Xavier B. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

Opinion

1 U.S. F D IL IS E T D R I I N C T T H C E O URT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 2 Nov 17, 2025 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 4 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

5 XAVIER B., 6 No. 2:25-CV-00186-ACE Plaintiff, 7 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 8 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 9 FRANK BISIGNANO, ECF Nos. 10 & 12 10 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 11 SECURITY,

12 Defendant. 13 14 BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff’s Opening Brief and Defendant’s Brief 15 in response. ECF No. 10, 12. Attorney Asa LaMusga represents Plaintiff; Special 16 Assistant United States Attorney Jeffrey E. Staples represents Defendant. After 17 reviewing the administrative record and the briefs filed by the parties, the Court 18 GRANTS Defendant’s Motion and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion. 19 JURISDICTION 20 Plaintiff protectively filed an application for child disability benefits on 21 January 9, 2020, alleging onset of disability on January 13, 2005. Tr. 458-459. 22 Plaintiff later amended the alleged onset date to January 9, 2020. Tr. 1175. The 23 application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Administrative Law 24 Judge (ALJ) Marie Palachuk held a hearing on June 17, 2021, and issued an 25 unfavorable decision on August 17, 2021. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s 26 request for review on September 2, 2022. Tr. 1-7. A civil action was then filed in 27 this Court which resulted in a stipulated remand on March 27, 2023. Tr. 1044- 28 1046. ALJ Palachuk held a new administrative hearing on December 21, 2023. Tr. 1 974-1004, and issued an unfavorable decision on February 28, 2024, Tr. 947-967. 2 The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s written objections on March 26, 2025, Tr. 3 937-943, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision for 4 purposes of judicial review, which is appealable to the district court pursuant to 42 5 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff filed this action for judicial review on May 30, 2025. 6 ECF No. 1. 7 STANDARD OF REVIEW 8 The ALJ is tasked with “determining credibility, resolving conflicts in 9 medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 10 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ’s determinations of law are reviewed de novo, with 11 deference to a reasonable interpretation of the applicable statutes. McNatt v. Apfel, 12 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). The decision of the ALJ may be reversed 13 only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. 14 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is 15 defined as being more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Id. at 16 1098. Put another way, substantial evidence “is such relevant evidence as a 17 reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. 18 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 19 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 20 interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. 21 Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098; Morgan v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 22 599 (9th Cir. 1999). If substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, or 23 if conflicting evidence supports a finding of either disability or non-disability, the 24 ALJ’s determination is conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th 25 Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will be set 26 aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and 27 making the decision. Brawner v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 839 F.2d 432, 28 433 (9th Cir. 1988). 1 SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS 2 Childhood Disability 3 The Social Security Act provides that a child under 18 is “disabled” for 4 purposes of SSI eligibility if he “has a medically determinable physical or mental 5 impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which 6 can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for 7 a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). 8 The Commissioner follows a three-step sequential process in determining 9 childhood disability: (1) whether the child is engaged in substantial gainful 10 activity; (2) if not, whether the child has a medically determinable severe 11 impairment; (3) and, if so, whether the child’s severe impairment meets, medically 12 equals, or functionally equals the severity of a set of criteria for an impairment 13 listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924. 14 If the Commissioner determines at step three that the claimant has an 15 impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the 16 severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 17 Appendix 1, the analysis ends there. If not, the Commissioner decides whether the 18 child’s impairment results in limitations that functionally equal a listing. 20 C.F.R. 19 § 416.926a(a). In determining whether an impairment or combination of 20 impairments functionally equal a listing, the Commissioner assesses the claimant’s 21 functioning in terms of six domains: (1) acquiring and using information; (2) 22 attending and completing tasks; (3) interacting and relating with others; (4) moving 23 about and manipulating objects; (5) caring for yourself; and (6) health and physical 24 well-being. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1). 25 When evaluating the ability to function in each domain, the ALJ considers 26 information that will help answer the following questions “about whether your 27 impairment(s) affect your functioning and whether your activities are typical of 28 o

ther c

hildren your age who do not have impairments”: 1 (i) What activities are you able to perform?

