Yates v. State

392 So. 2d 1020, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 18756
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedJanuary 28, 1981
DocketNo. 80-179
StatusPublished

This text of 392 So. 2d 1020 (Yates v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Yates v. State, 392 So. 2d 1020, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 18756 (Fla. Ct. App. 1981).

Opinion

SHARP, Judge.

Yates pled nolo contendere to the charge of “escape,”1 and reserved the right to challenge in this appeal the sufficiency of the criminal information filed against him. The information charged Yates with leaving the Kissimmee Community Correctional Center without permission, after having been committed to the Department of Corrections and sentenced to serve the remainder of his probationary term because he had violated the terms of his probation.2 We agree with the trial judge that Yates was charged with a violation of the “escape” statute.3

Initially Yates argues he did not flee from a penal institution described in the statute. Section 944.40, Florida Statutes (1979) provides:

Any prisoner confined in any prison, jail, road camp, or other penal institution, state, county or municipal, .. . who escapes ... from such confinement shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, ....

Although the statute does not specify “community correctional centers,” its use of the terms “prison,” “jail,” and “road camp” are not exclusive, because it clearly says “or other penal institution(s).”4 This statute applies to various kinds of correctional facilities, including those unforeseen and nonexistent at the time the statute was adopted, where the liberty of a person is restricted and he is in the lawful custody of the Department of Corrections because of his conviction of a criminal statute.

Yates also argues that he was not subject to the “escape” statute because he was not serving a “sentence of imprisonment” when he escaped. As charged in the information, pursuant to section 948.01(6), Yates had been committed to the Department of Corrections and he was serving the balance of his probation in the community facility after having violated the terms of his probation. He was at that time a “prisoner” within the meaning of the criminal law5 and he was a person under sentence of imprisonment. Peek v. State, 395 So.2d 492 (Fla. 1980).

AFFIRMED.

DAUKSCH, C. J., and ORFINGER, J., concur.

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Related

Watford v. State
353 So. 2d 1263 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1978)
Peek v. State
395 So. 2d 492 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1981)
State v. Akers
367 So. 2d 700 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1979)
Pompano Horse Club, Inc. v. State Ex Rel. Bryan
111 So. 801 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1927)
The Children's Bootery v. Sutker
107 So. 345 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1926)
Schleman v. Guaranty Title Company
15 So. 2d 754 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1943)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
392 So. 2d 1020, 1981 Fla. App. LEXIS 18756, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/yates-v-state-fladistctapp-1981.