Yang Real Est. Invs., LLC v. Affordable Mini Storage of Newton, LLC

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: July 16, 2025
• Docket: 24-1120
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA24-1120

Filed 16 July 2025

Catawba County, No. 21CVS001580-170

YANG REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS, LLC, Plaintiff,

v.

AFFORDABLE MINI STORAGE OF NEWTON, LLC, Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from order entered 31 July 2023 and advisory order

entered 9 July 2024 by Judge William A. Long in Catawba County Superior Court.

Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 May 2025.

Morgan Law, PLLC, by William E. Morgan, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Davis Hartman & Wright, LLP, by R. Daniel Gibson, for Defendant-Appellant.

COLLINS, Judge.

This appeal arises out of an agreement for the sale of a business and the real

property on which it sits. Defendant Affordable Mini Storage of Newton, LLC appeals

from the trial court’s order indicating it would grant Plaintiff Yang Real Estate

Investments, LLC’s motion for relief under North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure

60(b) were an appeal not pending before this Court and the trial court’s order granting

Plaintiff’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement executed between the parties.

For the following reasons, we affirm and remand. YANG REAL EST. INVS., LLC V. AFFORDABLE MINI STORAGE OF NEWTON, LLC

Opinion of the Court

I. Background

On or about 17 January 2021, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a purchase

agreement, under which Plaintiff would purchase from Defendant the self-storage

business and the real property on which the business sits (“Business”) located in

Newton, North Carolina. The purchase agreement stated that the closing date was

to occur on 1 May 2020, provided that all of the conditions to closing, listed in the

purchase agreement, were either satisfied or waived. Plaintiff did not waive any of

the conditions prior to closing.

Closing did not occur on 1 May 2020. Throughout the next few months,

Defendant “made improvements to the physical aspects of the Business and

demanded a higher price for the Business.” Then, on 11 December 2020, Defendant

informed Plaintiff that it did not “wish to move forward with the sale of the [Business]

at this time.”

Plaintiff commenced this action on 23 June 2021 by filing a complaint alleging

various claims, including breach of contract. On 20 September 2021, Defendant filed

a Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Strike, Answer, and Affirmative Defenses.

On 22 August 2022, the parties conducted a mediated settlement conference,

where they “agreed to resolve and settle the disputes between them.” The terms of

the settlement agreement, signed by both parties on 22 August 2022, included the

following:

1. Plaintiff shall be allowed to purchase the

-2- YANG REAL EST. INVS., LLC V. AFFORDABLE MINI STORAGE OF NEWTON, LLC

[Business] . . . for the sum of $4.2 million. . . .

2. Plaintiff shall be on site and inspect the property within ten days of this agreement. . . .

3. Immediately upon confirmation of this agreement, Defendant shall be entitled to $5,000.00 of the earnest money currently held by escrow agent John Fuller. . . .

4. Plaintiff shall file a voluntary dismissal with prejudice of the lawsuit by August 26, 2022.

5. At the conclusion of the inspection described above, Plaintiff shall either

a. Sign a new purchase agreement within fourteen days of this agreement to close its purchase of the [Business] for the sum of $4.2 million on or before December 31, 2022. There shall be no extensions absent written agreement signed by all parties. Upon Plaintiff’s signing of the new purchase agreement, Defendant shall be entitled to the remaining $20,000.00 earnest money . . . .

b. Accept the remaining $20,000.00 in earnest money currently held by escrow agent John Fuller, at which point this matter shall be completed and closed. All parties shall be mutually released for all further obligations.

In accordance with the terms of this settlement agreement, Plaintiff filed a

voluntary dismissal with prejudice on 23 August 2022. Plaintiff was on site for an

inspection of the Business on 29 August 2022.

On 7 September 2022, sixteen days after the parties agreed to and signed the

settlement agreement, Plaintiff signed a new purchase agreement and sent it to

Defendant via email. Defendant’s counsel responded:

-3- YANG REAL EST. INVS., LLC V. AFFORDABLE MINI STORAGE OF NEWTON, LLC

I have spoken with my client. His position is that your clients had until close of business on Monday, September 5, 2022 (14 days from the date of the August 22, 2022 mediated settlement agreement) to sign a new purchase agreement. We chose to allow one additional day for your clients to sign and return the purchase agreement due to September 5, 2022 being a legal holiday.

Defendant’s counsel continued that because Plaintiff had failed to sign a new

purchase agreement before 6 September, “the parties must walk away from this

dispute as provided in the mediated settlement agreement.”

