SUMMARY ORDER
These petitions challenge either (1) decisions of the BIA that either affirmed an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum and related relief or reversed an IJ’s grant of relief,
or (2) BIA denials of motions to remand or reopen,
or (3) rulings of both kinds.
The applicable standards of review by this Court are well-established.
See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey,
546 F.3d 138, 157-58, 168-69 (2d Cir.2008).
Petitioners, all natives and citizens of China, sought relief from removal based on their claim that they fear persecution because they have one or more children in violation of China’s population control program. For largely the same reasons as this Court set forth in
Jian Hui Shao,
546 F.3d 138, the agency’s decisions are not erroneous.
See id.
at 158-72. Although the petitioners in
Jian Hui Shao
were from Fujian Province, as are most of the petitioners here, some petitioners
are from Zhejiang and Guangdong Provinces. Regardless, as with the evidence discussed in
Jian Hui Shao,
the evidence they have submitted related to Zhejiang and Guangdong Provinces either does not discuss forced sterilizations or references isolated incidents of persecution of individuals who are not similarly situated to the petitioners.
See id.
at 160-61, 171-72.
Some of the petitioners
also argue that the BIA has erred by improperly making
de novo
factual findings rejecting the determinations made by an IJ. Their claims lack merit. The BIA has not made
de novo
factual findings. Instead, the BIA has concluded that the IJ’s factual findings do not meet the legal standard of an objectively reasonable fear of persecution, in these eases, a fear of forced sterilization or economic persecution. That approach is entirely consistent with the applicable regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(8).
See Jian Hui Shao,
546 F.3d at 162-63 (concluding that the BIA did not erroneously conduct
de novo
review of the IJ’s factual findings by making “a legal determination that, while [petitioners’] credible testimony was sufficient to demonstrate a genuine subjective fear of future persecution, more was needed to demonstrate the objective reasonableness of that fear”).
We decline the request of some of the petitioners
that we take judicial notice of documents outside the administrative record, and we will not remand for the agency to consider such evidence.
See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A);
see also Xiao Xing Ni v. Gonzales,
494 F.3d 260, 269-70 (2d Cir.2007).
For the same reasons as this Court set forth in
Yuen Jin v. Mukasey,
538 F.3d 143, 156, 158-59 (2d Cir.2008), the BIA did not err in concluding that those petitioners
seeking to file a successive asylum application based on their changed personal circumstances without filing a timely motion to reopen were not eligible to do so.
Two of the petitioners
argue that the BIA failed to give sufficient consideration to the statement of Jin Fu Chen, who alleged that he suffered forcible sterilization after his return to China based on the births of his two children in Japan. A prior panel of this Court has remanded a petition making a similar claim so that Jin Fu Chen’s statement (which was submitted to the BIA after a remand) could be considered by the IJ.
See Zheng v. Holder,
361 Fed.Appx. 184 (2d Cir.2010). Since that remand, the BIA has repeatedly concluded that Jin Fu Chen’s statement does not support a claim of a well-founded fear of persecution. Accordingly, it is clear that further consideration of that statement in cases in which the IJ or the BIA failed to consider it would not change the result.
See Shunfu Li v. Mukasey,
529 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir.2008). We cannot say, furthermore, that the agency’s conclusion concerning the probative force of the statement involved any error of law.
The BIA did not err in
Xiao Jun Lin v. Holder,
No. 08-1713-ag, in declining to consider the petitioner’s eligibility for relief based on her Falun Gong claim because she failed to exhaust this claim in her brief on appeal to the BIA. In
Ai Rong Lin v. Holder,
No. 08-4492-ag, we decline to consider petitioner’s unexhausted claim for CAT relief based on her illegal departure from China.
See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
480 F.3d 104, 124 (2d Cir.2007). In
Ji Chun Yang v. Holder,
No. 09-1839-ag, we assume hypothetical jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s unexhausted claim that she is eligible for
withholding of removal because the “jurisdictional issues are complex and the substance of the claim is ... plainly without merit,”
Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
433 F.3d 332, 338 (2d Cir.2006), particularly when her claim for withholding of removal was predicated entirely on the same facts as her claim for asylum,
see Paul v. Gonzales,
444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006). In
Qiaomeng Zhou v. Holder,
No. 09-2013-ag, we lack jurisdiction either to review the agency’s pretermission of petitioner’s application for asylum as untimely under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B),
see 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3), or to consider petitioner’s unexhausted argument that he is eligible for CAT relief,
see Karaj v. Gonzales,
462 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir.2006) (citing
Beharry v. Ashcroft,
329 F.3d 51, 59 (2d Cir.2003)). In
Shui Jin Wu, Min Song Lin v. Holder,
No.
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SUMMARY ORDER
These petitions challenge either (1) decisions of the BIA that either affirmed an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum and related relief or reversed an IJ’s grant of relief,
or (2) BIA denials of motions to remand or reopen,
or (3) rulings of both kinds.
The applicable standards of review by this Court are well-established.
