Xynergy Healthcare Capital II LLC v. Municipio de San Juan

District Court, D. Puerto Rico·Decided January 29, 2021·No. 3:18-cv-01208·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

XYNERGY HEALTHCARE CAPITAL II LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL NO.: 18-1208 (MEL)

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, et al.

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER I. Procedural Background Xynergy Healthcare Capital II LLC (“Xynergy”) filed an amended complaint against the Municipality of San Juan (“the Municipality” or “MSJ”) and GEODATAPR International, Inc. (“Geodata”) on August 26, 2018. ECF No. 20. In the amended complaint, Xynergy alleges that Geodata is liable to Xynergy for breach of contract damages under the Healthcare Receivables Master Purchase and Sale Agreement (“Master Agreement”). Id. at 11-12, 15-16. It is also alleged by Xynergy that it has a valid and enforceable security interest over all assets of Geodata. Additionally, Xynergy seeks a declaratory judgment that the Municipality and Geodata are jointly and severally liable for certain unpaid payment obligations under the Master Agreement and Chapter 9 of Title 19, Annotated Laws of Puerto Rico, Section 2211, et. seq. (“the Commercial Transactions Act”). Id. at 11, 15-16. Geodata answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim on March 25, 2019, seeking declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages for contractual deceit and breach of fiduciary duties. ECF No. 105. Geodata also seeks damages for breach of contract. Id. Pending before the court is a motion for summary judgment on the complaint filed by Xynergy against Geodata. ECF No. 142. Geodata did not file a timely response in opposition and Xynergy’s motion for summary judgment against Geodata was deemed unopposed.1 ECF No. 165. In the prayer for relief of the motion for summary judgment, Xynergy moves the court to enter a summary judgment:

(1) ordering Geodata to pay to Xynergy, a misdirected payment penalty in the amount of $254,874.80, as agreed in Master Agreement;

(2) ordering Geodata to pay to Xynergy the amount of $367,359.01, for the discount fees accrued on the 17 invoices that it sold, transferred and assigned to Xynergy and later impeded its collection by Xynergy;

(3) ordering Geodata to pay to Xynergy a termination event prepayment penalty in the amount of $132,532.68 for defaulting on the terms of the Master Agreement;

(4) decreeing that Geodata is concurrently liable with the Municipality to pay to Xynergy the amount of $1,019,499.19 in damages for its fraudulent misappropriation of the payment proceeds of the 17 invoices that it sold, transferred and assigned to Xynergy and later collected for itself;

(5) decreeing that under the law, Xynergy has a valid and enforceable security interest over all assets of Geodata, now existing or hereafter arising, wherever located, including and not limited to all of Geodata’s receivables from the Municipality;

(6) decreeing that any amount due or to become due by the Municipality to Geodata, is an asset of Xynergy and consequently, the Municipality must pay to Xynergy any amount to be paid by the Municipality for any invoiced amount due to Geodata, until all the amounts owed to Xynergy are paid;

(7) ordering Geodata to pay to Xynergy all attorney’s fees and costs incurred by Xynergy in this case;

(8) granting all other further relief that is necessary or proper to effectuate the judgment.

ECF No. 142, at 14-15.

1 Geodata also did not file a timely response in opposition to Xynergy’s “Motion Requesting Order to Deem Xynergy's Motion for Summary Judgment Against [Geodata] as Unopposed.” See ECF No. 154. II. Standard of Review The purpose of summary judgment “is to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties’ proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required.” Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Summary judgment is granted when the record shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party. A fact is material if it has the potential of determining the outcome of the litigation.” Farmers Ins. Exch. v. RNK, Inc., 632 F.3d 777, 782 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Rodríguez-Rivera v. Federico Trilla Reg’l Hosp., 532 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 2008)). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant presents a properly focused motion “averring ‘an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case[,]’ [t]he burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of

at least one fact issue which is both ‘genuine’ and ‘material.’” Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1990)). For issues where the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof, the party cannot merely “rely on an absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific facts [in the record] that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute.” McCarthy v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The party need not, however, “rely only on uncontradicted evidence . . . . So long as the [party]’s evidence is both cognizable and sufficiently strong to support a verdict in her favor, the factfinder must be allowed to determine which version of the facts is most compelling.” Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the court “must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 115. There is “no room for credibility

determinations, no room for the measured weighing of conflicting evidence such as the trial process entails, [and] no room for the judge to superimpose his own ideas of probability and likelihood.” Greenburg v. P. R. Mar. Shipping Auth., 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir. 1987). The court may, however, safely ignore “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). III. Uncontested Material Facts2 Xynergy is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the state of Florida. ECF No. 142-1, at 1, ¶ 1; ECF No. 142-2, at 1. Mr. Alejandro Nathan (“Mr. Nathan”) is the

President of Xynergy. ECF No. 142-1, at 1, ¶ 2; ECF No. 142-3, at 1.

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