Wynford Jones v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
This text of Wynford Jones v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Wynford Jones v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM DECISION Mar 05 2015, 7:02 am Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Deborah Markisohn Gregory F. Zoeller Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana Kenneth E. Biggins Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Wynford Jones, March 5, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Cause No. 49A02-1407-CR-520 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court Cause No. 49G21-1312-CM-081564 State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. The Honorable Gary Miller, Judge
Barnes, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1407-CR-520 | March 5, 2015 Page 1 of 6 Case Summary
[1] Wynford Jones appeals the revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his
suspended sentence. We affirm.
Issue
[2] The issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking Jones’s
probation and ordering him to serve his suspended sentence of 319 days.
Facts
[3] On December 30, 2013, Jones was involved in a domestic dispute with his
girlfriend, N.Y., in which he grabbed her hair and pulled her head toward his
waist, applying pressure to her neck. On January 22, 2014, Jones pled guilty to
Class A misdemeanor domestic battery and was sentenced to 365 days
incarceration, with a suspended sentence of 319 days on probation. The order
required that Jones pay a court-ordered fee, complete twenty-six weeks of
domestic violence classes, refrain from new criminal charges, and be subjected
to random drug screens and GPS monitoring. Additionally, Jones was
prohibited from making contact with N.Y.
[4] On April 16, 2014, the probation department filed a notice alleging that Jones
had violated several conditions of his probation. The notice stated that Jones
was arrested and charged with invasion of privacy and resisting law
enforcement on April 10, 2014, and that he violated the no-contact order, did
not attend domestic violence counseling, failed to pay the court-ordered
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1407-CR-520 | March 5, 2015 Page 2 of 6 financial obligation, and failed to submit to several mandatory drug screenings.
An amended notice also alleged that Jones was arrested on May 29, 2014, and
charged with four criminal counts.
[5] At the probation violation hearing on July 2, 2014, Jones admitted to all alleged
probation violations except the May 29 criminal charges, which had been
dismissed. Jones also acknowledged that he pled guilty and was convicted of
the April 16 resisting law enforcement charge. Megan Morguson of the Marion
County Probation Department testified that Jones had “violated every
condition of probation.” Tr. p. 8.
[6] At the hearing, Jones requested that the court retain his probation rather than
reinstate his suspended sentence. Jones alleged extenuating circumstances to
explain his noncompliance with probation conditions, such as his lack of
transportation, his inability to finance the domestic violence counseling, and a
disconnected phone that prevented him from receiving notice to report for drug
screens. Jones also explained that his violation of the no-contact order was the
result of a mistaken belief that it was no longer in effect, claiming that N.Y. had
made contact on her own initiative and had told Jones that she had the order
rescinded.
[7] The trial court emphasized that Jones had “clearly” violated the conditions of
probation and found his explanations in an attempt to mitigate the violations
“incredible.” Id. at 50-51. The court revoked Jones’s probation and reinstated
the 319-day suspended sentence. Jones now appeals.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1407-CR-520 | March 5, 2015 Page 3 of 6 Analysis
[8] Jones argues that because of his alleged extenuating circumstances, the trial
court should have imposed a sanction less serious than reinstatement of his
suspended sentence. In probation orders, the trial court devises the conditions
of probation and may revoke probation if those conditions are violated. Prewitt
v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (citing Ind. Code. § 35-38-2-3). We
review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for probation violations pursuant to
the abuse of discretion standard. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.”
Id.
[9] Probation serves as an alternative to incarceration and is granted at the sole
discretion of the trial court. Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999).
Probation is not a right conferred to defendants but rather a “matter of grace”
and a “conditional liberty that is a favor.” Id. If the trial court finds that an
individual has violated a condition of probation, the court is empowered to
“[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time
of the initial sentencing.” I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h).
[10] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by reinstating all of Jones’s
suspended sentence. Given that Jones admitted to violating every condition of
his probation, the decision to restore his original sentence was well within the
trial court’s discretion. Breach of a single condition is sufficient to remove an
individual from probation. See J.J.C. v. State, 792 N.E.2d 85, 88 (Ind. Ct. App.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1407-CR-520 | March 5, 2015 Page 4 of 6 2003). The reinstatement of Jones’s suspended sentence comports with the
express language of Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h), which indicates that
“trial courts have the flexibility both to use and to terminate probation when
appropriate.” Stevens v. State, 818 N.E.2d 936, 941–42 (Ind. 2004) (emphasis
added).
[11] Because probation is a matter of grace, the individual who benefits from this
grace is expected to strictly comply with the conditions of probation. Woods v.
State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ind. 2008). Jones’s probation record is a far
departure from this level of compliance.
[12] Ordering execution of the suspended sentence for Jones’s multiple probation
violations was well within the trial court’s scope of discretion. See Abernathy v.
State, 852 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Reinstatement of the full
suspended sentence is appropriate in a case of repeated noncompliance, as more
liberal probation-violation sanctions would reduce probationers’ motivation to
modify their behavior, and “the ‘grace of probation’ would be rendered
meaningless.” Id. at 1022.
Conclusion
[13] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Jones’s probation and
reinstating his suspended sentence.
[14] Affirmed.
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