Yates v. United States Environmental Protection Agency

• Court: District Court, D. Oregon
• Decided: April 14, 2020
• Docket: 6:17-cv-01819
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON EUGENE DIVISION

KRISTINE YATES, Case No. 6:17-cv-01819-AA OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff, vs. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; et al., Defendants.

AIKEN, Judge: Plaintiff Kristine Yates alleges defendants have violated her rights by constructing a solar energy array on the property parcel adjacent to her property. Plaintiff proceeds on her claims pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Defendant Marion County Planning Department (“Marion County”): filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all plaintiffs claims against it. For the reasons set forth below, defendant’s summary judgment motion is GRANTED.

1 Marion County Planning Department is not a separate legal entity from Marion County. Although this defendant refers to itself as Marion County Planning Department throughout its briefing, this opinion will refer to defendant as “Marion County.” Page 1 - OPINION AND ORDER

BACKGROUND PlaintiinSf ifllvievretso onnE, x cOlruesgioUvnse,ze o Fnaerdm (l"aEnFdU." ) DefendSainltv eSrotloLanLr C,( "SilSvoelratarop"np) lfo irea Cd o nditUisoen al Permtioit n sat1 a2l-la cre osonapl raor p(ea"rrtstrhuyaeby j percotp eardtjya"c)e nt toa njdu nsotr otpfhl ainptrioffpseT rhtseyu .b jpercotpi easrl tzsyoo n EeFdU A.t thtei mteh,Me a riCoonu nCtoyd( e" MCaCl"l)o twhetidys p oefs olaarrr aasay condiutsiieont n haEelF Uz onSee.Me o tS.u mmJ..( do1c4.8E )x1 .0 a1t8 .O2n Janu1a9r2,y0 1M6a,r iCoonu nPtlya'nsnD iinrgeg crtaonrtt heaedp pliicnaa t ion

"NotoiDfce ec isIidoa.nt6 . -"1 0. Int hseu mmoef2r 0 1t7h,se o laarrr waaybs u iolntt h seu bjpercotp erty. Plaintitffh saahtlde li nedog rtee sc eniovtoeitf ch epe l atnoc onstthrseuo clatar rr ay. Additipolnaailanlltyli,efft g heatsth c eo nstnri unectrtfieowriethdhe urs aen d enjoyomhfee nprtr opaenrtdth yta htce o nstrcuacutsflieoodon do inhn egpr r operty. Plaifinrtsfiitlff ea cd o mplianNi onvte m2b0e1ra7 l,l edgaimnagig necsu rred fromt hceo nstrouftc htseio olanar rr aTyhC.eo uhratps r evidoiussmlioyst sheedr defendfoarnl taoscjf ku risdfaiiclttuiosro tena ac,t l ea ainmgd,r antthreeed m aining

defendsaunmtmsa ry jountd hgtemr eensatpn andsu si scalnacaiesm sse argtaeidn st them. AddtihCteoi uohrnatads li lsym,ip slsaeidn tiffsE qcuiPaarlio mtse cfotri on

2T heC ountyN'otsi ocfeD ecisrieogna rdSiinlgv erStoolna r's apopblsiecravttehidao tn "Chap1t7e.r1 36(.F0)5(0o3 ft) h eM arioCno untCyo de(M CC)p ermiat psh otovoslotlapaiorcw er generafatciinlgii nta ynE FUz onaes a c ondituisoens,au lb jteocM tC C1 7.120.M1o1t0S..u "m mJ. . (do1c4.8 E)x .1 01a t8 .T heN otiacless ot attehda" tM CC1 7.120.1s1t0a(tt2eh)sa fotr,h igh-value farmlasnoidl dse scraitbO eRdS1 95.300.(.1[0.ap)] h, o tovoslotlapaiorcw egre neraftaicoinsl hiatlyl noptr eclmuodrete h a1n2 a crefsr oums ea sa commercial agricultIudr(a.el m pehnatseirsp rise. normalizeMdC)C. 1 7.120h.a1s1 0 sbinecerene pealbeudtt, h afta chta sn ob earitnhgei ssues presenhteerwdeh ,i ccho ncewrhne thMearr iCoonu nctoym plwiietdfeh d eraslt,a taen,dl oclaalwi n effeacttt htei moefi tdse cisainodtn h seo laarrr acyo'nss truction. Clauvsieo lafrtaiuoadnn,scd ,i vcioln spiMraarciCyoo.nu nttyh oein slr ye maining defendaannptdls a,i nctliafaifgmsas i initsn tc lnuedgel ipgeesrne pc,re o cedduuer al procneusiss,aa nntcdre e spass. STANDAORFDR EVIEW Whecno nsidaem roitnifogors n u mmajruyd gm"e[ntti],nh qeu pierryfo rmed ist hteh resihnoqludoi fdr eyt ermwihneitnhtgeh rei rste h nee efodr a t rial­ wh ethienor t,h weorr dtsh,ea rreae n gye nufaicnteu iasls tuheaspt r opcearbnle y

