Yates Ranch Oil & Royalties v. Jones

100 F.2d 419, 1938 U.S. App. LEXIS 2673
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedDecember 16, 1938
DocketNo. 8718
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 100 F.2d 419 (Yates Ranch Oil & Royalties v. Jones) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Yates Ranch Oil & Royalties v. Jones, 100 F.2d 419, 1938 U.S. App. LEXIS 2673 (5th Cir. 1938).

Opinion

SIBLEY, Circuit Judge.

Two stockholders, owning respectively five and fifty-five shares out of a total of sixty thousand shares of stock in Yates Ranch Oil and Royalties Company, on May 4, 1936, filed in behalf of all stockholders a bill in the District Court against the corporation and C. A. Everts, who since April, 1930, had been its president and manager. It charged a corrupt bargain on the part of Everts with one Hoover, who preceded him as president, whereby Everts paid Hoover $10,000 for seventy-nine shares of stock and the presidency of the Company; that Everts had since by misrepresentation to the eighteen hundred stockholders obtained each year their proxies by which he elected dummy directors and continued in power; that he had mismanaged the corporation, paid himself and his wife unreasonable and unearned sums, and was about to dissipate $40,000 which would soon be received in cash from oil royalties held up by the pipe line companies during a long litigation. An account with Everts was prayed, and a recovery for the Company against him o f the $10,000 paid Hoover, and of what Everts had wrongfully diverted, and a receiver to take the Company’s affairs in hand. Discovery under oath was neither prayed nor waived.

The answer, sworn to positively by Everts, denied all the wrongdoing charged and made a showing of honest and economical administration of the corporate affairs during a very trying time and under ad[420]*420verse circumstances. Everts offered to make good any sum which it might be found he had improperly received. There was also a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complainants, holding but one-tenth of one percent of the .stock, had shown no right to act for the corporation or disturb its affairs.

The motion to dismiss was overruled. After hearing evidence, on Nov. 20, 1937, a decree was made ordering an account to be taken between the corporation and Everts. It continued; “The Court is of the opinion that the affairs of the respondent corporation have been mismanaged by the said C. A. Everts, and that on account of the great number of stockholders, who live in many parts of the United States and other countries, it would be impossible to secure concerted action of said stockholders to elect proper officers of said corporation; that all the assets and properties of said corporation should be impounded and sold to the best advantage, and distribution of the proceeds made to said stockholders; it is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that” a named receiver be appointed, directed to employ counsel and take over the business; and Everts was enjoined from interfering with or from disposing of assets or the books of the corporation. This appeal, the receivership being superseded, asserts that a receiver should not have been appointed, and that the bill should have been dismissed.

On the face of the bill there was enough to justify an inquiry into what, if anything, the president and manager of the corporation owed it. The allegations were that the two other directors were one a member of his family and the other a clerk in his office, so that they could not be expected to sue him in behalf of the corporation. The stockholders were alleged to exceed eighteen thousand in number, to average in ownership only four shares each of a par value of $1 per share; that their names and addresses were unknown to the complainants and they were widely scattered and had never attended any stockholders’ meeting, and that it was practically impossible to obtain concerted action by them. If these two stockholders, small though their interest is, are willing to assume the labor and responsibility of recovering this supposed asset of the Company in behalf of all, a court of equity without great risk of doing an injustice might countenance it. But the phase of the bill which sought a receivership and the taking of the general affairs of the corporation out of the hands of those elected to manage them by the body of the stockholders is a much more' serious matter. If the majority are satisfied with the management and desire to continue Everts in control, a small minority ought to be held strictly to the preliminaries required to enable them to sue in behalf of the corporation. They assert no advantage taken of them by the majority, but present only contentions in which their interest is exactly like that of every other stockholder. The broad questions of who should be president and manager and directors, and whether the business should be carried on or terminated, ought to be decided by the stockholders in meeting, and not by a court at the instance of shareholders having a. one-thousandth interest and a total par value investment of $60.00. We said in Stone v. Holly Hill Fruit Products Co., 5 Cir., 56 F.2d 553, where the corporate officers were sought to be- dispossessed by minority stockholders [page 554] : “It is not alleged that there is any wrong combination of a majority of the stockholders, but only that they live at a distance, are ignorant of the situation, and send their proxies to the president. The plain remedy for. that would be to seek another stockholders’ meeting,'after informing the other stockholders of the situation and asking them to withdraw their proxies and to attend. A stockholder, in taking stock in the ordinary corporation, submits, within the charter limits, to a guidance of the corporate affairs according to the will of the owners of a majority of the stock and through the directors whom the majority choose. The minority have a right to have the majority exercise their judgment, and to exercise it honestly and not fraudulently, but have no right to have a court substitute their own ideas and wishes for those of the majority, and that in advance of any refsual of the majority to hear and decide on the matter at issue.” These complainants as stockholders had a right to inspect the books of their company, and to learn who the stockholders are and their addresses. That they are numerous does not authorize two to act for all, there being no sudden emergency. If such a rule were established, the largest corporations might be embarrassed by many suits thus brought by slight stockholdings without any previous effort to ascertain by the usual means the will of the majority. This bill could [421]*421not be retained for the purpose of ousting corporate officers or ending the corporate enterprise. Only because it also seeks the adjustment of an account with the ^person in sole control of the corporation who could not sue himself, do we affirm the refusal.to dismiss it.

What we have said amounts to a reversal of the appointment of a receiver. A reversal is further required by a consideration of the evidence. It appears that these complainants through the same attorneys had previously filed a bill for a receiver in a State court, and had abandoned it. They had never attended the stockholders’ meetings, which were held on a date in April each year, nor asked to see the books, nor sought to know who or where the other stockholders were. It appears that though Everts is the largest stockholder, owning nine thousand shares, two others have each about two thousand shares and had been invited by Everts to become directors but had declined. A stockholders’ meeting was held in April, 1937, pending this suit. Everts in sending out the notice of it advised each stockholder of the suit in the State court, and of this renewal of it in the federal court, and of the nature of the charges made against him, and stated his version of the matter.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Bruce & Co. v. Bothwell
8 F.R.D. 45 (S.D. New York, 1948)
Strong v. Broward County Kennel Club, Inc.
65 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Florida, 1946)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
100 F.2d 419, 1938 U.S. App. LEXIS 2673, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/yates-ranch-oil-royalties-v-jones-ca5-1938.