F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 29 2000 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
CHEN JEAN YANG,
Petitioner,
v. No. 99-9531 (No. A36032364) IMMIGRATION & (Petition for Review) NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Respondent.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , EBEL , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Petitioner Chen Jean Yang petitions this court for review of a decision of
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen the
deportation case against him. Yang sought reconsideration of the BIA’s denial of
his motion to remand the case to the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) to allow him to apply for adjustment to permanent resident alien status.
In a previous decision in this case, we determined that the BIA’s decision
that Yang was deportable was supported by substantial evidence and had not been
an abuse of discretion. See Yang v. INS , No. 90-9557, 1991 WL 128491, at **1
(10th Cir. July 10, 1991) (unpublished disposition). We also upheld the BIA’s
denial of Yang’s previous motion for remand for adjustment of status. See id.
Over two years later, on November 17, 1993, Yang filed the motion for
reconsideration at issue here, relying on a new “good faith exception” to the rules
barring adjustment of status for aliens currently in deportation proceedings. This
exception became effective on November 29, 1990, after the BIA had reached its
previous decision in Yang’s case. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649,
104 Stat. 4978, 5086; 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e) (1991).
Motions for reopening of immigration proceedings are disfavored,
particularly in deportation proceedings, where every delay works to the benefit of
the deportable alien who wishes to remain in the United States. See INS v.
Doherty , 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992). Here, the BIA denied reopening on two
-2- grounds: failure to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought, and denial in
the exercise of the BIA’s discretion. We review the denial of reopening under
both grounds for an abuse of discretion. See id. ; M.A. v. INS , 899 F.2d 304, 308
(4th Cir. 1990).
Yang launches several attacks on the BIA’s decision not to reopen and
remand his case. He first argues that the BIA was required to grant his motion to
reopen, since the INS did not respond to the motion. He relies on an agency
regulation concerning INS responses to motions to reopen, 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(g)(3).
Section 3.2(g)(3), however, states only that “[a] motion [to reopen] shall be
deemed unopposed unless a timely response is made.” It does not say that an
unopposed motion must be granted. Rather, the decision to grant or deny a
motion to reopen remains within the BIA’s discretion. See id. § 3.2(a).
Yang argues, however, that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to
explain why it did not reopen his case and why relief would not likely be granted
on remand. On the contrary, the BIA provided an extended discussion of its
reasons for denying the motion to reopen as an exercise of discretion and also
explained why it was unlikely that Yang would receive relief on remand. R. at 4.
The BIA measured the positive equities of Yang’s marriage to his present wife,
his United States citizen children, and his operation of a business that employs
approximately twenty-five people against the earlier finding that his prior
-3- marriage had been a sham entered into for purposes of evading the immigration
laws. The BIA then determined, in its discretion, that the previous marriage fraud
outweighed the positive equities favoring adjustment of status and that Yang had
therefore failed to demonstrate that he would likely be granted relief on remand.
Yang fails to show that the BIA abused its discretion in making this finding.
Yang next attempts to attack the substance of the BIA’s determination that
his first marriage was primarily intended to be a sham. This argument is barred
by the law of the case doctrine, because it was fully resolved against Yang in our
previous order and judgment in this case. See Hale v. Gibson , ___F.3d___,
No. 99-6083, 2000 WL 1375305, at *33 n.13 (10th Cir. Sept. 25, 2000)
(discussing law of the case doctrine).
Yang next argues that the BIA erred in failing to consider whether he was
eligible to apply for cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). 1
The BIA denied Yang’s application as a matter of discretion. This being the case,
it had no duty even to consider whether he made out a prima facie case for relief
1 The BIA determined that he was not eligible pursuant to § 1229b(a) because he had not met the seven-year continuous presence requirement of § 1229b(a)(2). Computation of that period (which runs from the date of admission to the United States) was suspended when Yang was served a notice to appear. See id. § 1229b(d)(1). Yang contends, however, that the BIA should also have considered whether he met the ten-year continuous presence requirement of § 1229b(b)(1)(A), which runs backward from the date of application.