resoolnvlbeyyda fi ndoeffar c bte catuhsemeya yr easobnear belsyoi lnfav veodor f eitphaerrtA yn.d"e rvsL.oi nb eLrotbybI yn,c4 .7U,7. S2.4 22,5( 01 98A6m )o.t ifoorn summajruyd gmiepsnr to pgerralny"t itefhdm e o vasnhto twhsat th eirnseo g enuine dispaustt oae n mya tefarciatan ltd h meo vainestn tittojl ueddg maesanm ta ttoefr lawF.e"dR ..C ivP..5 6(Tah)em. o vipnagr htayts h e buorfed setna bltihseh ing abseonafcg ee nuiisnseou fmea tefarcitIa.dlC . e,l·o CtoervxpC. .a tr47e 7tU t.,S3 .1 7, 32(31 98It6fh) me.o vipnagrs thyo twhsae b seonafcg ee nuiisnseou mfea tefarcita,l thneo nmovpianrmgtu ys gtob eyotnhpde l eadainnidgd se nfatcitwfysh ischho aw genuiisnsfoeur te r iCaell.o4 7t 7eU x.,Sa .t3 24".S ummjaurdyg mieisnn ta ppropriate

irfe asojnuarboldrers a,w ailnilgn ferienfan vcoeorsft hneo nmovpianrcgto yu,l d retauv renr diintc htne o nmopvainrgtfa yv'osrD .i"av zE. a gPlreo dLutcdPe1s. h ip, 52F1. 31d2 0112,0( 79 tChi2 r0.0 8). DISCUSSION Marion mCoovufoenrsst uym majruyd gmoenan lctll aaismsse argtaeiidnt s.t Plainnteigfflsi pgeesrne ac ned prodcuepedr uorcaaerlsf esa ctuaanlldel gya lly relaatsae rdhe,e t rr esapnandsu si scalnacieTm hsCe.o uwritlt lh,e reafodrder,e ss thopsaeio rcfsl aiintm usr n. I. NegligPeenrSc eea ndP rocedDuureaP lr ocess Plaianstsietffrh tMasat r iCoonu nctoym mintetgeldi pgeesrnea c nvedi olated hedru per ocreisgbshy ft asi tloni ontghi eforytf h pel atnoc onstasr oulcaatrr ro any

thseu bjpercotp erty. MariCoonu natcyk nowtlheaidattgp e psr otvhpeeed r maiptp lifocrat thieo n solaarrrw aiyt hfiorupstrt o vindoitaningcad eh earBiuntg .M aCroiuonants ys erts thsatta ltaaewn d ccooudanelt lylo awnu dsp ee rmidtetciintsgoii sosnwusie t hao ut hearsioln ogna gsa npye rssotna tuetnotriittlonly oe tdii pscr eo vniodteoidftc hee deciasniadono n p porttuaonp ipitetyaA. lc cortdMoia nrgi on iCstoe upnnltta yi,n tiff thJea nu1a9r2,y0 1N6o toifDc eec icsoinocne trhnseio nlagar rr wahyi,ic nhfo rmed plaionhfte irrfi fgt hoat p ptehadele cibsuiptol na,ifa nitliteffoed x erhceiarsp ep eal

rights. Ins uppoofir ttss u mmary jmuodtgiMmoaenrn,it o n Couenvtiyd eonffceer s thaotnJ, a nu1a9r2,y0 1i6mt,a iltehNdeo toifDce ec itsopi loani antht eiPrffO B ox addrSeesMeso .tS .u mmJ..( do1c4.8E )x1 .0 a1t2 -(3d eclaorTfaa tmAiimo anli ad).; at4 -(5c ertoimffia cialtiienn cgl,ul dioisrfnte g c ipainedn tmsa ilingi-daa.td dress 6-1(0N otoifDc eec isseinwotin t mha iliMnogtS).u; m mJ..( do1c4.8E )x1 .0 a4t 9 (excerpt from deposition of Kristine Yates, where plaintiff acknowledges that the address listed next to her name on the mailing list is plaintiffs mailing address). Plaintiff does not challenge Marion County’s evidence that it mailed the Notice of Decision to her. Instead, she responds that she did not have an opportunity to appeal the decision because she did not receive the Notice of Decision. Plaintiff offers her own declaration and declarations from three neighbors, who were also included on the mailing list, which aver that they never received the Notice of Decision by mail. Yates Decl. (doc. 160) June 12, 2019; id. Exs. 1a, 1b, le. Accordingly, the Court must determine whether an Oregon statutes or due process required Marion County to ensure that plaintiff received the mailed Notice of Decision. A. Negligence Per Se Plaintiffs fourth claim, negligence per se, alleges that Marion County had a duty to notify plaintiff “regarding the intent ... to construct a solar array on the [property] adjoining Plaintiffs ... property” and failed todo so. Am. Compl. J 84.4 To prevail on a claim for negligence per se, plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) “defendants violated a statute”; (2) “that plaintiff was injured as a result of that violation”; (83) “that plaintiff was a member of the class of persons meant to be