2 (ii) What activities are you not able to perform? 3 (iii) Which of your activities are limited or restricted compared to other 4 5 c hildren your age who do not have impairments? 6 (iv) Where do you have difficulty with your activities – at home, in 7 c hildcare, at school, or in the community? 8 (v) Do you have difficulty independently initiating, sustaining, or 9 c ompleting activities? 10 (vi) What kind of help do you need to do your activities, how much help do 11 you need, and how often do you need it? 12 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(2)(i)-(vi). 13 The evaluation of functional equivalence begins “by considering the child’s 14 functioning without considering the domains or individual impairments.” Title 15 XVI: Determining Childhood Disability Under the Functional Equivalence Rule – 16 The “Whole Child” Approach, SSR 08-1p, 2009 WL 396031 (Feb. 17, 2009). The 17 rules provide that “[w]hen we evaluate your functioning and decide which domains 18 may be affected by your impairment(s), we will look first at your activities and 19 limitations and restrictions.” Id. citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(c). The rules instruct 20 the Co mmissioner to: 21 Look at information we have in your case record about how your functioning is affected during all your activities when we decide whether 22 your impairment or combination of impairments functionally equals the 23 listings. Your activities are everything you do at home, at school, and in 24 your community. 25 Id. citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b). The severity of limitation in each affected 26 functional domain is then considered. This technique is called the “Whole Child” 27 approach. 28 /// 1 Adult Disability 2 With respect to adults, the Commissioner has established a five-step 3 sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 4 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-142 5 (1987). In steps one through four, the claimant bears the burden of establishing a 6 prima facie case of disability benefits. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-1099. This 7 burden is met once a claimant establishes that a physical or mental impairment 8 prevents the claimant from engaging in past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 9 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). If a claimant cannot perform past relevant work, 10 the ALJ proceeds to step five, and the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show 11 (1) that Plaintiff can perform other substantial gainful activity and (2) that a 12 significant number of jobs exist in the national economy which Plaintiff can 13 perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497-1498 (9th Cir. 1984); Beltran v. 14 Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012). If a claimant cannot make an adjustment 15 to other work, the claimant will be found disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 16 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). 17 ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 18 On February 28, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not 19 disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. Tr. 947-967. 20 With respect to the childhood standard of disability, the ALJ found at step 21 one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the 22 application date, January 9, 2020. Tr. 952. At step two, the ALJ determined 23 Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairment: autism, attention deficit 24 hyperactivity disorder, depressive disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. Tr. 25 952. The ALJ found at step three that the evidence of record demonstrated 26 Plaintiff’s impairments, although severe, did not meet, medically equal, or 27 functionally equal the criteria of any of the listed impairments. Tr. 953. As to the 28 six domains (functional equivalence), the ALJ concluded Plaintiff had less than a 1 marked limitation in acquiring and using information, less than a marked limitation 2 in attending and completing tasks, a marked limitation in interacting and relating 3 with others, no limitation in moving about and manipulating objects, less than a 4 marked limitation in caring for himself, and no limitation in health and physical 5 well-being. Tr. 955. The ALJ thus determined Plaintiff’s impairments resulted in 6 only one marked limitation and no extreme limitations. Because Plaintiff did not 7 have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically or 8 functionally equaled the listings, it was determined that Plaintiff was not disabled 9 prior to attaining age 18. Tr. 962. 10 Plaintiff attained age 18 on January 12, 2023. Tr. 952. With respect to the 11 adult standard of disability, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not develop any new 12 impairment or impairments since attaining age 18; he continued to have a severe 13 impairment or combination of impairments but his impairments did not meet or 14 medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments; he had the residual 15 functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels 16 with several nonexertional limitations; he had no past relevant work; and, based on 17 the testimony of the vocational expert and considering Plaintiff age, education, 18 work experience and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 19 national economy that Plaintiff can perform, including the jobs of cleaner 20 housekeeping, labeler, and industrial cleaner. Tr. 962-966. 21 Accordingly, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not under a disability within 22 the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time from the January 9, 2020 23 disability application date, through the date of the ALJ’s decision, February 28, 24 2024. Tr. 967. 25 ISSUES 26 The question presented is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 27 decision denying benefits and, if so, whether that decision is based on proper legal 28 standards. 1 Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in this case by (1) finding he only had a 2 mild limitation with his ability to understand, remember or apply information; (2) 3 failing to properly assess the functional domains; and (3) finding “persuasive” the 4 opinion of medical expert Ann Monis, Psy.D.. ECF No. 10 at 2. 5 Plaintiff does not specifically challenge the ALJ’s adult disability 6 determination. 7 DISCUSSION 8 A. Ann Monis, Psy.D. 9 Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred by finding “persuasive” the opinion of 10 medical expert Ann Monis, Psy.D.. ECF No. 10 at 11-14. 