-4- under § 1229b(b). See INS v. Rios-Pineda , 471 U.S. 444, 449 (1985). Its failure
to address this issue does not require us to afford Yang relief.
Yang next contends, for the first time on appeal, that he was eligible for
“repapering” under a new policy adopted by the General Counsel of the INS. See
generally IIRIRA § 309(c)(2), (3), Pub. L. 104-208, as amended Pub. L. 104-302,
110 Stat. 3657 (1996). He fails to show, however, that repapering applies to
aliens like himself, who are subject to a final administrative decision and whose
motion to reopen already was denied in the exercise of the BIA’s discretion prior
to the effective date of the new policy. See Addendum to Appellant’s Br.,
General Counsel Mem. at 2 (“Section 309(c)(3) only provides for repapering in
proceedings in which there has not been a final administrative decision, and
section 309(c)(2) applies to aliens at an even earlier stage of proceeding, not to
those with a final order.”).
Finally, Yang asserts that the BIA failed to provide adequate consideration
and weight to his right to family integrity and to the rights of his citizen wife and
children. Given that reopening is a discretionary decision, we conclude that the
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 29 2000 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
CHEN JEAN YANG,
Petitioner,
v. No. 99-9531 (No. A36032364) IMMIGRATION & (Petition for Review) NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Respondent.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , EBEL , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. Petitioner Chen Jean Yang petitions this court for review of a decision of
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen the
deportation case against him. Yang sought reconsideration of the BIA’s denial of
his motion to remand the case to the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) to allow him to apply for adjustment to permanent resident alien status.
In a previous decision in this case, we determined that the BIA’s decision
that Yang was deportable was supported by substantial evidence and had not been
an abuse of discretion. See Yang v. INS , No. 90-9557, 1991 WL 128491, at **1
(10th Cir. July 10, 1991) (unpublished disposition). We also upheld the BIA’s
denial of Yang’s previous motion for remand for adjustment of status. See id.
Over two years later, on November 17, 1993, Yang filed the motion for
reconsideration at issue here, relying on a new “good faith exception” to the rules
barring adjustment of status for aliens currently in deportation proceedings. This
exception became effective on November 29, 1990, after the BIA had reached its
previous decision in Yang’s case. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649,
104 Stat. 4978, 5086; 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e) (1991).
Motions for reopening of immigration proceedings are disfavored,
particularly in deportation proceedings, where every delay works to the benefit of
the deportable alien who wishes to remain in the United States. See INS v.
Doherty , 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992). Here, the BIA denied reopening on two
-2- grounds: failure to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought, and denial in
the exercise of the BIA’s discretion. We review the denial of reopening under
both grounds for an abuse of discretion. See id. ; M.A. v. INS , 899 F.2d 304, 308
(4th Cir. 1990).
Yang launches several attacks on the BIA’s decision not to reopen and
remand his case. He first argues that the BIA was required to grant his motion to
reopen, since the INS did not respond to the motion. He relies on an agency
regulation concerning INS responses to motions to reopen, 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(g)(3).
Section 3.2(g)(3), however, states only that “[a] motion [to reopen] shall be
deemed unopposed unless a timely response is made.” It does not say that an
unopposed motion must be granted. Rather, the decision to grant or deny a
motion to reopen remains within the BIA’s discretion. See id. § 3.2(a).
Yang argues, however, that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to
explain why it did not reopen his case and why relief would not likely be granted
on remand. On the contrary, the BIA provided an extended discussion of its
reasons for denying the motion to reopen as an exercise of discretion and also
explained why it was unlikely that Yang would receive relief on remand. R. at 4.
The BIA measured the positive equities of Yang’s marriage to his present wife,
his United States citizen children, and his operation of a business that employs
approximately twenty-five people against the earlier finding that his prior
-3- marriage had been a sham entered into for purposes of evading the immigration
laws. The BIA then determined, in its discretion, that the previous marriage fraud
outweighed the positive equities favoring adjustment of status and that Yang had
therefore failed to demonstrate that he would likely be granted relief on remand.
Yang fails to show that the BIA abused its discretion in making this finding.
