*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCCQ-XX-XXXXXXX 20-OCT-2022 08:46 AM Dkt. 12 OP
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
---o0o---
MATT YAMASHITA, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
LG CHEM, LTD.; LG CHEM AMERICA, INC., Defendants-Appellees,
and
COILART; GEARBEST.COM; and WA FA LA INC., Defendants.
SCCQ-XX-XXXXXXX
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT (CASE NO. 20-17512)
OCTOBER 20, 2022
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, WILSON, AND EDDINS, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY EDDINS, J.
In response to two certified questions from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, we examine the
relationship between Hawaiʻi’s general long-arm statute, Hawaiʻi
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 634-35 (2016), and the personal *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
jurisdiction limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process clause.
These certified questions arise from a product liability
suit. Matt Yamashita, a Hawaiʻi resident, sued two out-of-state
corporations in Hawaiʻi state court over an exploding electronic
cigarette. The suit was removed to the United States District
Court for the District of Hawaiʻi. There, Yamashita’s complaint
was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The District
Court based its dismissal on a finding that the defendant’s
activities in Hawaiʻi were not the but-for cause of Yamashita’s
injuries, meaning that his claims did not “arise out of” the
defendants’ activities.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined that to exercise
personal jurisdiction over the defendant corporations, both
Hawaiʻi’s long-arm statute and constitutional due process must be
satisfied. Finding Hawaiʻi precedent on the reach of Hawaiʻi’s
long-arm statute unclear in light of a recent Supreme Court
case, Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court,
141 S.Ct. 1017 (2021), the Ninth Circuit panel certified the
following questions to the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court:
1. May a Hawaii court assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporate defendant if the plaintiff’s injury “relates to,” but does not “arise from,” the defendant’s in-state acts enumerated in Hawaii’s general long-arm statute? Compare Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S.Ct. 1017 (2021), with Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634-35.
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2. In light of Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, does Hawaii’s general long-arm statute, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634-35, permit a Hawaii court to assert personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
We accepted these questions under Hawaiʻi Rules of Appellate
Procedure Rule 13 and now answer “Yes” to both.
In 1965, Hawaiʻi adopted a long-arm statute, HRS § 634-35.
This law provides that:
(a) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, the person’s personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the acts . . . . (Emphasis added.)
The legislature took its language directly from an Illinois
statute, which had already been construed by that state’s
highest court “as expanding Illinois’ jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants to the extent permissible by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Cowan v. First
Ins. Co. of Hawaii, Ltd., 61 Haw. 644, 649 n.4, 608 P.2d 394,
399 n.4 (1980). Thus, in Cowan we observed that “Hawaii’s long-
arm statute, HRS § 634-35, was adopted to expand the
jurisdiction of the State’s courts to the extent permitted by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at
649, 608 P.2d at 399.
Because most serious personal jurisdiction disputes end up
in federal court, we have had few occasions to further consider
the relationship between Hawaiʻi’s long-arm statute and the due
3 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
process clause. When the question has arisen, we have treated
Cowan as governing precedent. See e.g., Shaw v. North Am. Title
Co., 76 Hawaiʻi 323, 327, 876 P.2d 1291, 1295 (1994) (following
Cowan). Hawaiʻi’s District Court which has fielded the majority
of these cases, has done the same. See e.g., Greys Ave.
Partners, LLC v. Theyers, 431 F.Supp.3d 1121, 1128 (D. Haw.
2020) (citing to Cowan) (“Hawaii’s jurisdiction reaches the
limits of due process set by the United States Constitution.”)
The limits of due process, however, have not been static.
Last year, the Supreme Court held that injuries that “relate to”
but do not “arise from” (in the sense of strict causation) a
defendant’s in-state acts open that defendant up to personal
jurisdiction in that state. See Ford Motor Co., 141 S.Ct. at
1026. That is, acts of the defendant within the state do not
need to be the cause of the plaintiff’s injury, as long as there
is a sufficient relationship between the defendant and the
forum. Id.
