, 712
F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1983) (visual body cavity search did not
violate the Fourth Amendment rights of woman arrested for
felonious assault). Accordingly, I reject his challenge to the
County's alleged strip search policy.
H. Other Federal Claims
To the extent that Yekimoff claims that Seastrand violated
- 23 - his constitutional rights by spreading rumors about him, he does
not state a constitutional claim. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693, 702 (1976) (there is "no constitutional doctrine converting
every defamation by a public official into a deprivation of
liberty within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
or Fourteenth Amendment") (internal footnote omitted). Yekimoff
has asserted only bare conclusions, not facts from which I could
find that he had any injury beyond that of ordinary defamation.
This claim must therefore fail.
I. State Law Claims
Yekimoff has asserted a variety of state law claims against
each defendant. Because the parties are not diverse, I have
jurisdiction over the state law claims only to the extent that
they are supplemental to the federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. §
1367. Since I am dismissing all federal claims, I exercise my
discretion, given the early stage of this litigation, to decline
to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims. 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(3); Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 990 (1st Cir. 1995);
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
- 24 - CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I grant judgment on the
pleadings for each defendant with respect to Yekimoff's federal
claims (Doc. nos. 71, 51, 47, 50, 48), and decline to exercise
jurisdiction over his state law claims. This necessarily renders
all other pending motions moot.
SO ORDERED.
Paul Barbadoro Chief Judge
March 19, 2004
cc: Serge Yekimoff, pro se John Alexander, Esg. Andrew Livernois, Esg. Emily Rice, Esg. Andrew Schulman, Esg.
- 25 -