See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey,
546 F.3d 138, 157-58, 168-69 (2d Cir.2008).
Petitioners, all natives and citizens of China, sought relief from removal based on their claim that they fear persecution because they have one or more children in violation of China’s population control program. For largely the same reasons as this Court set forth in
Jian Hui Shao,
546 F.3d 138, the agency’s decisions are not erroneous.
See id.
at 158-72. Although the petitioners in
Jian Hui Shao
were from Fujian Province, as are most of the petitioners here, some petitioners
are from Zhejiang and Guangdong Provinces. Regardless, as with the evidence discussed in
Jian Hui Shao,
the evidence they have submitted related to Zhejiang and Guangdong Provinces either does not discuss forced sterilizations or references isolated incidents of persecution of individuals who are not similarly situated to the petitioners.
See id.
at 160-61, 171-72.
Some of the petitioners
also argue that the BIA has erred by improperly making
de novo
factual findings rejecting the determinations made by an IJ. Their claims lack merit. The BIA has not made
de novo
factual findings. Instead, the BIA has concluded that the IJ’s factual findings do not meet the legal standard of an objectively reasonable fear of persecution, in these eases, a fear of forced sterilization or economic persecution. That approach is entirely consistent with the applicable regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(8).
See Jian Hui Shao,
546 F.3d at 162-63 (concluding that the BIA did not erroneously conduct
de novo
review of the IJ’s factual findings by making “a legal determination that, while [petitioners’] credible testimony was sufficient to demonstrate a genuine subjective fear of future persecution, more was needed to demonstrate the objective reasonableness of that fear”).
We decline the request of some of the petitioners
that we take judicial notice of documents outside the administrative record, and we will not remand for the agency to consider such evidence.
See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A);
see also Xiao Xing Ni v. Gonzales,
494 F.3d 260, 269-70 (2d Cir.2007).
For the same reasons as this Court set forth in
Yuen Jin v. Mukasey,
538 F.3d 143, 156, 158-59 (2d Cir.2008), the BIA did not err in concluding that those petitioners
seeking to file a successive asylum application based on their changed personal circumstances without filing a timely motion to reopen were not eligible to do so.
Two of the petitioners
argue that the BIA failed to give sufficient consideration to the statement of Jin Fu Chen, who alleged that he suffered forcible sterilization after his return to China based on the births of his two children in Japan. A prior panel of this Court has remanded a petition making a similar claim so that Jin Fu Chen’s statement (which was submitted to the BIA after a remand) could be considered by the IJ.
See Zheng v. Holder,
361 Fed.Appx. 184 (2d Cir.2010). Since that remand, the BIA has repeatedly concluded that Jin Fu Chen’s statement does not support a claim of a well-founded fear of persecution. Accordingly, it is clear that further consideration of that statement in cases in which the IJ or the BIA failed to consider it would not change the result.
See Shunfu Li v. Mukasey,
529 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir.2008). We cannot say, furthermore, that the agency’s conclusion concerning the probative force of the statement involved any error of law.
The BIA did not err in
Xiao Jun Lin v. Holder,
No. 08-1713-ag, in declining to consider the petitioner’s eligibility for relief based on her Falun Gong claim because she failed to exhaust this claim in her brief on appeal to the BIA. In
Ai Rong Lin v. Holder,
No. 08-4492-ag, we decline to consider petitioner’s unexhausted claim for CAT relief based on her illegal departure from China.
See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
480 F.3d 104, 124 (2d Cir.2007). In
Ji Chun Yang v. Holder,
No. 09-1839-ag, we assume hypothetical jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s unexhausted claim that she is eligible for
withholding of removal because the “jurisdictional issues are complex and the substance of the claim is ... plainly without merit,”
Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
433 F.3d 332, 338 (2d Cir.2006), particularly when her claim for withholding of removal was predicated entirely on the same facts as her claim for asylum,
see Paul v. Gonzales,
444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006). In
Qiaomeng Zhou v. Holder,
No. 09-2013-ag, we lack jurisdiction either to review the agency’s pretermission of petitioner’s application for asylum as untimely under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B),
see 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3), or to consider petitioner’s unexhausted argument that he is eligible for CAT relief,
see Karaj v. Gonzales,
462 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir.2006) (citing
Beharry v. Ashcroft,
329 F.3d 51, 59 (2d Cir.2003)). In
Shui Jin Wu, Min Song Lin v. Holder,
No. 09-2176-ag, we need not consider whether we have jurisdiction to review petitioners’ challenge to the BIA’s pretermission of their application for asylum as untimely because the BIA’s alternative finding that they failed to demonstrate their eligibility for asylum was supported by substantial evidence. In
Yan Zhen Chen v. Holder,
No. 09-2664-ag, we decline to consider petitioner’s unexhausted arguments, and we need not consider petitioner’s contention that the IJ’s positive credibility determination is supported by the record because the BIA assumed,
arguendo,
that she was credible for purposes of her appeal. Finally, in
Qin Yun Zheng v. Holder,
No. 09-2862-ag, there is no merit to petitioner’s argument that she established her eligibility for withholding of removal and CAT relief based on her purportedly illegal departure from China.
See Qun Yang v. McElroy,
277 F.3d 158, 163 n. 5 (2d Cir.2002) (per curiam);
see also Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
432 F.3d 156, 159-60 (2d Cir.2005).
For the foregoing reasons, these petitions for review are DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in these petitions is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in these petitions is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in these petitions is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).