11 Dr. Monis testified at the 2023 administrative hearing that Plaintiff had a 12 mild limitation with understanding, remembering or applying information, a 13 marked limitation with interaction with others, a moderate limitation with 14 concentration, persistence or pace, and a mild limitation with adapt or manage 15 oneself. With regard to the functional domains, Dr. Monis opined Plaintiff had 16 less than marked limitation in acquiring and using information, less than marked 17 limitation in attending and completing tasks, marked limitation in interacting and 18 relating with others, no limitation moving about and manipulation objects, no 19 limitation in caring for self, and no limitation with health and physical well-being. 20 Tr. 980-981, 983. 21 The ALJ found the opinions expressed by Dr. Monis “persuasive,” 22 concluding her opinions were supported by explanations at the hearing and 23 consistent with the record as a whole, including the limitations assessed by other 24 medical professionals of record. Tr. 960-961. 25 Plaintiff contends the ALJ should have rejected Dr. Monis’ opinions as 26 unsupported and inconsistent with the record evidence. ECF No. 10 at 11-14; ECF 27 No. 13 at 4-5. However, Plaintiff does not identify any contradictory medical 28 source opinion evidence, nor does Plaintiff argue that the ALJ erred by rejecting 1 the opinion of any medical professional in this case other than Dr. Monis. The 2 Court finds Dr. Monis explained her review of the record and how the evidence 3 supported her conclusions at the administrative hearing, Tr. 979-980, and that Dr. 4 Monis’ opinion was consistent with all objective medical evidence of record, see 5 Tr. 381, 391, 910, 960, 983, 1009, 1526-1527. Accordingly, the ALJ’s assessment 6 that Dr. Monis was persuasive is supported by substantial evidence. The Court 7 finds that the ALJ did not err by crediting Dr. Monis’ opinions. 8 B. Step Three - - Per Se Disabling Impairments 9 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred at step three by finding he has only a mild 10 limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information, which resulted 11 in a determination that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal a 12 listed impairment. ECF No. 10 at 8. 13 At step three, a claimant is automatically presumed disabled if his severe 14 impairment(s) meet or medically equal a listed impairment. To show error in an 15 ALJ’s step-three finding, a claimant must identify “which listing [he] believes [he] 16 meets or equals,” and then set forth “evidence which would support the diagnosis 17 and findings of a listed impairment.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 683 (9th 18 Cir. 2005). 19 Here, the ALJ analyzed Listings 112.04, 112.06, 112.10, and 112.11. Tr. 20 953-954. In order to meet or medically equal these Listings, Plaintiff must be 21 found to have an “extreme limitation of one, or marked limitation of two,” of the 22 four broad areas of mental functioning: understanding, remembering, and applying 23 information; interacting with others; concentration, persistence, and pace; and 24 adapting and managing oneself. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 25 112.04B. The ALJ determined Plaintiff had a mild limitation in understanding, 26 remembering, and applying information, a marked limitation in interacting with 27 others, a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, and pace, and a 28 moderate limitation in adapting or managing oneself and thus found that Plaintiff 1 did not satisfy the criteria of Listings 112.04, 112.06, 112.10, and 112.11. Tr. 953- 2 954. 3 As correctly asserted by Defendant, although Plaintiff argued that the ALJ 4 erred by finding only a mild limitation in understanding, remembering, and 5 applying information, Plaintiff did not state how severe he believed that limitation 6 should be categorized, nor did he provide any specific medical record support for a 7 finding of a greater limitation in understanding, remembering, and applying 8 information. See ECF No. 10 at 8-11. Instead, Plaintiff points to evidence in the 9 record that the ALJ had already assessed and ostensibly requests that this Court 10 reweigh that evidence. Id. However, it is not the role of this Court to second- 11 guess the Commissioner. If evidence supports more than one rational 12 interpretation, the decision of the ALJ must be upheld. Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 13 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989) 14 (finding the Court must ultimately uphold the Commissioner’s decision where the 15 evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation). 16 The ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff had a mild limitation in understanding, 17 remembering, and applying information is supported by substantial evidence. As 18 indicated by the ALJ, a 2020 teacher questionnaire, February 2021 IEP update and 19 subsequent counseling treatment note reflect that Plaintiff had some problems, but 20 those issues were believed to be due to a lack of confidence, anxiety, and 21 situational stressors related to his family situation, not cognitive difficulties. Tr. 22 953. The ALJ also noted, in addition to the opinion of the medical expert, 23 objective findings were not consistent with more than a mild limitation in this area. 24 See Tr. 381, 391, 910, 960, 983, 1009, 1526-1527. The Court declines to reweigh 25 the evidence. 26 C. Step Three - - Functional Equivalence 27 Plaintiff argues the ALJ also erred by failing to properly assess the 28 functional domains in this case. ECF No. 10 at 6-11. Plaintiff specifically asserts 1 he has a greater limitation in acquiring and using information than found by the 2 ALJ; therefore, his severe impairments functionally equaled a listing. Id. 3 To functionally equal a listing, a claimant’s impairment or combination of 4 impairments must result in “marked” limitations in two domains of functioning or 5 an “extreme” limitation in one domain. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(d). A “marked 6 limitation” in a domain results when the child’s impairment “interferes seriously” 7 with the ability to independently initiate, sustain or complete activities. 20 C.F.R. 8 § 416.926a(e)(2). An “extreme limitation” in a domain results when the child’s 9 impairment interferes “very seriously” with his ability to independently initiate, 10 sustain or complete activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3). 11 The ALJ weighed the medical record, Plaintiff’s educational records, and the 12 opinion evidence and found Plaintiff had less than a marked limitation in the 13 functional domain of acquiring and using information.1 Tr. 955. Plaintiff 14 challenges this finding but, again, fails to articulate, with specific support, what 15 level of limitation that functional domain should be assessed. Plaintiff again points 16 to evidence the ALJ already evaluated and asks the Court to reweigh the evidence. 17 ECF No. 10 at 8-10. However, as discussed above, it is not the role of this Court 18 to second-guess the Commissioner. See Lewis, 498 F.3d at 911. In any event, the 19

