USCA4 Appeal: 22-1176 Doc: 89 Filed: 08/14/2025 Pg: 1 of 15
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-1176
YASMIN CLARIBAL RIVAS DE NOLASCO; ROUESELYN LILIANA VASQUEZ-RIVAS; G.E.N.R.; A.S.N.R.,
Petitioners,
v.
PAMELA JO BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Argued: March 18, 2025 Decided: August 14, 2025
Before NIEMEYER and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge
Petition denied by published opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the opinion in which Judge Niemeyer joined. Judge Richardson joined the opinion except for Part III.B, wherein he concurred in the judgment.
ARGUED: A Joo Kim, YACUB LAW OFFICES, LLC, Woodbridge, Virginia, for Petitioners. Jonathan Aaron Robbins, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Mercedes Christina Altman, LAW OFFICE OF MERCEDES ALTMAN, PLLC, Westbury, New York, for Petitioners. Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Neiman-Kelting, Assistant Director, Bryan S. Beier, Senior Litigation Counsel, Erik R. Quick, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. USCA4 Appeal: 22-1176 Doc: 89 Filed: 08/14/2025 Pg: 2 of 15
FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge:
Yasmin Rivas de Nolasco petitions this Court for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision denying her asylum status based upon her
membership in two particular social groups (PSGs). She also contends that she is entitled
to statutory withholding of removal. Having reviewed the record, heard oral argument,
and considered supplemental briefing on our jurisdiction to consider the petition, we deny
Rivas de Nolasco’s petition for review.
I.
Rivas de Nolasco and her three children, all natives and citizens of El Salvador,
entered the United States in November 2015 without being admitted or paroled. Shortly
thereafter, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Notices to Appear,
charging Rivas de Nolasco and her children as removable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)
(“An alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled . . . is
inadmissible.”).
Rivas de Nolasco conceded removability before the Immigration Judge (IJ).
However, she filed applications for asylum, 8 U.S.C. § 1158, and statutory withholding of
removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), based upon her fear of persecution due to membership
in two PSGs. She identified those PSGs as (1) her immediate family, and (2) single
Salvadoran women.
Rivas de Nolasco stated that she left El Salvador “because of the MS gang,” also
referred to as MS-13. J.A. 189. To support her claim for relief, Rivas de Nolasco submitted
2 USCA4 Appeal: 22-1176 Doc: 89 Filed: 08/14/2025 Pg: 3 of 15
an affidavit describing incidents of alleged persecution in El Salvador. First, she stated
that her then-fifth-grade son, Axel, had been “threatened by a classmate named Jose” who
was “joining the MS gang and was trying to get other students to sell drugs with him at the
school.” Id. Axel informed Rivas de Nolasco of this incident after the family had entered
the United States. She alleged that Jose had threatened harm to Axel and his family if he
did not participate in selling the drugs; her testimony before the IJ characterized these
threats as threats of death. See id. at 152. Her written affidavit did not characterize these
threats as death threats. See id. at 189. Axel’s own affidavit stated that he avoided Jose
after two threatening encounters but did not have another interaction with Jose. Axel also
characterized the threats as more vague threats of harm as opposed to death threats. See
id. at 194.
The second incident described by Rivas de Nolasco occurred at her home in El
Salvador. She stated that two armed gang members forced their way into her home to hide
from the police, and threatened her if she did not let them in. Rivas de Nolasco stated she
believed that her home was targeted because she lived alone with her children, while men
lived in the homes located near hers. She and her children left the country two weeks after
this incident.
After a hearing, the IJ denied Rivas de Nolasco’s applications for relief, and the BIA
affirmed its decision. It concluded that the threats against Axel did not constitute
persecution because they “lacked specificity and immediacy.” Id. at 4. The BIA also
reasoned that even if the incident at Rivas de Nolasco’s home with the gang members
amounted to persecution, she had not demonstrated that it was on account of her
3 USCA4 Appeal: 22-1176 Doc: 89 Filed: 08/14/2025 Pg: 4 of 15
membership in a PSG. Further, it affirmed the IJ’s decision that the PSG of single
Salvadoran females is not cognizable, noting that Rivas de Nolasco had not established that
“‘single’ Salvadoran females are perceived as a distinct group by Salvadoran society.” Id.
at 5.
Rivas de Nolasco now petitions this Court for review. 1 She argues the BIA erred
when it dismissed her appeal because she had established that she was entitled to asylum
and statutory withholding. 2 We requested supplemental briefing on the question of our
jurisdiction to consider this petition, which is now complete. After considering the record
and the parties’ contentions, we deny Rivas de Nolasco’s petition for review.
