Yates v. Iams

10 Tex. 168
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 1, 1853
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 10 Tex. 168 (Yates v. Iams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Yates v. Iams, 10 Tex. 168 (Tex. 1853).

Opinion

Hemphill, Cu. J.

This case was argued and submitted upon the same statement of facts as the suit in which the present appellant prosecuted an appeal from a judgment against him in favor of Sam Houston; which judgment was affirmed by the court. (4 Tex. R., 433.)

Both parties claim through John Iams, sen. Appellant claimed the land by purchase from John Iams, jun., and Ruth Iams, who, he alleges, are the only legitimate heirs of John Iams, sen., and he contends that the plaintiffs in this suit in the court helow, who are appellees im this court, are the illegitimate children of the said John Iams, sen., and Tabitha, now Tabitlia Harris, and incapable of succeeding as heirs of the said John Iams, sen.

[85]*85Tiie legitimacy of tlie appellees and their capacity to take as heirs of their reputed father was settled by the decision in the case of Houston and this appellant in establishing the status of their mother to be the wife of the said John lams, sen.

Tlie statement of facts shows that John lams, jan., and Euth lams are the children of the said John, sen., by another mother, born in the State of Ohio, and that their father was lawfully married to their mother. John and Eutli are, then, the half brother and sister of the appellees; and the appellant claims all the title that accrued to them as heirs to their father. As to John lams, jun., there can bo no sort of doubt but lie is joint heir with the plaintiffs, as it is in evidence that lie came to the country with his father in 1822, and was a member of ills family at the date of the grant from the government of Mexico' to his father for the land now in controversy. But it is different with Euth. It is in evidence that she remained in Ohio when her father left in 1818, and never came to Tekas; and that she sold to the appellant in 1840. The headlight of her father was obtained in 1824; and he died in 1827, and the question is whether she had any right, as heir to her father, to convey, in 1840, when she conveyed to the appellant.

The rights of foreigners, especially of the transient class, and of foreign heirs in relation to lauded property in Spain, are not very easily to be understood.. In Spain foreigners are divided into two classes, the domiciliated and the transient, and there is an important difference between the rights, duties, and obligations of the two classes.

There are various modes by which a foreigner may become or be regarded as avecindado, or domiciliated; as, for instance, by naturalization ; by being born in the kingdom ; by being converted thereto the holy Catholic faith; by establishing a domicile, obtaining the right of residence in some settlement, marrying a native woman, and domiciliating himself in tlie kingdom ; and among other inodes of domiciliating himself is'that of attaching himself to the soil by purchasing and acquiring real property and possessions. Domiciliation is, in most respects, equivalent to naturalization. The domiciliated foreigner is regarded as a subject; and as such he must take the oatli of. allegiance, renouncing foreign protection and any relation or civil subjection to his own couutry. (L. 3,- Tit. 11, Book 6, Hov. Eec.) I-Iis rights can be defined without difficulty. He is in tlie condition of a native citizen, and is, as a general rule, entitled to the same rights and to the like charges and obligations.

A transient foreigner is defined to be one who visits tlie country without the intention of remaining; and his rights, especially with reference to real property, are not so easily comprehended. He is exempted, from some of tlie charges to which tiie domiciliated foreigner, in the capacity of a citizen, is subjected, but lie labors under tlie most onerous restrictions. He cannot sell goods by retail; nor can lie engage in the exercise of any liberal art or mechanical employment. He cannot employ himself as a banker, shopkeeper, carpenter, wigmaker, tailor, shoemaker, architect, painter, or surgeon, veterinary or otherwise, nor act even as a servant to a Spanish subject, without express license from the king; and if he attempt tlie exercise of any of these employments without domiciliating himself and taking the oatli of fidelity, he was liable to banishment in fifteen days from the court, and in two months from the kingdom. (Art. G and 7, L. 9, Tit. XI, Book G, Uov. Eec.) But a foreigner of the transient class majr sell goods by wholesale, or act as factor charged with certain affairs, or in tlie prosecution of suits in relation to these and other matters. (Diccionario of Escrielie, Yerbo ExtbANG-ERO.)

From a review of the above it appears that the acquisition of real property and possessions is a badge, or rather conclusive evidence, of domiciliation, or its equivalent, naturalization. The acquisition of such property is regarded as fixing tlie foreigner to tlie soil. He who, says the law, se anaiga comprando y adquiriendo bienes raíces y possessiones, is regarded as domiciliated. But notwithstanding such is tlie law, and it is so stated by Escrielie in his [86]*86dictionary, yet, according to this author, the transient foreigner is also entitled to hold and possess real property. How a transient foreigner can acquire landed property when the very possession of such property impresses upon him, by law, the character of domiciliation, is, to say the least, not very comprehensible.

Transient foreigners, says Escriche, are subject to the laws for contracts made or crimes committed' in Spanish territory, and also with respect to real property which they shall possess in the same. And, to support this statement, lie refers to L. 13, Tit. 1, Part 1; Inducción de la ley 15, Tit. 14, Part 3, Ciro, de 23 Aug., de 1771; Ced. de 24 de Oct., de 1782; L. S, Tit. 36, Lib. 12, Nov. Bee. y nota 12, Tit. 11, Lib. C, Nov. Bee. I have examined all these laws, with the exception of the circular of the 23d August, 1771, which is not accessible, and in neither of the others is there any reference to the rights of transient foreigners to hold real property in Spain. Unless the statement be founded on this circular, it is not supported so far as it relates to the real property of transient foreigners in Spain by the authorities cited.

It is also said by Escriche that a foreigner, whether transient or domiciliated, can dispose of his property freely by contract inter vivos or by last will, as well in favor of foreigners as of natives, and, if he shall die without a will, his property shall not bo confiscated, but shall be delivered to his heirs though they may be foreigners, and that the right aubana (that is, escheat, where the heirs are aliens) does not exist in Spain. If this be the law — and Escriche is very high authority — the right of a foreign hern to succeed to real property in Spain cannot well be questioned.

The state of the law then appears to be this, that a person prohibited from engaging in the exercise of any liberal art, mechanical- employment, or even servile office, (with some special exceptions pointed out by law,) and who is subject to banishment if lie attempts the exercise of any of these employments without taking the oath of fidelity, can acquire for himself, and transmit by inheritance to an heir in a foreign country, landed property, or that very species of property the acquisition of which, by law, fixes upon him the character of domiciliation and all the rights and duties of a resident subject. This might be intelligible if all the laws and their received construction were before us. As it stands, it is incomprehensible.

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Bluebook (online)
10 Tex. 168, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/yates-v-iams-tex-1853.