Yang next attempts to attack the substance of the BIA’s determination that
his first marriage was primarily intended to be a sham. This argument is barred
by the law of the case doctrine, because it was fully resolved against Yang in our
previous order and judgment in this case. See Hale v. Gibson , ___F.3d___,
No. 99-6083, 2000 WL 1375305, at *33 n.13 (10th Cir. Sept. 25, 2000)
(discussing law of the case doctrine).
Yang next argues that the BIA erred in failing to consider whether he was
eligible to apply for cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). 1
The BIA denied Yang’s application as a matter of discretion. This being the case,
it had no duty even to consider whether he made out a prima facie case for relief
1 The BIA determined that he was not eligible pursuant to § 1229b(a) because he had not met the seven-year continuous presence requirement of § 1229b(a)(2). Computation of that period (which runs from the date of admission to the United States) was suspended when Yang was served a notice to appear. See id. § 1229b(d)(1). Yang contends, however, that the BIA should also have considered whether he met the ten-year continuous presence requirement of § 1229b(b)(1)(A), which runs backward from the date of application.
-4- under § 1229b(b). See INS v. Rios-Pineda , 471 U.S. 444, 449 (1985). Its failure
to address this issue does not require us to afford Yang relief.
Yang next contends, for the first time on appeal, that he was eligible for
“repapering” under a new policy adopted by the General Counsel of the INS. See
generally IIRIRA § 309(c)(2), (3), Pub. L. 104-208, as amended Pub. L. 104-302,
110 Stat. 3657 (1996). He fails to show, however, that repapering applies to
aliens like himself, who are subject to a final administrative decision and whose
motion to reopen already was denied in the exercise of the BIA’s discretion prior
to the effective date of the new policy. See Addendum to Appellant’s Br.,
General Counsel Mem. at 2 (“Section 309(c)(3) only provides for repapering in
proceedings in which there has not been a final administrative decision, and
section 309(c)(2) applies to aliens at an even earlier stage of proceeding, not to
those with a final order.”).
Finally, Yang asserts that the BIA failed to provide adequate consideration
and weight to his right to family integrity and to the rights of his citizen wife and
children. Given that reopening is a discretionary decision, we conclude that the
-5- BIA’s discussion of these issues was adequate and that the BIA did not abuse its
discretion in declining to reopen Yang’s case.
The petition for review is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha Circuit Judge
-6- No. 99-9531, Yang v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
LUCERO , J., dissenting.
Although I agree with much of the majority’s analysis, I dissent from its
disposition of this case for the following reasons. The Order and Judgment
affirms a refusal to reopen proceedings where the sole negative factor that “tips
the balance” toward denying relief is petitioner's prior sham marriage, despite
several positive factors weighing in favor of relief. The result suggests reopening
of deportation proceedings can never be warranted where there has been a past
sham marriage, regardless of the positive equities that would otherwise favor
discretionary reopening. By elevating the sham marriage to the status of an
automatic disqualifier, the BIA has essentially abdicated its exercise of discretion.
See INS v. Rios-Pineda , 471 U.S. 444, 451 (1985) (“While all aliens illegally
present in the United States have, in some way, violated the immigration laws, it
is untenable to suggest that the Attorney General has no discretion to . . .
distinguish among them on the basis of the flagrancy and nature of their
violations.”).
Moreover, it is clear from a review of the record that the BIA has
overlooked a significant equitable factor: a six-year delay not occasioned by
petitioner. The unexplained postponement of the BIA’s ruling, to which one may
attribute the age of petitioner’s citizen children at this stage of the proceedings
and his gradual loss of association with friends and relatives in his country of origin, should have been considered as an equitable factor favoring reopening. In
short, by refusing to consider the effect of such a lengthy delay, the BIA has
neglected its duty to weigh all of the relevant evidence when considering a motion
to reopen. See Dulane v. INS , 46 F.3d 988, 995-96 (10th Cir. 1995) (reversing
the BIA’s decision not to reopen and remanding for further consideration where
the BIA’s articulation of the basis for its denial “gives no indication that it
actually considered all the relevant evidence”).
I would remand for a proper weighing of the equities with instructions to
consider the BIA’s six-year delay as a positive factor favoring reopening.
-2-