Consistent with the legislative intent identified in Cowan,
Hawaiʻi’s long-arm statute incorporates this more permissive
interpretation of due process. We hold that Hawaiʻi’s long-arm
statute allows Hawaiʻi courts to invoke personal jurisdiction to
the full extent permitted by the due process clause. As long as
federal due process is satisfied, under the long-arm statute a
Hawaiʻi court may assert personal jurisdiction over an injury
4 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
that “relates to,” but does not “arise from,” a defendant’s in-
state acts.
In certifying this question, the Ninth Circuit panel
spotlighted the two-step inquiry applied in our precedent. See
Norris v. Six Flags Theme Parks, Inc., 102 Hawaiʻi 203, 207, 74
P.3d 26, 30 (2003) (“Personal jurisdiction exists when (1) the
defendant’s activity falls under the State’s long-arm statute,
and (2) the application of the statute complies with
constitutional due process.”). If Hawaiʻi’s long-arm statute
incorporates the limits of due process, why does the long-arm
statute occupy a separate place in the personal jurisdiction
analysis? Indeed, the Hawaiʻi District Court has more than once
observed that “the personal jurisdiction analysis under the
Hawaii long-arm statute collapses into a single due process
inquiry.” Hueter v. Kruse, 576 F.Supp.3d 743, 765-66 (D. Haw.
2021). See also Lānaʻi Resorts, LLC v. Maris Collective, Inc.,
No. CV 21-00401 HG-KJM, 2022 WL 3084574, at *4 (D.
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*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCCQ-XX-XXXXXXX 20-OCT-2022 08:46 AM Dkt. 12 OP
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
---o0o---
MATT YAMASHITA, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
LG CHEM, LTD.; LG CHEM AMERICA, INC., Defendants-Appellees,
and
COILART; GEARBEST.COM; and WA FA LA INC., Defendants.
SCCQ-XX-XXXXXXX
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT (CASE NO. 20-17512)
OCTOBER 20, 2022
RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, WILSON, AND EDDINS, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY EDDINS, J.
In response to two certified questions from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, we examine the
relationship between Hawaiʻi’s general long-arm statute, Hawaiʻi
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 634-35 (2016), and the personal *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
jurisdiction limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process clause.
These certified questions arise from a product liability
suit. Matt Yamashita, a Hawaiʻi resident, sued two out-of-state
corporations in Hawaiʻi state court over an exploding electronic
cigarette. The suit was removed to the United States District
Court for the District of Hawaiʻi. There, Yamashita’s complaint
was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The District
Court based its dismissal on a finding that the defendant’s
activities in Hawaiʻi were not the but-for cause of Yamashita’s
injuries, meaning that his claims did not “arise out of” the
defendants’ activities.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined that to exercise
personal jurisdiction over the defendant corporations, both
Hawaiʻi’s long-arm statute and constitutional due process must be
satisfied. Finding Hawaiʻi precedent on the reach of Hawaiʻi’s
long-arm statute unclear in light of a recent Supreme Court
case, Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court,
141 S.Ct. 1017 (2021), the Ninth Circuit panel certified the
following questions to the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court:
1. May a Hawaii court assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporate defendant if the plaintiff’s injury “relates to,” but does not “arise from,” the defendant’s in-state acts enumerated in Hawaii’s general long-arm statute? Compare Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S.Ct. 1017 (2021), with Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634-35.
2 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
2. In light of Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, does Hawaii’s general long-arm statute, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634-35, permit a Hawaii court to assert personal jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
We accepted these questions under Hawaiʻi Rules of Appellate
Procedure Rule 13 and now answer “Yes” to both.
In 1965, Hawaiʻi adopted a long-arm statute, HRS § 634-35.
This law provides that:
(a) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, the person’s personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of the acts . . . . (Emphasis added.)
The legislature took its language directly from an Illinois
statute, which had already been construed by that state’s
highest court “as expanding Illinois’ jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants to the extent permissible by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Cowan v. First
Ins. Co. of Hawaii, Ltd., 61 Haw. 644, 649 n.4, 608 P.2d 394,
399 n.4 (1980). Thus, in Cowan we observed that “Hawaii’s long-
arm statute, HRS § 634-35, was adopted to expand the
jurisdiction of the State’s courts to the extent permitted by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at
649, 608 P.2d at 399.
