Xirui Shi v. Michael McGeever

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: April 4, 2024
• Docket: 23-2868
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 23-2868 __________

XIRUI SHI, Appellant

v.

MICHAEL MCGEEVER, In His Official Capacity; COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY DEPT OF RECORDS; ALLEGHENY COUNTY SHERIFF OFFICE; KEVIN M. KRAUS, In His Official Capacity; CHURCHILL BOROUGH; ALEXANDER J. GRAZIANI, In His Official Capacity; TRI-COG LAND BANK ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-23-cv-00893) District Judge: Honorable Christy Criswell Wiegand ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) April 1, 2024

Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 4, 2024) ___________

OPINION* ___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. This matter relates to a piece of property in the borough of Churchill, located in

Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. The borough filed a Writ of Scire Facias Sur Tax Lien

against Xirui Shi and Nan Shi for unpaid taxes. After three years without a response

from the Shis, the Court of Common Pleas entered a default judgment against them, and

ordered the public sale of the property, which was purchased by Defendant Tri-Cog Land

Bank.

Xirui Shi filed a complaint pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the

Defendants violated her constitutional rights through the sale and the proceedings that led

up to it. Tri-Cog filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Similarly, Defendants Churchill Borough and Alexander J.

Graziani, the CEO of the borough, filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, citing

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Those three Defendants argued that the District

Court lacked jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act. The District Court agreed,

granting their motions and dismissing Shi’s complaint without prejudice. This appeal

followed.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “The standard of review is plenary

where the District Court dismisses for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Gould Elecs.

Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).1

1 Although the District Court’s dismissal was without prejudice, that order is nevertheless final and appealable because Shi can do nothing to cure her complaint. See Presbytery of N.J. of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1461 n.6 (3d Cir. 1994). 2 The Tax Injunction Act states that “[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or

restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain,

speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341.

Coupled together, the Tax Injunction Act and the principles of comity discussed by the

Supreme Court in Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981),

“make it clear that a federal court cannot entertain a suit posing either an equitable or

legal challenge to state or local taxes” if the state provides an adequate remedy. Kerns v.

Dukes, 153 F.3d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1998). “The Tax Injunction Act does not require that

the state courts provide a favorable substantive outcome; instead, it only requires access

to the state courts and an opportunity for meaningful review.” Gass v. County of

Allegheny, Pa., 371 F.3d 134, 139 (3d Cir. 2004).

Shi argues in her brief that the dismissal of her complaint was inappropriate, but

we find this claim to be meritless given the tax issues that form the basis of her case, the

applicability of the Tax Injunction Act, the principles of comity discussed in McNary and

Kerns, and the availability of state court remedies. Id. We agree with the District Court

that Shi could have obtained effective relief through state court, and that the Tax

Injunction Act therefore barred her from bringing her case in federal court. For this

reason, the District Court correctly concluded that dismissal for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction was required.

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.