3 As explained below, to be liable for negligence per se under Oregon law, a defendant must have violated a statute. 4 Plaintiff also alleges that Marion County was negligent in failing to "properly evaluate soil compaction plans, and water migration" and "prevent the construction" of a ditch within ten feet of plaintiffs property. Am. Compl. § 87, 90. Although Marion County’s motion addresses those allegations, the Court need not consider them. The Court previously dismissed all plaintiffs theories of negligence per se except for lack of notice in its April 30, 2018 Order & Opinion. Yates v. U.S. Envtl Prot. Agency, 2018 WI, 2033290, at *2-*3 (D. Or. 2018). Page 5 - OPINION AND ORDER

protected by the statute”; and (4) “that the injury plaintiff suffered is of a type that the statute was enacted to prevent.” McAlpine v. Mulinomah Cty., 131 Or. App. 136, 144 (1994). Plaintiff does not allege that Marion County violated a statute or otherwise specify the source of Marion County’s alleged duty to notify her. However, Marion County acknowledges that state law, and particularly ORS 215.416(11), allows it to make permitting decisions without a hearing, so long as certain impacted parties are provided notice of the decision and an opportunity to appeal. ORS 215.416(11) provides that a county’s governing body or its designee “may approve or deny an application for a permit without a hearing if” the county “gives notice of the decision and provides an opportunity for any person who is [impacted] or who is entitled to notice under paragraph (c) of this subjection, to file an appeal.” ORS 215.416(11)(a)(A). The statute also provides that “[w]ritten notice of the decision shall be mailed to those persons described in paragraph (c) of this subsection.” ORS 215.416(11)(a)(B). Paragraph (c) provides that “[nJotice of a decision... shall be provided to the ... owners of record of property ... located within 750 feet of the property that is the subject of the notice when the subject property is within” and EFU zone. ORS 215.416(11)(c)(A). Because plaintiff owned property adjacent to the EFU-zoned subject property, she was entitled to notice of Marion County’s decision. ORS 215.416(11) required Marion County to mail her notice of the decision, and Marion County’s evidence that it mailed the Notice of Decision to plaintiffis undisputed.