Plaintiff filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the judgement voluntarily

dismissing its claim with prejudice and a motion to enforce the settlement

agreement—by requiring Defendant to sell the Business to Plaintiff—on 29 June

2023. Defendant filed a response on 20 July 2023, which included counter-motions

for summary judgment to enforce the settlement agreement—by requiring Plaintiff

to accept the $20,000 in earnest money and to accept that “this litigation is closed

and Defendant has been released from any obligation to Plaintiff”—and for attorney’s

fees.

The trial court, by written order entered 31 July 2023, granted Plaintiff’s

motion to enforce the settlement agreement and “reserved any ruling as it relates to

any motion under Rule 60. . . .” On 30 August 2023, Defendant filed a Rule 60(b)

motion for relief from the trial court’s 31 July order to enforce the settlement

agreement and appealed the order enforcing the settlement agreement to this Court.

On 15 February 2024, this Court directed the trial court “to conduct an

-4- YANG REAL EST. INVS., LLC V. AFFORDABLE MINI STORAGE OF NEWTON, LLC

evidentiary hearing, if necessary, on the Rule 60(b) Motions before it and indicate

what action it would be inclined to take were an appeal not pending before the Court

of Appeals.”

An evidentiary hearing was held on 6 March 2024, and on 9 July 2024, the trial

court entered a written order indicating that it “would take the following actions were

an appeal not pending before the Court of Appeals:”

1. The Defendant’s Rule 60(b) Motion is GRANTED;

2. The Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) Motion seeking relief from and striking the Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice filed by the Plaintiff on August 23, 2022, is GRANTED;

3. The Plaintiff’s Motion for Enforcement of Settlement Agreement is GRANTED;

4. The Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment for Enforcement of Settlement Agreement is DENIED and, to the extent necessary to enforce the terms of the Settlement requiring the Defendant to sell the Business to the Plaintiff, Summary Judgment is GRANTED to the Plaintiff;

5. The Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is DENIED[.]

Defendant timely appealed from this indicative order.

II. Discussion

A. Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) Motion

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by indicating that it would set

aside Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal under Rule 60(b). We disagree.

The main objective of Rule 60(b) is to “strike a proper balance between the

-5- YANG REAL EST. INVS., LLC V. AFFORDABLE MINI STORAGE OF NEWTON, LLC

conflicting principles of finality and relief from unjust judgments.” Carter v. Clowers,

102 N.C. App. 247, 254 (1991) (citation omitted). Generally, “a motion for relief under

Rule 60(b) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and appellate review

is limited to determining whether the court abused its discretion.” Sink v. Easter,

288 N.C. 183, 198 (1975) (citation omitted). Under an abuse of discretion standard,

“we review to determine whether a decision is manifestly unsupported by reason, or

so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” Mark Grp.

Int’l, Inc. v. Still, 151 N.C. App. 565, 566 (2002) (citation omitted).

Rule 60(b)(1) authorizes the trial court to relieve a party from a final judgment

or order due to “[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(1) (2023). “Although the decision to set aside a judgment

under Rule 60(b)(1) is a matter within the trial court’s discretion, what constitutes

‘excusable neglect’ is a question of law which is fully reviewable on appeal.” In re

Hall, 89 N.C. App. 685, 687 (1988) (citations omitted).

To grant relief from a final order on the grounds of excusable neglect under

Rule 60(b)(1), “the moving party must show that the judgment rendered against him

was due to his excusable neglect and that he has a meritorious defense.” Monaghan

v. Schilling, 197 N.C. App. 578, 584 (2009) (citation omitted). “While there is no clear

dividing line as to what falls within the confines of excusable neglect . . . , what

constitutes excusable neglect depends upon what, under all the surrounding

circumstances, may be reasonably expected of a party in paying proper attention to

-6- YANG REAL EST. INVS., LLC V. AFFORDABLE MINI STORAGE OF NEWTON, LLC

his case.” Croom v. Hedrick, 188 N.C. App. 262, 267 (2008) (citation omitted).