Because most serious personal jurisdiction disputes end up
in federal court, we have had few occasions to further consider
the relationship between Hawaiʻi’s long-arm statute and the due
3 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
process clause. When the question has arisen, we have treated
Cowan as governing precedent. See e.g., Shaw v. North Am. Title
Co., 76 Hawaiʻi 323, 327, 876 P.2d 1291, 1295 (1994) (following
Cowan). Hawaiʻi’s District Court which has fielded the majority
of these cases, has done the same. See e.g., Greys Ave.
Partners, LLC v. Theyers, 431 F.Supp.3d 1121, 1128 (D. Haw.
2020) (citing to Cowan) (“Hawaii’s jurisdiction reaches the
limits of due process set by the United States Constitution.”)
The limits of due process, however, have not been static.
Last year, the Supreme Court held that injuries that “relate to”
but do not “arise from” (in the sense of strict causation) a
defendant’s in-state acts open that defendant up to personal
jurisdiction in that state. See Ford Motor Co., 141 S.Ct. at
1026. That is, acts of the defendant within the state do not
need to be the cause of the plaintiff’s injury, as long as there
is a sufficient relationship between the defendant and the
forum. Id.
Consistent with the legislative intent identified in Cowan,
Hawaiʻi’s long-arm statute incorporates this more permissive
interpretation of due process. We hold that Hawaiʻi’s long-arm
statute allows Hawaiʻi courts to invoke personal jurisdiction to
the full extent permitted by the due process clause. As long as
federal due process is satisfied, under the long-arm statute a
Hawaiʻi court may assert personal jurisdiction over an injury
4 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
that “relates to,” but does not “arise from,” a defendant’s in-
state acts.
In certifying this question, the Ninth Circuit panel
spotlighted the two-step inquiry applied in our precedent. See
Norris v. Six Flags Theme Parks, Inc., 102 Hawaiʻi 203, 207, 74
P.3d 26, 30 (2003) (“Personal jurisdiction exists when (1) the
defendant’s activity falls under the State’s long-arm statute,
and (2) the application of the statute complies with
constitutional due process.”). If Hawaiʻi’s long-arm statute
incorporates the limits of due process, why does the long-arm
statute occupy a separate place in the personal jurisdiction
analysis? Indeed, the Hawaiʻi District Court has more than once
observed that “the personal jurisdiction analysis under the
Hawaii long-arm statute collapses into a single due process
inquiry.” Hueter v. Kruse, 576 F.Supp.3d 743, 765-66 (D. Haw.
2021). See also Lānaʻi Resorts, LLC v. Maris Collective, Inc.,
No. CV 21-00401 HG-KJM, 2022 WL 3084574, at *4 (D. Haw. July 13,
2022) (“The personal jurisdiction analysis under the Hawaii
long-arm statute thus becomes a due process inquiry.”).
Functionally, the two-step inquiry may in fact be
redundant. For instance, in Kailieha v. Hayes, a non-resident
Virginia doctor was sued in Hawaiʻi court over an allegedly
negligent medical prescription that resulted in an automobile
crash in Honolulu. 56 Haw. 306, 307, 536 P.2d 568, 569 (1975).
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We first found that jurisdiction was proper under the long-arm
statute because a tortious act, which includes the consequences
of that act, was committed in the state. Id. But we ultimately
held that due process under the Fourteenth Amendment was not
satisfied, since the non-resident defendant did not have
sufficient contacts with Hawaiʻi. Id. at 312, 536 P.2d at 572.
As the more restrictive requirement, the personal jurisdiction
issue could have been resolved in Kailieha by skipping straight
to an examination of federal due process.
To the extent that this collapsed inquiry yields the same
practical result as the two-step test, the method currently used
by the District Court in Hawaiʻi is not improper. But there is
value in remembering that personal jurisdiction rests on both
negative federal limits and positive state assertions of
jurisdiction. That the legislature has chosen to align the
inquiry into personal jurisdiction in Hawaiʻi with an inquiry
into constitutional due process limits does not mean this must
always be the case.
James J. Bickerton, /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald Jeremy Kyle O’Steen, /s/ Paula A. Nakayama for Plaintiff-Appellant /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna Stefan Reinke, /s/ Michael D. Wilson Wendy Sabina Dowse, for Defendants-Appellees /s/ Todd W. Eddins