Yates v. District of Columbia

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: June 17, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2026-2089
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MARIE YATES, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action No. 26-02089 (UNA) v. ) ) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., ) ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, appearing pro se, has filed a complaint for injunctive relief, a motion to proceed

in forma pauperis (IFP), and a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO). For the following

reasons, the court grants the IFP motion, denies the TRO motion, and dismisses the complaint.

Plaintiff’s housing case is pending in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. See

Yates v. N.H.P. Foundation, No. 2025-CAB-003982 (designating case as “open”). In both the

TRO motion and instant complaint, Plaintiff seeks “to halt and stay” a Superior Court scheduling

order. TRO Mot. ¶ 1, ECF No. 3; Compl., ECF No. 1 at 7; see TRO Mot. ¶ 2 (“[O]n May 29,

2026, the Associate Judge granted a 60-day continuance but explicitly set the closure date for July

24, 2026, stripping 4 critical days from Plaintiff’s timeline to find counsel.”).

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” possessing “only that power authorized

by Constitution and statute,” and it is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.”

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). A “court

without jurisdiction over an underlying case cannot issue a TRO[.]” Barwood, Inc. v. District of

Columbia, 202 F.3d 290, 295 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Plaintiff asserts that the events giving rise to this action occurred at her D.C. “residence

and in the DC Superior Court and DC Court of Appeals.” Id at 4. Her factual allegations and

demands for relief focus entirely on the proceedings in the local courts, see id. at 6-7, over which

this court cannot exercise jurisdiction. See United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D.D.C.

2011) (as “a trial level court in the federal judicial system,” district courts “generally lack[]

appellate jurisdiction over other judicial bodies, and cannot exercise appellate mandamus over

other courts”) (citing Lewis v. Green, 629 F. Supp. 546, 553 (D.D.C. 1986)); Chen v. Raz, 172

F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of complaint seeking review of

Superior Court’s decision in probate matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); see also Amiri

v. Gelman Management Company, No. 08-cv-1864, 2010 WL 11575469, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 18,

2010), aff’d, 427 F. App’x 17 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 2, 2011), citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45

(1971) and JMM Corp. v. District of Columbia, 378 F.3d 1117, 1120-22 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (It is

“well settled doctrine that federal courts should not enjoin ongoing state [or District of Columbia]

[judicial] proceedings” except in extraordinary circumstances). Therefore, this case will be

dismissed by separate order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

_________/s/_____________ TANYA S. CHUTKAN Date: June 17, 2026 United States District Judge