Wynn v. Raji

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Wynn v. Raji

7 A.D.3d 616, 775 N.Y.S.2d 895

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 10, 2004

StatusPublished

This text of 7 A.D.3d 616 (Wynn v. Raji) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Wynn v. Raji, 7 A.D.3d 616, 775 N.Y.S.2d 895 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2004).

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Opinion

— In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Harkavy, J.), dated May 14, 2003, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff Tracey M. Wynn did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is denied, and the complaint is reinstated.

The defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff Tracey M. Wynn did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955 [1992]). Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been denied. Prudenti, P.J., Florio, H. Miller, Schmidt and Cozier, JJ., concur.

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— In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Harkavy, J.), dated May 14, 2003, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff Tracey M. Wynn did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is denied, and the complaint is reinstated.

The defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff Tracey M. Wynn did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955 [1992]). Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint should have been denied. Prudenti, P.J., Florio, H. Miller, Schmidt and Cozier, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

7 A.D.3d 616, 775 N.Y.S.2d 895, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wynn-v-raji-nyappdiv-2004.

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