Yager ex rel. National Labor Relations Board v. International Union of Operating Engineers

133 F. Supp. 362, 36 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2552, 1955 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2891
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedJuly 25, 1955
DocketNo. 18319
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 133 F. Supp. 362 (Yager ex rel. National Labor Relations Board v. International Union of Operating Engineers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Yager ex rel. National Labor Relations Board v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 133 F. Supp. 362, 36 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2552, 1955 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2891 (S.D. Cal. 1955).

Opinion

YANKWICH, Chief Judge.

George A. Yager, Acting Regional Director of the Twenty-First Region of the National Labor Relations Board, for and on behalf of the National Labor Relations Board, has filed a petition for injunction under § 10(l) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(1).

The petition recites that in March and April, 1955, Crook Company (herein called Crook) and William W. Shepherd and Nora D. Shepherd, co-partners doing business as Shepherd Machinery Company, (to be referred to as Shepherd) filed separate charges with the Board alleging that the respondent, International Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union No. 12, AFL, (to be referred to as “the Union”) is engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of § 8(b), Subsection 4(A) and 4'(B) of the [364]*364Act. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b) 4(A, B). The matter was referred to the petitioner and investigated by him. After such investigation, he has reasonable cause to believe that the charges are true and that a Complaint of the Board based thereon should issue against the respondent.

Specifically, it is alleged that since the early part of this year the Union has been engaged in a campaign to secure recognition from Crook and Shepherd as collective bargaining representatives of their employees. No certification of the Union as collective bargaining representative of any of the employees of Crook or of Shepherd has been made.

The following additional facts are given in the petition: The Union, since March 9, 1955, has picketed Crook’s premises. In addition, the Union’s pickets have followed Crook’s employees from Crook’s premises to various construction and other sites at which Crook equipment was located, and have, by picketing,- orders, instructions, directions and appeals, induced and encouraged employees of other employers engaged in work at said sites, including but not limited to Yankee Body Shope, Crowell & Larson, Paving Materials Co. (herein called Yankee, Crowell, , Paving respectively) to refuse to perform services for their respective employers.

Since on or about April 23, 1955, the Union by orders,, directions, instructions and appeals, induced and encouraged employees of Ralph Welker and of McCammon-Wunderlich Company, (herein called Welker and McCammon-Wunderlich) excavating and grading contractors, to refuse to work or perform services for Welker and McCammon-Wunderlich Company, while employees of Shepherd were at construction sites repairing equipment leased by Welker from Shepherd and purchased by McCammon-Wunderlich from Shepherd, respectively. Since on or about March 11, 1955, respondent has engaged in, and by picketing, orders, directions, instructions, appeals, and by other means, has induced and encouraged employees of Yankee, Crowell, Paving, Welker, McCammon-Wunderlich, and of other employers, to engage in strikes or concerted refusals in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on goods, articles, materials or commodities, or to perform services.

The petition stated that the objects of the Union’s conduct were: (1) to force or require Yankee, Crowell, Paving, Welker, McCammon-Wunderlich, and other employers and persons, to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of Crook and/or Shepherd, or to cease doing business with Crook and/or Shepherd; and (2) to force or require Crook and/or Shephérd to recognize or bargain with the Union as the collective bargaining representatives of their employees although the Union has not been certified as the representative of such employees in accordance with § 9 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 159.

Other allegations need not concern us. The Court is asked to enjoin the acts of the Union pending the final adjudication of the matter by the National Labor Relations Board. 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(e).

In a matter of this character, the problem for us to determine is not whether the Union has been guilty of unfair labor practices, but, as stated by the' writer in one of the first cases brought under this provision of the Act, whether the petitioner has reasonable ground to believe that the charge is true and that the Complaint should issue. Le Baron v. Los Angeles Building & Construction Trades Council, D.C.Cal.1949, 84 F.Supp. 629. As stated in that opinion:

“The test by which compliance is determined is whether the facts are such that a reasonable person could be led to believe that they constitute a violation of law. They need not be sufficient to actually prove such violation.” 84 F.Supp. at page 635.

[365]*365The hearing of this matter took several days. Since submission, the testimony given has been reviewed with the aid of a complete transcript prepared by the official reporter of this court. Without reviewing the incidents in detail, I am satisfied that the evidence in the record warrants the conclusion that the petitioner has reasonable ground to believe that the Union has induced the workmen of Yankee, Crowell, Paving, Welker, McCammon-Wunderlich, with whom they have no labor controversies, to cease using and handling the products of Crook and Shepherd and to cease doing business with Crook and Shepherd in order to force Crook and Shepherd to bargain with the Union as a collective bargaining agency, although it has not been certified as the representative of such employees, and, that an injunction should issue pending the final adjudication of the matter by the National Labor Relations Board.

Many of the facts presented by the petitioner were not disputed. The chief contention being that any suasion or persuasion exercised was directly on the employer. I am of the view that the acts of inducement were directed towards the employees who acted and resulted in work stoppages at the direction of the Union’s representatives.

The constitutionality of the Section, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160 (l), is challenged. I rejected the constitutional objections to the secondary boycott provision in the TaftHartley Act in Le Baron v. Los Angeles Building & Construction Trades Council, supra. That decision conforms to the views of higher courts cited in it and others. See, Printing Specialties and Paper Converters Union, Local 388, A.F.L. v. Le Baron, 9 Cir., 1948, 171 F.2d 331. The Supreme Court has since sustained the provisions of the specific section, 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(l), and others forbidding secondary pressure. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local, 501, A. F. of L. v. N. L. R. B., 1951, 341 U.S. 694, 725, 71 S.Ct. 954, 95 L.Ed. 1299; Radio Officers’ Union of Commercial Telegraphers Union, A.F.L. v. N. L. R. B., 1954, 347 U.S. 17, 74 S.Ct. 323, 98 L.Ed. 455.

The additional argument is made that by limiting the court’s injunctive power to the interim before the final determination by the Board, the Board is enabled by quick action, to render the question moot so as to make it difficult to obtain a final determination. The argument is rather unique. We have heard much about the abuse of the injunctive process in the past. But here a Congressional limitation on the judicial exercise of the injunctive power in labor disputes is objected to because the administrative board by expeditious action (which is commanded

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Stryjewski v. Local Union No. 830
304 A.2d 463 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1973)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
133 F. Supp. 362, 36 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2552, 1955 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2891, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/yager-ex-rel-national-labor-relations-board-v-international-union-of-casd-1955.