Page 6 —- OPINION AND ORDER

Thset atduoteneso i tn claunad cet nuoatlri ecqeu irbeumitedt ni trd,e quire □ MariCoonu n"ttpyor iodveano pportfournp"il tayi "nttfioil ffae n a ppeaOlR.S" 215.416(P1l1a)i(cnaot)ni.tff e tnhdassth dei ndo hta vaeno pporttuofin liaetn y appebaelc asuhsdeei ndo rte cetihvNeeo tiocfDe e cisiowna smt ahialtteoh d e r. Howevtehrce o ntoefxt thr ee quirienmO eRnS2t 1 5.416t(h1a1lt)a (nuads) e □ decisio"npmraokveairnods pe port.u.tn.ofii ltaeyna ppedaelm"o nsttrhaatt etsh e provirseiqoutnih rdeee sc isiotnom amkaaneak rpe peparlosca evsasi ltaoab ffleec ted partiepsl alibinyktc eir ffe aatp irnogc iensfosr,m aiffnegc ptaerdt oifte hspe r ocess antdh aec titohnemsyu stta kteoe ngaignie ta ,nh do ldaih nega rpiunrgs utaotn hte prociefas nsa ppeiaspl r opefirlleydS .u bpara(gCro)afO p RhS 2 15.'416(11)( provtihdaeatNs o tiocfDe e cimsuisoatnm, o nogt htehri n"gsstt ahtae[t i mpacted persaonntdsh ose etnont oittimlcaeeyad] p peada elc ibsyfii loinan w gr itatpepne al int hmea nnaenrd w ithtihnte i mpee ripordo viidnte hdce o untlya'nusds e regulaatnitdoh na"stt" hd ee ciwsiinloolnbt e cofimneau ln ttihlpe e rfoirofi dl ian g locaaplp ehaaelsx pi"r Seudb.para(gCra)al ppshro o vtihdaeacts o un"tmyan yo t estabalnai psphep aelrd ti hoaitls e tshsa 1n2d ayfsr otmhd ea ttehw er itntoetni ce odfe ci.s.iwo.anms a ileOdR.S2" 1 5.416(a)(ll)(C). MariCoonu nteyv'isd ednecmeo nsttrhaatitet cs o mplwiietdOh R S 215.41l6)((aaCn))dt( ,hl u psr,o vpildaeidwn ittaihnffo pporttuofin liaetna y p peal. ThNeo tiocfDe e cimsaiiolnte opd l aienxtpilffa tihna"et[d a o]nnweyh od isagrees witthh .e.. d ecimsaiyro enq uaensa tp"p ehaela reixnpgl,a hionwte ord e quae st hearsitnagtt,he aadtl a lp peraelq umeusstbtser ecebiyvM eadr iCoonu nPtlya nning Division by “5:00p.m. on February 3, 2016[,]” and that the decision would be “effective February 4, 2016, unless further consideration is requested.” Mot. Summ. J. (doc. 148) Ex. 101 at 7. Finally, Marion County adopted an appeals process that allowed a 15-day appeal period. See id. Ex. 104 at 16 (excerpt from MCC 17.119.140); MCC 17.119.140 (providing a 15-day appeal period from a decision on a Conditional Use Permit application); MCC 17.119.150 (providing a public hearing and decision on appeals); MCC Ch. 17.111 (establishing a public hearing process). In sum, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact □

regarding whether Marion County violated ORS 215.416(11). Marion County is, therefore, entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs negligence per se claim. B. Procedural Due Process Plaintiff's second claim alleges a violation of her right to procedural due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Procedural due process “imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment[s].”. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). Procedural due process requires that “[1] a person deprived of property [2] be given an opportunity to be heard [8] at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Yagman v. Garcetti, 852 F.3d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 2017). Whether an individual has a property interest entitled to constitutional protection is a question of state law. Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1810, 13816 (9th Cir. 1989).

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In prior opinions, the Court explained that plaintiffs statutory right to notice under ORS 215.416 may amount to a constitutionally protected property interest, but that Oregon law was unsettled on that point. Now, Marion County moves for summary judgment, arguing that it does not because the statute’s notice requirements do not operate as a “significant substantive restriction” on Marion County’s actions. Reply (doc. 162) at 4 (quoting Parks v. Waison, 716 F.2d 646, 657 (9th Cir. 1983)). The Court need not determine whether the notice requirement in ORS 215.415(11) amounts to a property interest protected by due process because, as explained in Section A above, Marion County’s evidence demonstrates that complied with the notice provisions of ORS 215.415(11) by mailing plaintiff the Notice of Decision, and plaintiff failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of fact on that issue. Therefore, even assuming plaintiff had a protected property interest in notice under ORS 215.416, plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Marion County’s actions deprived her of that property interest. Accordingly, plaintiffs due process claim fails as a matter of law on the first requirement enumerated in Yagman, and Marion County is entitled to summary judgment. II. Trespass and Nuisance Plaintiffs sixth and seventh claims allege that all defendants are liable for trespasses and nuisances caused by construction of the solar array. Trespass and private nuisance are separate fields of tort liability relating to actionable interference with the possession of land. They may be distinguished by comparing the interest

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invaadnea dc;t ioinnavbalosefi oan poisnsteesirsnteo hseretx' csl upsoisvsee ssion olfa nidast resapnaa scst;i oinnavbalosefai p oons seisnstoerir'ntes hs uets a en d enjoyomhfei lnsat ni adsn uisaMnacretv.iR. ne ynoMledtsaC lo2s. 2,O1 r 8.6( 1959). MariCoonu natryg utheiasitt es n tittosl uemdm ajruyd gmoenbn ottc hl aims becatuhseeir sne o e vidtehnacMtea riCoonu nttoyoa kn ayc ttihoanct a usae d tresoprna usiss aMnacreiC.oo nu natlyas rog utehsai tits n orte spofonrsa inbyl e alletgoerdtlciyoo nudbsuy tc hto isnev oilntv hecedo nstip·ruoccteisosn. Plaidnotenisoffa t l loerpg reo veivdied tehnMacater iCoonu nttoyao nka ction

