Ye v. Integon Natl. Ins. Co.

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJuly 8, 2026
Docket2024-10457
StatusPublished

This text of Ye v. Integon Natl. Ins. Co. (Ye v. Integon Natl. Ins. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ye v. Integon Natl. Ins. Co., (N.Y. Ct. App. 2026).

Opinion

Ye v Integon Natl. Ins. Co. - 2026 NY Slip Op 04341
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Law Reporting
Bureau
Thomas J.K. Smith, State Reporter

Ye v Integon Natl. Ins. Co.

2026 NY Slip Op 04341

July 8, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Xue Yan Ye, appellant,

v

Integon National Insurance Company, respondent.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on July 8, 2026

2024-10457, (Index No. 702490/24)

Betsy Barros, J.P.

Helen Voutsinas

Donna-Marie E. Golia

Phillip Hom, JJ.

Agulnick Kremin P.C., Melville, NY (Scott Agulnick of counsel), for appellant.

Mound Cotton Wollan & Greengrass LLP, New York, NY (Kevin F. Buckley and Rachel M. Horzempa Winship of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of an insurance contract, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Timothy J. Dufficy, J.), dated August 13, 2024. The order granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

On December 15, 2021, a home owned by the plaintiff in Queens (hereinafter the property) was damaged by a fire. At the time of the fire, the property was covered by an insurance policy issued by the defendant (hereinafter the policy). The policy provided, in relevant part, that "[n]o action can be brought against [the defendant] unless there has been full compliance with all of the terms under this policy and the action is started within two years after the date of loss" (hereinafter the subject provision). After the plaintiff submitted an insurance claim, the defendant disclaimed coverage in a letter dated March 14, 2022.

On February 1, 2024, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of an insurance contract. The defendant thereafter moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) to dismiss the complaint based on the subject provision providing that an action must be commenced within two years after the "date of loss." In an order dated August 13, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion. The plaintiff appeals.

"A motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action is barred by documentary evidence may be granted only where the documentary evidence utterly refutes the plaintiff's factual allegations, thereby conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law" (Koffler v Cincinnati Ins. Co., 239 AD3d 840, 841-842 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 316).

"An insurance policy is a written contract between an insurer and an insured and is based, in essence, on contract law" (Matter of Progressive Ins. Co. v Bruton, 240 AD3d 599, 600 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see American W. Home Ins. Co. v Gjonaj Realty & Mgt. Co., 192 AD3d 28, 38). "The statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging breach of contract is six [*2]years" (Filasky v Andover Cos., 230 AD3d 1297, 1299-1300, citing CPLR 213[2]; see Kaul v Brooklyn Friends Sch., 220 AD3d 939, 941). However, "[p]arties to a contract may agree to limit the period of time within which an action must be commenced to a period shorter than that provided by the applicable statute of limitations" (95 Crescent, LLC v Certified Restoration Servs., Inc., 241 AD3d 464, 465 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see D'Angelo v Allstate Ins. Co., 126 AD3d 931, 931).

"'As with any contract, unambiguous provisions of an insurance contract must be given their plain and ordinary meaning . . . and the interpretation of such provisions is a question of law for the court'" (Matter of Progressive Ins. Co. v Baby, 232 AD3d 902, 903, quoting White v Continental Cas. Co., 9 NY3d 264, 267). "Further, while ambiguities in an insurance contract are to be interpreted in favor of the insured, ambiguities arise only where there is more than one reasonable interpretation of the policy, as measured by the reasonable expectations of the average insured. In other words, even where policy language is susceptible of more than one interpretation, there is no ambiguity if only one of them is reasonable" (Eubanks v New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Assn., 240 AD3d 859, 860 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Garcia v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 151 AD3d 1020, 1022).

The plaintiff's contention that the subject provision is ambiguous is without merit. "This Court has held on many occasions that the phrase 'date of loss' refers 'to the date of the catastrophe insured against'" (D'Angelo v Allstate Ins. Co., 126 AD3d at 931, quoting Roberts v New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Assn., 253 AD2d 807, 807; see Shah v Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 304 AD2d 815, 816; Costello v Allstate Ins. Co., 230 AD2d 763, 763).

Here, the defendant established that the action was untimely by submitting a copy of the subject provision and the summons and complaint, which demonstrated that the plaintiff did not commence this action until more than two years after the date of loss (see D'Angelo v Allstate Ins. Co., 126 AD3d at 932; Vaccaro v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 116 AD3d 839, 840). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a question of fact (see Shah v Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 304 AD2d at 816).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) to dismiss the complaint.

BARROS, J.P., VOUTSINAS, GOLIA and HOM, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court

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Related

Goshen v. Mutual Life Insurance
774 N.E.2d 1190 (New York Court of Appeals, 2002)
White v. Continental Casualty Co.
878 N.E.2d 1019 (New York Court of Appeals, 2007)
D'Angelo v. Allstate Insurance
126 A.D.3d 931 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2015)
Garcia v. Government Employees Insurance Co.
2017 NY Slip Op 5202 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2017)
American W. Home Ins. Co. v. Gjonaj Realty & Mgt. Co.
2020 NY Slip Op 08027 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2020)
Costello v. Allstate Insurance
230 A.D.2d 763 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1996)
Roberts v. New York Property Insurance Underwriting Ass'n
253 A.D.2d 807 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1998)
Shah v. Cambridge Mutual Fire Insurance
304 A.D.2d 815 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2003)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Ye v. Integon Natl. Ins. Co., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ye-v-integon-natl-ins-co-nyappdiv-2026.