Yardley v. Sibbs

84 F. 531, 1897 U.S. App. LEXIS 2979

• Court: U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania
• Decided: December 11, 1897
• Docket: No. 25
• Status: Published

Opinion

DALLAS, Circuit Judge.

As to all the real estate which is the subject-matter of this litigation, with the exception of the two ground rents of $36 each, the complainant is entitled to relief in substantial accordance with the second prayer of his bill. The ground rents had been sold, and the other real estate had been mortgaged by Sibbs, and the entire proceeds of these several transactions were paid over by him to his grantor, Samuel Boyce, before this suit was brought. These facts are fully established; and the evidence also shows that beyond question the conveyance by Boyce to Sibbs was, as to Boyce and as against his creditors, fraudulent and void. Did'Sibbs take with knowledge, or with notice, actual or constructive, of the fraudulent purpose of Boyce? I cannot, upon the evidence, find that he did, or that he made any of the above-mentioned payments to Boyce with such knowledge or notice. The sworn answer of Sibbs explicitly and positively denies that he had such knowledge until after he had paid all the money to Boyce, and, when examined as a witness, he repeated this statement. His testimony, and certain letters which were written by him long after he had acquired knowledge of Boyce’s object in transferring title, is the only material evidence upon this subject. I have examined it with care, and do not find in it anything which, in my opinion, would warrant me in holding that, as respects the money, or any portion of it, received by Sibbs, and paid over by him to Boyce, the former should be required to account to the creditors of the latter or to this complainant. The evidence is not, in any particular or as a whole, in necessary conflict with the absolute denial by Sibbs of inculpating knowledge or actual notice; and, though some of the circumstances shown might, no doubt, have led a more astute person to regard Boyce’s conduct with suspicion, I do not think that the facts disclosed are sufficient to charge Sibbs with constructive notice of Boyce’s unlawful design. Let a decree be drawn in accordance with this opinion.