Wyman v. High Times Productions, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedNovember 3, 2020
Docket2:18-cv-02621
StatusUnknown

This text of Wyman v. High Times Productions, Inc. (Wyman v. High Times Productions, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wyman v. High Times Productions, Inc., (E.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RENA WYMAN, No. 2:18-cv-02621-TLN-EFB 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 HIGH TIMES PRODUCTIONS, INC., and CALIFORNIA EXPOSITION AND 15 STATE FAIR 16 Defendants. 17 18 19 This matter is before the Court on Theodore G. Spanos’s (“Spanos”) Motion to Withdraw 20 as Counsel for Defendant High Times Productions, Inc. (“Defendant”). (ECF No. 45.) Plaintiff 21 Rena Wyman (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 46.) Defendant filed a reply. (ECF No. 22 47.) Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement. (ECF No. 23 38.) Defendant filed a non-opposition. (ECF No. 42.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court 24 DENIES Spanos’s motion to withdraw and GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to enforce the Settlement 25 Agreement. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff suffers from a neurological disorder and physical disability, and she uses a 3 wheelchair. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges she has long been interested in attending 4 Defendant’s cannabis-related events, but she has suffered discriminatory treatment and lack of 5 access to the events. (Id.) On September 24, 2018, Plaintiff brought various federal and state law 6 claims against Defendant, seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages. (Id. at 2–3.) 7 On September 30, 2019, the parties filed a notice of settlement and attached copies of the 8 Settlement Agreement (“the Agreement”). (ECF No. 36.) The Agreement requires Defendant to 9 provide individual compensation to Plaintiff in the amount of $40,000 in cash and $10,000 worth 10 of stock within 30 days of the Effective Date. (Id. at 11.) The Agreement also requires 11 Defendant to provide a cash payment to Plaintiff’s counsel in the amount of $45,000 within 30 12 days of the Effective Date. (Id. at 12.) The Agreement defines the “Effective Date” as “the date 13 on which this Agreement is fully executed by all the Parties.” (Id. at 6.) The Agreement was 14 executed by all parties on September 25, 2019, making the payments due on October 25, 2019. 15 (See id. at 16.) 16 It is undisputed that Defendant has not complied with the terms of the Agreement. 17 Although Defendant requested three separate extensions from Plaintiff, Defendant repeatedly 18 failed to make the required payments on the promised dates. (See ECF No. 38 at 6.) On 19 November 14, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to enforce the Agreement. (ECF No. 38.) Defendant 20 filed a non-opposition, which stated “it is anticipated that [Defendant] will comply with the terms 21 of the Settlement Agreement on or before January 15, 2020.” (ECF No. 42 at 2.) Defendant did 22 not make any payments by January 15, 2020. (See ECF No. 47 at 2.) 23 On February 21, 2020, Spanos filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Defendant. (ECF 24 No. 45.) Spanos concedes Defendant has not complied with the Agreement, but he asks to 25 withdraw based on a “complete lapse” of communication with Defendant. (Id. at 4.) 26 II. STANDARD OF LAW 27 The local rules of this district require an attorney who would withdraw and leave his or 28 her client without representation to obtain leave of court upon a noticed motion. E.D. Cal. L.R. 1 (“Local Rule”) 182(d). Local Rule 182(d) also requires an attorney to provide notice to the client 2 and all other parties who have appeared, and an affidavit stating the current or last known address 3 of the client. Id. Finally, to comply with Local Rule 182(d), the attorney must conform to the 4 requirements of the California Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. Rule 1.16(b)(4) of the 5 California Rules of Professional Conduct permits an attorney to withdraw from representing a 6 client where the client has rendered it “unreasonably difficult” for the attorney to carry out the 7 representation effectively. 8 The decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw is within a court’s discretion. 9 McNally v. Eye Dog Found. for the Blind, Inc., No. 09-cv-AWI-SKO-01174, 2011 WL 1087117, 10 at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2011). District courts within this circuit have considered several factors 11 when evaluating a motion to withdraw, including the reason for withdrawal, prejudice to the 12 client, prejudice to the other litigants, harm to the administration of justice, and possible delay. 13 See, e.g., Deal v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. 09-cv-01643-SBA, 2010 WL 3702459, at *2 14 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2010); CE Res., Inc. v. Magellan Group, LLC, No. 08-cv-02999-MCE-KJM, 15 2009 WL 3367489, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009); Beard v. Shuttermart of Cal., Inc., No. 07-cv- 16 00594-WQH-NLS, 2008 WL 410694, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2008). 17 III. ANALYSIS 18 A. Motion to Withdraw 19 In moving to withdraw, Spanos states his law firm has been in bankruptcy since January 3, 20 2020. (ECF No. 45 at 6.) Spanos further states that since that date, he has been unable to 21 communicate with Defendant. (Id.) More specifically, Spanos states he notified Defendant by 22 email and telephone that he cannot continue representing it, but Defendant never replied. (Id.) 23 Spanos states he sent Defendant an email on February 19, 2020, notifying Defendant that if it did 24 not respond, Spanos would file a motion to withdraw. (Id.) Spanos also states he attempted to 25 call Defendant “on a number occasions,” but he did not receive a response. (Id.) According to 26 Spanos, this lack of communication renders it “unreasonably difficult” to continue as counsel for 27 Defendant. (Id. at 4.) 28 /// 1 In opposition, Plaintiff argues the Court should not allow Spanos to withdraw for several 2 reasons: (1) Spanos did not identify substitute counsel as required for corporate entities like 3 Defendant; (2) Spanos failed to take reasonable steps to avoid prejudice to both parties; (3) the 4 grounds for withdrawal are unfounded; and (4) withdrawal will cause undue delay and prejudice 5 to Plaintiff. (ECF No. 46 at 4–9.) 6 i. Prejudice to Defendant 7 The California Rules of Professional Conduct require an attorney who is seeking to 8 withdraw to take “reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the 9 client.” See Cal. Rules of Prof. Conduct 1.16(d). In this district, a corporation may not appear 10 without representation. E.D. Cal. L.R. 183(a). An unrepresented corporation cannot file any 11 pleadings, make or oppose any motions, or present any evidence, and would thus be subject to the 12 risk of entry of default and default judgment. See Emp. Painters’ Tr. v. Ethan Enters., Inc., 480 13 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Galtieri-Carlson v. Victoria M. Morton Enters., Inc., No. 14 2:08-CV-1777, 2010 WL 3386473, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2010). “It is the duty of the trial 15 court to see that the client is protected, so far as possible, from the consequences of an attorney’s 16 abandonment.” Magellan Grp., 2009 WL 3367489, at *2 (denying motion to withdraw where 17 corporation would be left unrepresented by counsel) (citations omitted). 18 Although Spanos claims he has “fulfilled [his] obligations to resolve this matter,” it is 19 undisputed that the matter is not yet resolved. (See ECF No. 45 at 3.) Spanos admits Defendant 20 has not made any payments as required by the Agreement. Until Defendant has complied with 21 the terms of the Agreement, it is likely Defendant will continue to require representation in this 22 matter. If Defendant is unrepresented, it will be unable to file pleadings, make or oppose 23 motions, or present evidence. Emp. Painters’ Tr., 480 F.3d at 998. Thus, Defendant would risk 24 the possibility of default judgments or other sanctions. These risks clearly constitute “reasonably 25 foreseeable prejudice.” 26 Moreover, Spanos has not shown he has taken reasonable steps to avoid such prejudice. 27 Neither Spanos nor Defendant has informed the Court of new substitute counsel.

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Wyman v. High Times Productions, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wyman-v-high-times-productions-inc-caed-2020.