II.
We first assess whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) precludes our review of the merits of
Rivas de Nolasco’s petition. Section 1252(b)(1) states that petitions for review of orders
of removal “must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.”
We have previously characterized § 1252(b)(1) as jurisdictional. See Martinez v. Garland,
86 F.4th 561, 566 (4th Cir. 2023), vacated, Riley v. Bondi, 145 S. Ct. 2190 (2025);
Santos-de Jimenez v. Garland, 53 F.4th 173, 174 (4th Cir. 2022)). “If a party neglects to
1 Rivas de Nolasco’s children are derivative beneficiaries of their mother’s application, so their claims succeed or fail alongside hers. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3). 2 Rivas de Nolasco also sought CAT relief before the IJ, but she expressly abandoned that argument before the BIA. J.A. 49. We therefore lack “the authority to consider the argument in the first instance.” See Kouyate v. Garland, 122 F.4th 132, 140 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Portillo Flores v. Garland, 3 F.4th 615, 632 (4th Cir. 2021) (en banc)).
4 USCA4 Appeal: 22-1176 Doc: 89 Filed: 08/14/2025 Pg: 5 of 15
raise, concedes, or waives” a nonjurisdictional argument, “a court generally has no
obligation to consider it.” Riley, 145 S. Ct. at 2201. But “[t]rue jurisdictional
requirements . . . are different” because “[a] federal court must always satisfy itself that it
has jurisdiction.” Id.; see also 33 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 8316
(2d ed. 2025) (“A litigant’s failure to comply with a jurisdictional bar deprives a court of
all authority to hear a case, regardless of waiver or equitable considerations.”) (citation
modified).
Proceeding with this jurisdictional understanding of § 1252(b)(1), we concluded that
a noncitizen had failed to clear this jurisdictional bar in Martinez, 86 F.4th at 571. Martinez
had reentered the United States several months after being deported in 2018; when DHS
detained him in 2020, his “prior order of removal” was reinstated “from its original date
and [was] not subject to being reopened or reviewed.” Id. at 564 (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(5) (provision governing “Reinstatement of removal orders against aliens illegally
reentering”)). So, because Martinez opted not to contest the removability determination
and only appealed his withholding and CAT claims to the BIA, that removability
determination became final at that time. See id. But § 1252(b)(1) requires a petition for
review be filed within 30 days of a “final order of removal,” and because Martinez did not
file his petition for review until about two years after the removal order became final, he
needed to “identify another eligible order.” Martinez, 86 F.4th at 567.
What about the BIA proceedings culminating in the denial of Martinez’s statutory
withholding and CAT claims? Orders denying those kinds of relief, standing alone, also
do not constitute final orders of removal. See id. That is because neither concludes a
5 USCA4 Appeal: 22-1176 Doc: 89 Filed: 08/14/2025 Pg: 6 of 15
noncitizen is deportable or orders their deportation, and instead an “‘order of removal is
separate from and antecedent to a grant of withholding of removal’ or CAT relief.” Id.
(quoting Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 540 (2021)). Further, eligibility for
either form of relief does not “affect the validity” of a removal order. Id. (quoting
Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 582 (2020)); see Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. at 540 (same).
Lastly, “[a]lthough statutory withholding and CAT orders are not themselves orders of
removal, we nevertheless may review them as part of our review of a final order of
removal.” Martinez, 86 F.4th at 567; see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (“zipper clause” permitting
review of “all questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken or proceeding
brought to remove [the] alien from the United States”).
In this case, Rivas de Nolasco conceded removability before the IJ, and did not
appeal that determination. See J.A. 79. The only matters she pressed before the BIA were
the denial of her asylum and withholding claims. And after the BIA rejected her appeal,
Rivas de Nolasco filed a petition for review well over 30 days after the IJ had finalized its
removability determination which she did not appeal. In light of justiciability concerns
related to the timeliness of Rivas de Nolasco’s petition for review, we ordered
supplemental briefing on the following question:
Does this Court have jurisdiction given the 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) requirement that the “petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal”? See Martinez v. Garland, 86 F.4th 561 (4th Cir. 2023); Salgado v. Garland, 69 F.4th 179 (4th Cir. 2023); Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523 (2021); Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573 (2020).
In supplemental briefing, both parties argued we possessed jurisdiction in this matter and
urged us to consider the merits of Rivas de Nolasco’s petition.
