Yance v. Phillips

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedApril 11, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-01213
StatusUnknown

This text of Yance v. Phillips (Yance v. Phillips) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Yance v. Phillips, (E.D. Wis. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

JAMES PATRICK YANCE,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 22-CV-1213-JPS

SGT. C.O. KELLEN, RICHARD CRAIG, JOSH SMITH, SGT. C.O. ORDER HAMLIN, C.O. PHILLIPS, STEVE SAXS, EDWARD SAWYERS, and JOHN DELANEY,

Defendants.

Plaintiff James Patrick Yance, an inmate confined at Walworth County Jail, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. ECF No. 1. This Order resolves Plaintiff’s motions for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, screens his complaint, and addresses his motion for miscellaneous relief. 1. MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because Plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the Court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. Id. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On November 17, 2022, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $53.64. ECF No. 6. Plaintiff paid that fee on November 17, 2022. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. ECF No. 2. The Court will accordingly deny Plaintiff’s second motion to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, ECF No. 11, as moot. Plaintiff must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this Order. 2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 2.1 Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). 2.2 Plaintiff’s Allegations Plaintiff alleges that on September 22, 2022, Defendant C.O. Phillips (“Phillips”) knowingly entered Plaintiff’s cell while he was using the bathroom. ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff entered a “PREA Complaint” and told Phillips that he wanted to speak to a sergeant about the issue privately. Id. Phillips denied his request and instead told him to “[P]ut it in a tablet.” Id. Plaintiff told Phillips that he had already and then Phillips called Defendant Sgt. C.O. Kellen. Id. Phillips told Kellen that Plaintiff was refusing to lockdown, which resulted in a minor infraction. Id. at 2–3. On September 23, 2022, Plaintiff received a major infraction from Defendant Joshua Smith (“Smith”) “after an internal PREA investigation was conducted by [Defendant] Sgt. Richard Craig.” Id. at 3. Following a hearing, Defendant C.O. Sgt. Hamlin (“Hamlin”) found Plaintiff guilty of “lying about staff” in a false PREA. Id. On September 28, 2022, Plaintiff submitted an appeal that was later denied. Id. The denial stated: “You should have received discipline time for this, and didn’t, next time you will.” Id. 2.3 Analysis It is unclear to the Court what type of claim Plaintiff seeks to bring in his complaint. As such, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint with leave to amend. The Court provides the following information to aid Plaintiff in amending his complaint. Plaintiff may be attempting to bring a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants. To prevail on this claim, Plaintiff must ultimately show that: “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation likely to deter such activity; and (3) the First Amendment activity was at least a motivating factor in the decision to impose the deprivation.” Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983, 996 (7th Cir. 2014). Here, it is not clear if Plaintiff is alleging retaliation. His complaint alleges that negative things happened to him after he entered a PREA complaint against Phillips. It is well established that a prisoner’s ability to file complaints is protected by the First Amendment. See Hughes v. Scott, 816 F.3d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 2016). As for the second element, Plaintiff alleges suffering deprivations—filing a false disciplinary report against him and receiving a major infraction—that, we can infer, would likely dissuade a person of ordinary firmness from exercising further First Amendment activity. See Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012) (prison transfer likely to deter First Amendment activity).

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Gomez v. Randle
680 F.3d 859 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Robert Westefer v. Michael Neal
682 F.3d 679 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Mazurek v. Armstrong
520 U.S. 968 (Supreme Court, 1997)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Woods v. Buss
496 F.3d 620 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
William Hawkins v. Rodney Mitchell
756 F.3d 983 (Seventh Circuit, 2014)
Cyril Korte v. HHS
735 F.3d 654 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Cooper v. Salazar
196 F.3d 809 (Seventh Circuit, 1999)
Hughes v. Scott
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Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Yance v. Phillips, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/yance-v-phillips-wied-2023.