Wyoming State Treasurer v. Moody's Investors Service, Inc.

650 F.3d 167, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9567
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedMay 11, 2011
DocketDocket Nos. 10-0712-cv, 10-0898-cv, 10-1288-cv
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 650 F.3d 167 (Wyoming State Treasurer v. Moody's Investors Service, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wyoming State Treasurer v. Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 650 F.3d 167, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9567 (2d Cir. 2011).

Opinion

REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge:

Because these three appeals raise common questions of law, we dispose of them in a single opinion. Plaintiffs, Locals 302 & 612 of the International Union of Operating Engineers — Employers Construction Industry Retirement Trust (“Operating Engineers”), New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund, and Boilermakers-Blacksmith National Pension Trust (collectively, “Union Plaintiffs”); Wyoming State Treasurer and Wyoming Retirement System (collectively, “Wyoming”); and Vaszurele Limited (“Vaszurele”), appeal from judgments of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Lewis A. Kaplan, Judge) entered on February 5, 2010, and February 17, 2010, dismissing their class-action complaints seeking to hold defendants, The McGraw Hill Companies, Inc. (“McGraw Hill”), through its subsidiary Standard & Poor’s (“S & P”), Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (“Moody’s”), and/or Fitch, Inc. (“Fitch”) (collectively, “Rating Agencies”), liable as underwriters or control persons for misstatements or omissions in securities offering documents in violation of §§ 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a)(5), 77o (a). Plaintiffs submit that the Rating Agencies are [171]*171“underwriters” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(ll) because they helped structure securities transactions to achieve desired ratings. The Union Plaintiffs and Wyoming also submit that the Rating Agencies’ alleged provision of advice and direction to primary violators regarding transaction structures makes the agencies liable as “control persons.” Id. § 77o (a). Finally, plaintiffs charge the district court with abuse of discretion in implicitly denying their requests to amend.

We reject these arguments as without merit.

I. Background

On appeal, we assume the truth of the facts alleged in plaintiffs’ complaints. See, e.g., In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir.2007).

A. The Securities Offerings 1. Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates

In the period from 2005 to 2007, plaintiffs and similarly situated persons purchased approximately $155 billion worth of mortgage pass-through certificates registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) entitling them to distributions from underlying pools of mortgages. To create such certificates, a “sponsor” originates or acquires mortgages. Next, the loans are sold to a “depositor” that securitizes the loans — meaning, in effect, that the depositor secures the rights to cash flows from the loans so that those rights can be sold to investors. The loans are then placed in issuing trusts, which collect the principal and interest payments made by the individual mortgage borrowers and, in turn, pay out distributions to the purchasers of the mortgage pass-through certificates. Finally, different risk levels, or “tranches” of risk, are created by using various types of credit enhancement, such as subordinating lower tranches to absorb losses first, overcollateralizing the loan pools in excess of the bond amount, or creating an excess spread fund to cover the difference between the interest collected from borrowers and amounts owed to investors.1 Each tranche is denominated by a credit rating- — in these cases issued by one or more Rating Agencies — determined by the seniority level and the expected loss of the loan pool. Finally, the depositor sells the certificates to underwriters, who then offer them to investors.

Many of the certificates here at issue received AAA ratings, the “safest” tranche supposedly least likely to default. Investment-grade ratings were crucial to the certificates’ sale because many institutional investors must purchase investment-grade securities. Moreover, some senior certificates’ sales were conditioned on the receipt of AAA ratings.

2. Union Plaintiffs’ Purchase of Certificates

The Union Plaintiffs and other similarly situated persons bought certificates in ninety-four offerings between September 29, 2005, and July 28, 2007, that were sponsored by Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (“LBHI”) and underwritten by Lehman Brothers, Inc., with Structured Asset Securities Corporation (“SASCo”), a wholly-owned LBHI entity, acting as depositor (collectively, “Lehman”). The certificates were issued pursuant to one of two registration statements, initially filed with the SEC on September 16, 2005, and August 8, [172]*1722006, respectively. S & P and Moody’s rated the securities.

3. Wyoming’s Purchase of Certificates

Wyoming and similarly situated persons purchased certificates sponsored by Indy-mac Bank, with Indymac MBS, Inc. acting as depositor. Many large investment banks underwrote the offerings, which were issued pursuant to three registration statements first filed on August 15, 2005, February 24, 2006, and February 14, 2007, respectively. S & P, Moody’s, and Fitch rated Wyoming’s certificates.

4. Vaszurele’s Purchase of Certificates

Vaszurele and similarly situated plaintiffs acquired senior mortgage pass-through certificates, issued on June 28, 2006, by the Residential Asset Securitization Trust 2006-A8 (“RAST”). Indymac Bank sponsored Vaszurele’s certificates, with Indymac MBS, Inc. acting as depositor and Credit Suisse Securities (USA) Inc. as lead underwriter. S & P and Moody’s rated the certificates acquired by Vaszurele, which are traceable to a registration statement initially filed on February 24, 2006.

B. Rating Agencies’ Alleged Role in the Offerings

In the transactions described above, plaintiffs allege that the Rating Agencies, which ordinarily serve as passive evaluators of credit risk, exceeded their traditional roles by actively aiding in the structuring and securitization process. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that issuing banks engaged particular Rating Agencies through a “ratings shopping” process, whereby the Rating Agencies reviewed loan-level data for a mortgage pool and provided preliminary ratings. Union Compl. ¶ 66; Wyoming Compl. ¶ 200. The banks then negotiated with the Rating Agencies regarding the amount of credit enhancements and percentage of AAA certificates for each mortgage pool. By thus “play[ing] the agencies off one another” and choosing the agency offering the highest percentage of AAA certificates with the least amount of credit enhancements, the banks purportedly “engender[ed] a race to the bottom in terms of rating quality.” Union Compl. ¶ 170.

During and after this negotiation, the Rating Agencies engaged in an “iterative process” with the banks, providing “feedback” on which combinations of loans and credit enhancements would generate particular ratings. Id. ¶ 177 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted); Wyoming Compl. ¶ 91 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted); Vaszurele Compl. ¶ 38 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). In the course of this dialogue, issuers adjusted the certificates’ structures until they achieved desired ratings.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Adkins v. Stanley
307 F.R.D. 119 (S.D. New York, 2015)
In Re Lehman Bros. Mortgage-Backed Securities
650 F.3d 167 (Second Circuit, 2011)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
650 F.3d 167, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 9567, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wyoming-state-treasurer-v-moodys-investors-service-inc-ca2-2011.