thdaitr eccatulseyei dtt hheaerl letgreedso prna usiss ances.h aeIr ngstutheeasat d,, byi ssutihCneog n ditUisPoeen ramlfoi rtt h seo laarrr Maayr,i Coonu n"tays sumed inspercetsipoonn sfoirtb hicelo intsyt"r purcotciReoesnss( p,d. o 1c5.9a )t8 ,a nd "allcoownesdt rouafcd triaoindni atgacenh ed a rctohm padcitrieobcnet hli[ynh de r] propaenrwdte ywl,il t .h.i[.nt h5e5fe] e [ts siect] baarceakan 2 d0 f e[estsi ec]t back areiant h.e. s.i ptlea fonrst "hs eo laarrr iady., Genernaulilsyaa,nn ctder espassa na rcetqiuotinhr deeeb feyn doaran tt , leaasctt iboyan p sa rtthyad te fendiasrn ets pofonrs.Si ebMela er tvi.Un n iPoanc .

R.Co2.,5O 6r 5.6 35,6 (51 9(7e0x)p ltahianatit nrge srpeaqsusai nri enst rusion causbyead d e fend"ainntt'esn nteigolniagle,n otru, l trreachkalczeoasnrsdd uocuts" ); Marvk.S ta(tMea rII)k1, 9 O1r A.p p5.6 35,7 (32 0(0e4x)p lathianatip nrgi vate nuisaand ceefe nids"a unntr'esa snoonna-btlree isnptaesrsfowerirytae hnn octeh er's privuasatene ed n joyomlfea nntRd e"s)t;a t(eSmeecnoTtno dr§)t§8,s 3 4-8(4109A6 5) (descpreirbsiloningafos br nl uei sance). Plaintiff has not provided evidence to show that Marion County was responsible for the actions of construction workers on the property. The Conditional Use Permit did not give Marion County control over the actions of the construction workers. Nor did the permit indicate that Marion County was responsible for intermittent inspections or monitoring of the construction site during construction. Mot. Summ. J. (doc. 148) Ex. 101, at 6-10. Instead the permit required Marion County to perform a final building inspection. Id. Marion County performed the final inspection, and the subject property passed. Jd. Ex. 103 at 9. As part of that inspection, the County concluded that the applicant had complied with the applicable setback of 20 feet. Jd. at 2-3. Plaintiff contends that there is a genuine dispute regarding whether the construction did, in fact, comply with the setbacks because she observed the construction of a drainage ditch and soil compaction within 20 feet of her property. Plaintiff asserts that those activities caused a trespass by causing flooding on her property. She further asserts that vibrations from soil compaction equipment so close to her property shook her home, constituting a nuisance. But, as Marion County points out, the 20-foot setback was an area where structures could not be erected. MCC 17.136.100(B); Mot. Summ. J. (148) Ex. 102 at 2-3 (Declaration of Glen Fennimore). Marion County Code defines “structure” as “that which is built or constructed, an edifice or building of any kind, or any piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts joined together in some definite manner[.]” MCC 17.110.555. Neither soil compaction nor a drainage ditch meet that

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definition. And, even assuming that the ditch was a structure, both parties note that plaintiffs property is downhill from the subject property and that water naturally flows southwest from the subject property onto plaintiffs property. As this Court has already concluded, that undisputed evidence demonstrates that any runoff or flooding allegedly caused by the ditch did not constitute a water trespass. Yates v. United States Envt Prot. Agency, No. 6:17-cv-1819-AA, 2019 WL 4580042, at *15 (D. Or. Sept. 20, 2019). Plaintiff also asserts that the construction violated a requirement that “the developed portion of the site will be at least 55 feet from farmed properties.” Resp. at 12 (quoting Doc. 148 Ex. 102 at 8). The site improvement plan map on which plaintiff relies designates a 55-foot “shade buffer,” distinct from the 20-foot setback. Mot. Summ. J. (doc. 148) Ex. 102 at 7. That shade buffer was not required by code, and Marion County had no ability to require or enforce it. Therefore, Marion County was not responsible for any failure to comply with the proposed, voluntary shade buffer.s Therefore, plaintiff has not shown that a genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding whether Marion County was responsible for any conduct that constituted a trespass or nuisance, Marion County is entitled to summary judgment on both claims. □

6 The Court will not address plaintiffs assertion that Marion County failed to ensure that the permit holders complied with other conditions in the Notice of Decision, ike weed management, because that conduct was not alleged in the Amended Complaint. Page 12— OPINION AND ORDER

CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 148) is GRANTED. ITIS SO ORDERED. Dated this /F “tay of April 2020

| 2 LAA bene Ann Aiken U.S. District Judge

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