Relief under Rule 60(b)(1) depends upon “the intention of the party seeking

relief.” T.H. v. SHL Health Two, Inc., 293 N.C. App. 462, 466 (2024). “The relevant

intention, however, is not the intended outcome of an action; the relevant intention

is the intended action.” Id. at 466-67. (emphasis and citation omitted). “Generally,

this Court will not find excusable neglect where the party establishes merely that he

was ignorant of the judicial process or misunderstood the nature of the action against

him, even when the party has little education.” Grier v. Guy, 224 N.C. App. 256, 259

(2012) (citation omitted). Rather, to get relief under Rule 60(b)(1) for excusable

neglect, “the material question is whether Plaintiff deliberately took the action for

which Plaintiff requests relief.” T.H., 293 N.C. App. at 467 (citation omitted).

Here, the trial court found that the requirement that Plaintiff sign a new

purchase agreement within fourteen days was not a material term to the settlement

agreement; thus, Defendant’s “refusal to sign the new purchase agreement after

receiving the signed purchase agreement from [] Plaintiff was arbitrary . . . .” The

trial court therefore concluded,

7. By refusing to execute the purchase agreement and close on the sale of the Business, [] Defendant deprived [] Plaintiff of the benefit of the bargain of the Settlement.

8. To deprive [] Plaintiff of the benefit of the bargain on the sole basis of Plaintiff’s returning the executed purchase agreement one day later than contemplated in the Settlement would be unjust.

-7- YANG REAL EST. INVS., LLC V. AFFORDABLE MINI STORAGE OF NEWTON, LLC

We agree with the trial court.

Plaintiff filed for a voluntary dismissal with prejudice pursuant to the terms

of the settlement agreement, which had been signed by both parties. In doing so,

Plaintiff was acting under the assumption that once it filed for a voluntary dismissal

with prejudice and performed the other requirements listed in the settlement

agreement, Plaintiff and Defendant would close on the sale of the Business. In filing

for a voluntary dismissal, Plaintiff was not “ignorant of the judicial process,” and in

no way did Plaintiff misunderstand the nature of the action or the consequences that

would result. Grier, 224 N.C. App. at 259 (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s intention was

deliberate and obvious; Plaintiff intentionally filed for a voluntary dismissal with

prejudice because doing so was an enumerated term of the settlement agreement.

This constitutes excusable neglect.

Defendant argues that the voluntary dismissal is not excusable neglect

because although Plaintiff intended to dismiss its claims, Plaintiff “simply did not

appreciate the consequences of the dismissal.” (quoting T.H., 293 N.C. App. at 467

(citation omitted)). This mischaracterizes Plaintiff’s action. There is no evidence

suggesting Plaintiff did not realize that by dismissing its claim with prejudice, the

action would be terminated. To the contrary, Plaintiff accepted this consequence.

Plaintiff acted in good faith when it attempted to fulfill its obligations under the

settlement agreement; Defendant deprived Plaintiff of the benefit of the bargain by

refusing to go through with the sale.

-8- YANG REAL EST. INVS., LLC V. AFFORDABLE MINI STORAGE OF NEWTON, LLC

Accordingly, the trial court did not err by indicating that it would grant

Plaintiff relief from its voluntary dismissal with prejudice under Rule 60(b)(1). In

light of this conclusion, we need not address Defendant’s remaining arguments as to

why the trial court erred by indicating that it would grant Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)

motion under Rules 60(b)(4) and 60(b)(6).

B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by granting Plaintiff’s motion

to enforce the settlement agreement and denying Defendant’s motion to enforce the

settlement agreement. Defendant specifically argues that the plain language of the

settlement agreement does support the trial court’s conclusion that the fourteen-day

deadline for Plaintiff to sign a new purchase agreement is not a material term of the

settlement agreement.

“A motion to enforce a settlement agreement is treated as a motion for

summary judgment for purposes of appellate review.” Williams v. Habul, 219 N.C.

App. 281, 288 (2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Summary judgment

shall be granted where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2023). The moving party bears “the

burden of demonstrating the lack of any triable issue of fact and entitlement to

judgment as a matter of law.” Hardin v. KCS Int’l, Inc., 199 N.C. App. 687, 695 (2009)

-9- YANG REAL EST. INVS., LLC V. AFFORDABLE MINI STORAGE OF NEWTON, LLC

(citation omitted). “On appeal, this Court must review the entire record, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Williams, 219 N.C.

App. at 289 (citation omitted).

“Questions relating to the construction and effect of a settlement agreement

are resolved by employing the same rules that govern the interpretation of contracts

generally.” Id. at 292. (citation omitted). An appellate court is to “interpret a contract

according to the intent of the parties to the contract, unless such intent is contrary to

law.” Bueltel v. Lumber Mut. Ins. Co., 134 N.C. App. 626, 631 (1999) (citation

omitted).

