Wynne v. Simmons Hardware Co.

1 S.W. 568, 67 Tex. 40, 1886 Tex. LEXIS 612
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 22, 1886
DocketNo. 1994
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 1 S.W. 568 (Wynne v. Simmons Hardware Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wynne v. Simmons Hardware Co., 1 S.W. 568, 67 Tex. 40, 1886 Tex. LEXIS 612 (Tex. 1886).

Opinion

Stayton, Associate Justice.

Thomas F. Hudson & Son made an assignment, under the statute, for the benefit of such of their creditors as would consent to take under it and release them.

C. E. Wynne was made the assignee, and he qualified and proceeded to administer the insolvent estates.

This action is by many of the consenting creditors to recover from the assignee several sums of money claimed to have been illegally paid out by him in the course of his administration* to remove him therefrom and to have some other person appointed in his stead.

The money is sought for the benefit of all consenting creditors who, in accordance with the statute, filed their claims with the assignee.

The case was tried by the court without a jury, and resulted in a judgment against the assignee for nine thousand seven hundred and seventy dollars and fourteen cents, which sum is made up of three items.

1. The sum of eight thousand four hundred and fifty-two dollars and seventy-two cents, paid to. P. J., Willis & Bro., who were creditors of the insolvent estate to the extent of forty thousand dollars, and had consented to take under the assignment, but had not filed their claim, verified by affidavit, as the statute requires.

3. The sum of nine hundred and fifty-five dollars and seventy-[43]*43five cents, which the assignee paid out of the trust fund towards the expenses of cultivating a farm, or part of the insolvent estates.

3. Three hundred and sixty-one dollars and sixty-seven cents, which the assignee paid as taxes on real estate which passed to him by the assignment encumbered with liens.

The assignee was also removed for mismanagement of the estate and another person appointed in his stead.

There is no statement of facts, but the conclusions of law and fact contain a very full statement of the case.

The finding as to the claim on which the payment to Willis & Bro. was made is as follows: “Peter J. Willis & Bro. had suit pending against Thomas F. Hudson & Son at the date of the assignment, and prosecuted the same to judgment after the assignment without making Wynne, the assignee, a party, and without his coming into the suit, and they recovered judgment against Hudson & Son on their claim for forty thousand dollars ; it was a valid debt. They accepted under the terms of the assignment, presented their judgment to the assignee within the time required by law, but failed to verify it by. affidavit, as required by the assignment act. It was allowed and filed by the assignee, and remained on file subject to inspection by the creditors several months. Ho objection was made to its payment by any creditor. Just about the time (about the first of October, 1881) the assignee declared dividend among the accepting creditors he discovered, for the first time, that the Willis judgment was not sworn to. He advised with his attorney about paying him, was advised to pay his pro rata, and on the eighth of October, 1881 (as shown by the Willis receipt), he paid them by draft of the Rockdale bank on Kaufman & Runge (regular correspondents of the bank) eight thousand four hundred and fifty-two dollars and seventy-two cents, they giving a receipt in full discharge.”

If the liability of the assignee depended upon the application of the general principles of equity, the facts, thus stated, would forbid a recovery on this item.

The claim, on which the payment was made, was a just one; ordinarily a payment under such circumstances would not evidence a failure to use that degree of care and good faith which a trustee must exercise; all the creditors would receive the pro rata contemplated by the assignees and required by the law to be made, and the assignees would be relieved from further liability, [44]*44in accordance with the spirit of the instrument through which they, in effect, sought a composition with their creditors.

The rights of the parties, however, do not depend solely upon the application of equitable principles, which may be applied to matters statutory when not in conflict with both the letter and spirit of the statute.

The assignment under which the assignee was acting was made under a statute the express provisions of which must determine the rights and duties of all persons interested in the estate to be administered under it, and the duties of the person to whom was confided the administration of the trust.

The statute, where clear and unambiguous, read in the light of the subject to which it relates, gives the measure of right to all who take benefits under it and prescribes the duties of the trustee.

In matters regulated by statute, if the legislative “intention is -expressed in a manner devoid of contradiction and ambiguity, there is no room for interpretation or construction, and the judiciary are not at liberty, on consideration of policy or hardship, to depart from the words of the statute; that they have no right to make exceptions or insert qualifications, however abstract justice or the justice of the particular case may seem to require it.”

The statute under which the assignee was acting provides that “every creditor consenting to an assignment shall, within six months from the time of the first publication of the notice of appointment of the assignee, file with such assignee a distinct statement of the particular nature and amount of his claim against the debtor, which shall be supported by an affidavit of the creditor, his agent or attorney, that the statement is true, that the debt is just, and that there are no credits or offsets that should be allowed against the claim except as shown by the statement, and no creditor shall take any benefit under any assignment whatever who neglects to file such statement.” (Act March 24, 1879, sec. 7.)

The statement required to be filed is unsupported by the affidavit of the creditor, and the plain declaration of the legislature is that if the creditor fails to file such a statement he shall not take any benefit under the assignment. It is not enough that he be a creditor; for the statute in terms assumes that he may be this and still not entitled to take. It is not enough that his. claim is [45]*45entirely just and subject to no diminution by reason of the existence of any fact.

It is not enough that the failure to authenticate a claim, entirely just, was the result of inadvertence or negligence, for the statute, in terms, recognizes the fact that the failure, to authenticate a claim, as required, may result from just such causes, and still declared that the creditor so negligent shall take nothing under the assignment.

It is urged that the plaintiffs are estopped to now question the rights of the assignee to make the payment to Willis & Bro.; because the claim was filed with the assignee, subject to the inspection of the other creditors, and no objection urged to its payment until after the payment was made in good faith upon the advice-of counsel.

It is urged that the plaintiffs should have resisted the payment.

The twelfth section of the Act provides that: “The statement of a creditor, verified and filed with the assignee, as hereinbefore provided, shall be sufficient, prima facie evidence to justify theassignee in allowing it as a valid claim against the estate, and it shall be allowed,” etc.

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Bluebook (online)
1 S.W. 568, 67 Tex. 40, 1886 Tex. LEXIS 612, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wynne-v-simmons-hardware-co-tex-1886.