Yadir Flores-Vargas v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 18, 2026
• Docket: 20-70855
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 18 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

YADIR FLORES-VARGAS, No. 20-70855

Petitioner, Agency No. A088-092-420

v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 18, 2026**

Before: BERZON and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK,*** District Judge.

Petitioner Yadir Flores-Vargas, a native and citizen of Mexico, challenges

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order declining to remand his case to

the immigration judge (“IJ”) for a chance to apply for adjustment of status and

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Frederic Block, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. affirming the IJ’s denial of cancellation of removal.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to remand for abuse of discretion.

Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005). Because the BIA

adopted the IJ’s reasoning, see Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d 1015, 1019–20 (9th Cir.

2009), we review for substantial evidence the IJ’s determination that the facts do

not satisfy the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard for

cancellation of removal, Gonzalez-Juarez v. Bondi, 137 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th Cir.

2025). For the following reasons, we deny the petition for review.

1. The BIA did not abuse its discretion by declining to remand Flores-

Vargas’s case to the IJ based on his asserted eligibility for adjustment of status. To

succeed on a motion to remand, a petitioner must establish prima facie eligibility

for the relief sought. Partap v. Holder, 603 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (per

curiam). Flores-Vargas is not eligible for adjustment of status unless a “visa is

immediately available to [him] at the time the application is filed.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1255(i)(2)(B) (emphasis added). A visa is immediately available only when the

applicant’s priority date is earlier than the “final action” date for the relevant

family preference category, as shown on the current State Department visa bulletin.

See 8 C.F.R. §§ 245.1(g)(1), 1245.1(g)(1); see also Babaria v. Blinken, 87 F.4th

963, 974 (9th Cir. 2023). When the BIA denied remand, Flores-Vargas’s priority

date, April 28, 2001, was not earlier than the final action date for his family

2 20-70855 preference category. As a visa was not immediately available to him, he was not

prima facie eligible for adjustment of status. Accordingly, the BIA properly

concluded that Flores-Vargas did not meet the standard for remand.1

2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s and IJ’s determination that

Flores-Vargas’s qualifying relatives—his lawful permanent resident mother and

his two U.S. citizen children—would not suffer “exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship” resulting from his removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). To meet

the statutory standard, “the hardship must be out of the ordinary and exceedingly

uncommon.” Gonzalez-Juarez, 137 F.4th at 1006.

The IJ reasonably concluded that any hardship to Flores-Vargas’s mother

would not rise to the level necessary to qualify for cancellation. Flores-Vargas

testified that he lives with and cares for his mother, who has various medical

ailments. The IJ found that if Flores-Vargas were removed, his mother would need

to relocate but would continue to receive medical care in the United States, and his

three lawfully present siblings could adequately care for her even though she

would prefer Flores-Vargas to be her caretaker. The record thus supports the IJ’s

conclusion that any hardship to Flores-Vargas’s mother would not be extreme or

1 To the extent Flores-Vargas argues that his “apparent eligibility” for adjustment of status required the IJ to continue his removal proceedings to allow his priority date to come current, he did not appeal the IJ’s continuance denial to the BIA and so did not exhaust that issue. See Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2023).

3 20-70855 exceedingly uncommon.

As to Flores-Vargas’s sons, the record also supports the IJ’s determination

that any financial hardship or change in their lifestyle would not be exceptional or

extremely unusual. The IJ found that if Flores-Vargas were removed and his two

sons stayed in the United States, the children could suffer some financial hardship,

but they would continue attending school, and his son Jaydin would continue

receiving medical care for asthma. The IJ also found that if the children

accompanied Flores-Vargas to Mexico, the asserted hardship would also be

financial: Flores-Vargas might not find a job and fears he would not be able to

afford or obtain asthma medication for Jaydin. Flores-Vargas did not present

evidence that the medication would be financially unavailable to his child or hard

to find in Mexico. Absent such evidence, the IJ reasonably concluded that the

asserted emotional or financial hardship to his children was not “substantially

beyond that which would ordinarily result from an alien’s removal.”

Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s and IJ’s denial of

cancellation on hardship grounds.

PETITION DENIED.2

2 The government’s motion to file its supplemental brief late is granted. Flores-Vargas’s motion to stay removal is denied, and the temporary administrative stay of removal is lifted.

4 20-70855