6 USCA4 Appeal: 22-1176 Doc: 89 Filed: 08/14/2025 Pg: 7 of 15
But then, in Riley v. Bondi, the Supreme Court altered the state of play and held that
§ 1252(b)(1) is “not jurisdictional.” 149 S. Ct. at 2203. The Court reasoned that,
“[b]ecause jurisdictional rules have a unique capacity to disrupt the orderly adjudication of
disputes,” it was “reluctant to label a rule ‘jurisdictional’ unless Congress has clearly
signaled that the rule is meant to have that status.” Id. at 2201. And it in turn, it concluded
this “demanding requirement” was not met when it comes to the language of Section
1252(b)(1). Id. at 2202. 3 Therefore, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncement,
we will read § 1252(b)(1) as a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule.
“Courts generally decide only the questions that are presented by the parties.” Id.at
2201. “[A] court will not enforce a procedural rule against a non-complying party if his
opponent has forfeited or waived an objection.” Harrow, 601 U.S. at 483–84. The
government has consistently maintained that we may hear this case, albeit premised upon
our previous holdings classifying the 30-day filing deadline as jurisdictional. But even
then, it maintained the position that “a different finality analysis applies” when a noncitizen
concedes removability but appeals their asylum claim to the BIA, and under that finality
analysis “the petition is timely.” Supplemental Brief of Respondent at 1, 5. At bottom, the
3 The Court reasoned that the statutory language informs noncitizens the steps they must take if they want judicial review, but “provides no directives to courts. It makes no reference to jurisdiction and lacks any language ‘demarcat[ing] a court’s power.’” Riley, 145 S. Ct. at 2202 (emphasis in original) (quoting Harrow v. Dep’t of Def., 601 U.S. 480, 484 (2024)). The Court further observed that the statutory provision was not placed amongst sections pertaining to, for example, appellate courts’ review authority, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4), or matters not subject to judicial review, id. § 1252(a)(2). Riley, 145 S. Ct. at 2202. Congress, the Court concluded, “eschewed those logical homes for a true jurisdictional provision.” Id.
7 USCA4 Appeal: 22-1176 Doc: 89 Filed: 08/14/2025 Pg: 8 of 15
parties have agreed throughout this litigation that § 1252(b)(1) does not foreclose our
review of the petition.
Because the government does not press this basis for declining to review the
petition, we will consider the merits of the petition. See Harrow, 601 U.S. at 483–84. We
therefore leave for another day the question of §1252(b)(1)’s effect when a noncitizen
concedes removability but seeks asylum before the IJ, only raises the denial of their asylum
claim to the BIA, and only files a petition for review following the BIA’s decision.
III.
We now address the merits of Rivas de Nolasco’s petition for review. She argues
that the BIA erred by upholding the IJ’s denial of her claims for asylum and statutory
withholding. Asylum requires a lower evidentiary showing than that of withholding.
“Because the burden of proof for withholding of removal is higher than for asylum . . . an
applicant who is ineligible for asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal.”
Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir. 2004). The burden to demonstrate
eligibility for asylum rests with the applicant, who must establish three elements:
(1) that the applicant has suffered past persecution or has a well-founded fear of future persecution; (2) that the persecution is “on account of” [their] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; and (3) that the persecution is perpetrated by an organization that [their] home country’s government is unable or unwilling to control.
Portillo Flores, 3 F.4th at 626 (quoting Arita-Deras v. Wilkinson, 990 F.3d 350, 357 (4th
Cir. 2021)).
8 USCA4 Appeal: 22-1176 Doc: 89 Filed: 08/14/2025 Pg: 9 of 15
In this case, the Petitioner’s request for relief is premised upon (1) her membership
in the PSG of her immediate family, and persecution she therefore suffered on that basis
because of death threats directed at her son Axel; and (2) her membership in the PSG of
single Salvadoran women, and persecution she therefore suffered on that basis when her
house was allegedly singled out for the gang members to use to hide from pursuing police
officers.
“We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo.” Id. at 625. “[W]e review factual
findings for substantial evidence, treating them as conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Ibarra Chevez v. Garland,
31 F.4th 279, 288–89 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Portillo Flores, 3 F.4th at 626). And when,
as here, the BIA issues “its own detailed opinion affirming the IJ with further reasoning of
its own but without expressly adopting the IJ’s opinion,” we focus our review on the BIA
order. Wambura v. Barr, 980 F.3d 365, 368 n.2 (4th Cir. 2020). Ultimately, we will uphold
the BIA decision “unless it is manifestly contrary to law and an abuse of discretion.”