“The general rule governing bilateral contracts requires that if either party to

the contract commits a material breach of the contract, the other party should be

excused from the obligation to perform further.” Coleman v. Shirlen, 53 N.C. App.

573, 577-78 (1981) (citation omitted). “Whether a breach is material or immaterial is

ordinarily a question of fact.” McClure Lumber Co. v. Helmsman Constr., Inc., 160

N.C. App. 190, 198 (2003) (citations omitted). “When reviewing a trial court’s

determination that a party has materially breached a contract, the appellate courts

are bound by the trial judge’s findings of fact if there is some evidence to support

them, even though the evidence might sustain findings to the contrary.” Id.

(quotation marks and citation omitted). A material breach is “one that substantially

defeats the purpose of the agreement or goes to the very heart of the agreement, or

can be characterized as a substantial failure to perform.” Supplee v. Miller-Motte

- 10 - YANG REAL EST. INVS., LLC V. AFFORDABLE MINI STORAGE OF NEWTON, LLC

Bus. Coll., Inc., 239 N.C. App. 208, 220 (2015) (citation omitted).

Here, the settlement agreement, on its face, constitutes a complete and

enforceable contract for the sale of the Business. Its terms include the identity of the

buyer (Yang Real Estate Investments, LLC), the identity of the seller (Affordable

Mini Storage of Newton, LLC), the purchase price ($4.2 million), and the identity of

the real property to be sold (“the real property and business of the Defendant

described in the pleadings”), and also the closing date (on or before 31 December

2022). See Hurdle v. White, 34 N.C. App. 644, 648 (1977) (holding that the material

terms of an agreement to sell land include the seller, the buyer, the purchase price,

and a description of the land that is the subject of the transaction).

The date by which Plaintiff was required to sign the new purchase agreement

is not a material term of the settlement agreement. The trial court found that, under

the settlement agreement, “Plaintiff and Defendant would enter into a new purchase

agreement, drafted by counsel for [] Defendant, to be signed by [] Plaintiff within

fourteen (14) days of the date of mediation (which would set that date as September

5, 2022, also the Labor Day Holiday)[.]” Closing on the sale of the Business, however,

was to take place “on or before December 31, 2022 (which was 131 days after the

mediation).” Defendant unilaterally chose to allow [Plaintiff] one additional day,” or

until 6 September 2022, to sign and return the new purchase agreement; this action

indicates that Defendant did not consider the fourteen-day deadline material.

Plaintiff signed the new purchase agreement and sent it to Defendant on 7 September

- 11 - YANG REAL EST. INVS., LLC V. AFFORDABLE MINI STORAGE OF NEWTON, LLC

2022. Although a breach, it does not “substantially defeat[] the purpose of the

agreement or go[] to the very heart of the agreement.” Supplee, 239 N.C. App. at 220

(citation omitted). All essential terms of the parties’ contract remained intact, and

Plaintiff’s intention to fulfill the terms of the settlement agreement and purchase the

Business from Defendant remained clear. This is particularly true given the fact that

Plaintiff had already voluntarily dismissed its claim with prejudice and traveled to

the Business to conduct its inspection.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff presented “no evidence” in support of its

motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Plaintiff, however, submitted the

settlement agreement, which had been signed by both parties, as evidence to the trial

court, and Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal with prejudice was a matter of record on file

with the trial court. It is unclear what additional evidence Defendant believes that

Plaintiff should have provided. Furthermore, there is no dispute over the facts of this

case; rather, the dispositive question is whether Plaintiff’s delay in executing the new

purchase agreement constitutes a material breach, thus excusing Defendant from its

obligations under the contract. As discussed above, we hold that Plaintiff’s breach is

not material.

Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting Plaintiff’s motion to enforce

the settlement agreement.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

- 12 - YANG REAL EST. INVS., LLC V. AFFORDABLE MINI STORAGE OF NEWTON, LLC

discretion by indicating that it would grant Plaintiff relief from its voluntary

dismissal with prejudice under Rule 60(b). The trial court did not err by granting

Plaintiff’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement and denying Defendant’s

motion to enforce the settlement agreement. We affirm the trial court’s 31 July 2023

order and remand to the trial court to enter a final order consistent with its 9 July

2024 indicative order.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

Judges TYSON and GRIFFIN concur.

- 13 -