Yardeny v. Tanenbaum

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Yardeny v. Tanenbaum

132 A.D.3d 984, 18 N.Y.S.3d 349

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 28, 2015

Docket2013-06350

StatusPublished

This text of 132 A.D.3d 984 (Yardeny v. Tanenbaum) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Yardeny v. Tanenbaum, 132 A.D.3d 984, 18 N.Y.S.3d 349 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dufficy, J.), dated April 18, 2013, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The three-year statute of limitations on a cause of action alleging legal malpractice begins to run when the malpractice is committed, not when the client discovers it (see CPLR 214 [6]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]; Landow v Snow Becker Krauss, P.C., 111 AD3d 795, 796 [2013]). Here, the defendant established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint as untimely by demonstrating that the plaintiff did not commence the action within three years after the claim accrued in 2006. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the action was timely commenced or whether the defendant should be equitably estopped from relying upon the statute of limitations (see Benjamin v Allstate Ins. Co., 127 AD3d 1120, 1121 [2015]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time-barred (id.). In light of our determination, we need not reach the plaintiff’s remaining contentions.

Rivera, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Dickerson, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dufficy, J.), dated April 18, 2013, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The three-year statute of limitations on a cause of action alleging legal malpractice begins to run when the malpractice is committed, not when the client discovers it (see CPLR 214 [6]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]; Landow v Snow Becker Krauss, P.C., 111 AD3d 795, 796 [2013]). Here, the defendant established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint as untimely by demonstrating that the plaintiff did not commence the action within three years after the claim accrued in 2006. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the action was timely commenced or whether the defendant should be equitably estopped from relying upon the statute of limitations (see Benjamin v Allstate Ins. Co., 127 AD3d 1120, 1121 [2015]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time-barred (id.). In light of our determination, we need not reach the plaintiff’s remaining contentions.

Rivera, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Dickerson, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

132 A.D.3d 984, 18 N.Y.S.3d 349, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/yardeny-v-tanenbaum-nyappdiv-2015.

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