Portillo Flores, 3 F.4th at 626 (quoting Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 337 (4th Cir.
2014)). “The BIA abuses its discretion ‘if it fails to offer a reasoned explanation for its
decision, or if it distorts or disregards important aspects of the applicant’s claim.’” Id.
(quoting Cordova, 759 F.3d at 337).
A.
We first address Rivas de Nolasco’s contentions regarding the incident in which
gang members demanded entry to and then hid in her home. The IJ found that this incident
9 USCA4 Appeal: 22-1176 Doc: 89 Filed: 08/14/2025 Pg: 10 of 15
established persecution, but it concluded the Petitioner had not established that this
persecution was “on account of” her status as a single Salvadoran female. See Arita-Deras,
990 F.3d at 357. The BIA, in turn, agreed. It assumed arguendo that the incident at her
home constituted persecution and that her proposed PSG of single Salvadoran females was
cognizable. However, it “discern[ed] no clear error in the [IJ]’s finding that the gang
members during the September 2015 incident were motivated by their desire to hide from
the police and that they selected [Rivas de Nolasco]’s home for ease of access and not on
account of a protected ground.” J.A. 5.
Although Rivas de Nolasco’s argument on this point is not particularly well-
developed, after reviewing the record and hearing oral argument we conclude the BIA did
not err in upholding the IJ’s judgment. As evidence supporting her contention that the
gang members targeted her home because she was a single woman, Rivas de Nolasco has
put forth that gang members knew her name and noted that she was known as being single
in the community. She stated that the gang members were fleeing the police after assaulting
an artisan at a nearby festival, and that they remained in her home for approximately an
hour until an unknown individual called one of their phones to confirm the police were no
longer in the area. She also put forth country conditions evidence tending to show that
women in El Salvador face mistreatment by gang members. Finally, a friend present the
evening of the incident submitted an affidavit corroborating Rivas de Nolasco’s testimony
about the gang members using her name and threatening harm unless they were allowed to
hide in the home.
We are not convinced that this evidence compelled the conclusion that Rivas de
10 USCA4 Appeal: 22-1176 Doc: 89 Filed: 08/14/2025 Pg: 11 of 15
Nolasco’s status as a single Salvadoran woman was “at least one central reason for
persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). “A central reason is not
necessarily ‘the central reason or even a dominant central reason,’ but it must be more than
‘incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate’ to another reason for harm.” Cedillos-
Cedillos v. Barr, 962 F.3d 817, 824 (4th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original) (quoting Crespin-
Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 127 (4th Cir. 2011)).
The BIA concluded that the gang members were “motivated by their desire to hide
from the police and that they selected [Rivas de Nolasco]’s home for ease of access and
not on account of a protected ground.” J.A. 5. Substantial evidence supports that
conclusion. That said, in past cases we “have cautioned the BIA against taking an
‘excessively narrow’ approach to the nexus requirement.” Cedillos-Cedillos, 962 F.3d at
825 (quoting Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 949 (4th Cir. 2015)).
For example, in Hernandez-Avalos, gang members threatened to kill the petitioner
if she did not allow her son to join their gang. See 784 F.3d at 947. The BIA rejected the
petitioner’s contention that she had been persecuted as a member of her son’s nuclear
family (a protected ground for asylum purposes, see Crespin-Valladares, 632 F.3d at 125),
and instead concluded she was persecuted because she would not consent to her son’s gang
membership. Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 949. We determined that this was an
“excessively narrow reading” of the nexus requirement, id., and remanded to the agency.
Characterizing the distinction drawn by the BIA as “meaningless,” we emphasized that it
was “unreasonable to assert that the fact that [petitioner] is her son’s mother is not at least
one central reason for her persecution.” Id. at 950 (emphasis in original).
11 USCA4 Appeal: 22-1176 Doc: 89 Filed: 08/14/2025 Pg: 12 of 15
Unlike the record before this Court in Hernandez-Avalos, the record does not
compel a finding that Rivas de Nolasco’s status as a single Salvadoran was “at least one
central reason” that the gang members demanded entry to her home to hide from the police.
Cedillos-Cedillos, 962 F.3d at 826 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)). In addition to
explaining her belief regarding her status as a single woman before the IJ, Rivas de Nolasco
testified that she “lived in a simple house and you could really see it from the street.” J.A.