20 1In the domain of acquiring and using information, an ALJ considers “how 21 well you acquire or learn information, and how well you use the information you 22 have learned.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(g). A claimant may be limited in acquiring 23 and using information if he (1) does not demonstrate understanding of words about 24 space, size, or time; (2) cannot rhyme words or the sounds in words; (3) has 25 difficulty recalling important things he learned in school yesterday; (4) has 26 difficulty solving mathematics questions or computing arithmetic answers; or (5) 27 talks only in short, simple sentences and has difficulty explaining what he means. 28 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(g)(3)(i)-(v). Court concludes the ALJ’s finding pertaining to this functional domain is supported by substantial evidence: Plaintiff was able to graduate from high school with a special education degree, on time, without failing any classes, Tr. 959, 4|| Plaintiff was found to have appropriate thought content/process and fair memory 5|| on exam, Tr. 910, 960, 1526-1527, and the medical expert and other reviewing 6|| medical professionals opined Plaintiff had less than a marked limitation in acquiring and using information, Tr. 381, 391, 983, 1009. 8 Since Plaintiff did not have marked limitations in at least two domains of 9|| functioning or an extreme limitation in one domain, the ALJ did not err by finding 10|| Plaintiff did not functionally equal a listing. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(d). 11 CONCLUSION 12 Having reviewed the record and the ALJ’s findings, the Court finds the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error. 14|| Plaintiff is not entitled to a remand in this case. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 16 1. Defendant’s motion to affirm, ECF No. 12, is GRANTED. 17 2. Plaintiff's motion to reverse, ECF No. 10, is DENIED. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive shall file this Order 19]|| and provide copies to counsel. Judgment shall be entered for Defendant and the file shall be CLOSED. 21 DATED November 17, 2025.

23 Claude € Glade C, oe gs ALEXANDER C. EKSTROM _ UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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