151. The intruders also were fleeing from police, and the BIA was free to draw the
inference from this evidence that they were motivated purely by convenience and were not
specifically seeking a single woman’s home. See Madrid-Montoya v. Garland, 52 F.4th
175, 182 (4th Cir. 2022) (“The BIA had to make inferences about the narcotraffickers’
motivations given the sparse factual record before it.”). And although the home invasion
incident itself is corroborated by witness affidavits, the record simply does not demonstrate
that the agency was compelled to find that Rivas de Nolasco’s status as a single Salvadoran
woman was a central reason for that persecution.
The standard of review we must apply requires us to “treat the IJ’s factual findings
as conclusive, unless a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach a contrary
conclusion.” Cruz v. Sessions, 853 F.3d 122, 128 (4th Cir. 2017) (describing standard as
“stringent”). That stringent standard has not been met here with respect to a lack of nexus
between the home invasion and Rivas de Nolasco’s status as a single Salvadoran woman. 4
4 Because we resolve Petitioner’s asylum claim on nexus grounds, we do not reach her arguments regarding the cognizability of the PSG of “single Salvadoran females.”
12 USCA4 Appeal: 22-1176 Doc: 89 Filed: 08/14/2025 Pg: 13 of 15
B.
We now address the other incident of alleged persecution upon which Rivas de
Nolasco bases her asylum claim: alleged threats made to Axel by another fifth grader at
school before the family departed El Salvador. The IJ concluded that those threats did not
amount to persecution, and the BIA agreed. The BIA also concluded that Rivas de Nolasco
had not established a nexus between this alleged persecution and Rivas de Nolasco’s status
as a member of Axel’s immediate family. On the record before us, we conclude the BIA
was not compelled to conclude otherwise and therefore did not err. See Ibarra Chevez, 31
F.4th at 288–89.
Rivas de Nolasco engages little with this issue beyond her general assertions that
she was entitled to relief because of these threats allegedly made to Axel. However,
substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Rivas de Nolasco was not
persecuted on this basis. Indeed, she testified that she was not even made aware of these
threats until after the family had entered the United States. See J.A. 189. When an asylum
applicant contends that they experienced persecution “on account of” family ties, they
“must demonstrate that these ties are more than ‘an incidental, tangential, superficial, or
subordinate reason’ for [their] persecution.” Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 949 (quoting
Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 2009)). It does not appear this
standard has been met.
Hernandez-Avalos provides helpful contrast here, too. In that case, the petitioner
was threatened by members of a gang who held a gun to her head and warned her that if
she opposed her son joining the gang, “[she] was the one who was going to die.” 784 F.3d
13 USCA4 Appeal: 22-1176 Doc: 89 Filed: 08/14/2025 Pg: 14 of 15
at 947; see also Cruz, 853 F.3d at 129 (applicant persecuted on basis of familial ties after
husband’s disappearance when persecutor made calls threatening harm if applicant
reported suspect to police and killed applicant’s family pets). As explained, there was not
even a threat made to Rivas de Nolasco related to the other student’s unsuccessful attempt
to recruit Axel to sell drugs for the gang. The record before us, given that it lacks evidence
purporting to show otherwise, simply does not compel the conclusion that Rivas de
Nolasco had been persecuted on the basis of her membership in her immediate family. 5
*****
“[B]ecause the standard for withholding of removal is higher than the standard for
asylum, if applicants cannot demonstrate asylum eligibility, their applications for
withholding of removal will necessarily fail as well.” Ayala-Osegueda v. Garland, 92
F.4th 220, 227 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Djadjou v. Holder, 662 F.3d 265, 272 (4th Cir.
2011)). Because we uphold the denial of Rivas de Nolasco’s claim for asylum, her
application for withholding of removal fails with it.
5 Although it was, of course, Axel who purportedly received these threats from his classmate, Rivas de Nolasco has not previously and does not now argue that this conduct suffices to establish conditions necessary to qualify Axel for asylum. Therefore, we do not decide this case on that basis. Nor do we address the BIA’s conclusion that the threats were not of sufficient severity to constitute persecution, because we need not reach that question to resolve this case, either. However, we emphasize that we have “repeatedly refused to discount the seriousness of a death threat,” including refusing to allow the BIA to “discount credible death threats” because the petitioner “did not suffer major physical injuries or long-term mental harm.” Sorto-Guzman v. Garland, 42 F.4th 443, 449 (4th Cir. 2022).
14 USCA4 Appeal: 22-1176 Doc: 89 Filed: 08/14/2025 Pg: 15 of 15
IV.
In accordance with the foregoing, we deny Rivas de Nolasco’s petition for review.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED