IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 90-1058
HOWARD L. WYATT, Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BILL COLE, JOHN ROBBINS, II, Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
(June 25, 1993)
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Before JOHNSON, WILLIAMS, AND HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
This § 1983 suit returns to this panel on remand from the
Supreme Court. In our first opinion, we affirmed the district
court's grant of qualified immunity to defendants Cole and Robbins.
Wyatt v. Cole, 928 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that "qualified immunity, as enunciated in
[Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982], is [not] available
for private defendants faced with § 1983 liability for invoking a
state replevin, garnishment or attachment statute." 112 S.Ct.
1827, 1834 (1992). In so doing, the Court explained that its
decision did "not foreclose the possibility" that private
defendants "could be entitled to an affirmative defense based on good faith and/or probable cause or that § 1983 suits against
private, rather than governmental, parties could require plaintiffs
to carry additional burdens." Id.
We have requested, and received, supplemental briefs from
Wyatt, Cole, and Robbins.1 In keeping with the Court's suggestion,
as well as the more explicit guidance provided by Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion, id. at 1835-37 (Kennedy, J., concurring), and
the Chief Justice's dissent, id. at 1838-39 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting), we now hold that plaintiffs seeking to hold private
actors liable under Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 102 S.Ct. 2744
(1982), must demonstrate that defendants failed to act in good
faith in invoking the unconstitutional state procedures. Because
Wyatt has not shown that Cole and Robbins either knew or should
have known that Mississippi's replevin statute was unconstitutional
prior to its invalidation in April 1989, we affirm the district
court's judgment.
I.
Howard Wyatt and Bill Cole are former business partners. Cole
sought to dissolve the partnership in July 1986. When negotiations
failed, Cole, with the assistance of his attorney, John Robbins,
II, filed a state court complaint in replevin against Wyatt
accompanied by a bond of $18,000. Pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 11-
37-101, a writ of replevin issued and the county circuit judge
1 The State of Mississippi and several county officials were also parties to this case in the district court and on appeal. Wyatt's claims against these defendants were resolved prior to argument in the Supreme Court and are therefore not before us.
2 signed an order directing the county sheriff to execute the writ a
few days later. The sheriff seized 24 head of cattle, a tractor,
and other property from Wyatt on July 29 and 30, 1986. The writ of
replevin and summons were served on Wyatt the next day. On October
3, 1986, after a post-seizure hearing, the circuit judge dismissed
Cole's complaint in replevin and ordered him to return the property
to Wyatt. Although Cole had not yet complied with this order, the
judge dismissed the action without prejudice on September 3, 1988.
In July 1987, Wyatt filed this § 1983 suit in U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, contending that the
seizure of his property without notice violated the Due Process
Clause as well as several state provisions. The district court
declared the state replevin statute unconstitutional on April 13,
1989, 710 F.Supp. 180, but held that Cole and Robbins were entitled
to qualified immunity from any damages suffered by Wyatt prior to
this date under Folsom Investment Co. v. Moore, 681 F.2d 1032 (5th
Cir. 1982). Wyatt conceded that he could not prove any damages
resulting from defendants' conduct after the statute had been
invalidated, but asserted that Cole and Robbins should be held
liable for attorney's fees. The district court denied this request
with respect to Cole and Robbins on grounds that a failure to
recover money damages from defendants precluded a recovery of
attorney's fees.
On appeal, we held that Wyatt's request for damages suffered
prior to the district court's decision in 1989 was barred by
Folsom, where this court held that "'a § 1983 defendant who has
3 invoked an attachment statute is entitled to an immunity from
monetary liability so long as he neither knew nor reasonably should
have known that the statute was unconstitutional.'" 928 F.2d 718,
721 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Folsom, 682 F.2d at 1037). Given our
invalidation of a similar Georgia prejudgment statute in Johnson v.
American Credit Co., 581 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1978), we recognized
that the reasonableness of Cole's and Robbins' invocation of the
Mississippi statute presented a close question. 928 F.2d at 721-
22. We held, however, that Cole and Robbins, as private actors,
should not be charged with the same degree of knowledge as public
officials, and that, under this more liberal standard, their
reliance on the law "was not an act of unreasonable ignorance."
Id. at 722. We therefore affirmed the district court's grant of
qualified immunity to Cole and Robbins.2
The Supreme Court then reversed, holding that qualified
immunity is not "available for private defendants faced with § 1983
2 We did reverse the district court on the issue of attorneys' fees, holding that Cole, but not Robbins, was liable for fees incurred after the district court's declaratory judgment because this decision "affected the behavior of Cole towards Wyatt by effectively requiring him to return the property seized." 928 F.2d at 723. We are no longer persuaded that this is correct. Cole offered to return the cattle soon after the district court's invalidation of the statute, but the record discloses that his overture was not accepted. Wyatt instead sought to recover damages for the loss of his share of the partnership's assets, which included the cattle. At trial, however, Wyatt conceded that he could not demonstrate that Cole's seizure resulted in a net loss, and thus could not establish any damages. Since Cole was not required to pay damages or otherwise change his behavior in any way as a result of the court's judgment, he has not been "prevailed against" and thus is not liable for attorneys' fees. See Kentucky v. Graham, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3104 (1985).
4 liability for invoking a state replevin, garnishment or attachment
statute." 112 S.Ct. 1827, 1834 (1992). While noting that private
actors enjoyed a good-faith defense against suits for malicious
prosecution and abuse of process at common law, the Court asserted
that such history did not, by itself, entitle them to "the
qualified immunity from suit accorded governmental officials under
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982)." 112 S.Ct. at 1832
(emphasis added). To the contrary, Harlow's recognition of "such
an immunity w[as] based not simply on the existence of a good-faith
defense at common law, but on the special policy concerns involved
in suing government officials." Id. at 1833. Because Harlow
"'completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not
at all embodied in the common law,'" id. (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3042 (1987)), the doctrine could be
extended only if suits against private defendants implicated the
same policies supporting immunity for public officials. The Court
found that they did not. Qualified immunity, the Court explained,
is necessary to ensure that "public officials are able to act
forcefully and decisively in their jobs" and that "talented
candidates [are] not deterred by the threat of damage suits from
entering public service." Id. at 1833. Since these considerations
are absent in the case of private parties, who of course "hold no
office requiring them to exercise discretion," id., the expansion
of qualified immunity contended for by Cole and Robbins was
unwarranted. Thus, the Court concluded that, "[a]lthough
principles of equality and fairness may suggest . . . that private
5 citizens who rely unsuspectingly on state laws they did not create
and may have no reason to believe are invalid should have some
protection for liability," id. at 1833, it could "offer no relief
today." Id. at 1834.
The Court identified two issues for consideration on remand.
Noting that this panel affirmed the district court's judgment
solely on grounds of qualified immunity, the Court stated that its
decision made it necessary to determine "whether Cole and Robbins,
in invoking the replevin statute, acted under color of state law
within the meaning of [Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922
(1982)]." 112 S.Ct. at 1834. The Court also indicated that its
denial of qualified immunity did not
foreclose the possibility that private defendants faced with liability under [Lugar] could be entitled to an affirmative defense based on good faith and/or probable cause or that § 1983 suits against private, rather than governmental, parties could require plaintiffs to carry additional burdens.
Id. We address these issues in turn.
II.
Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person
who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights secured
by the Constitution. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S.Ct.
1061, 1066 (1992); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Lugar v. Edmundson Oil
Co., 102 S.Ct. 2744 (1982), the Supreme Court held that private
parties invoking a state attachment statute may be held liable
under § 1983 if their actions are "fairly attributable to the
state." Id. at 2753. The Court established a two-part test for
determining whether the conduct alleged meets this requirement.
6 First, "the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some
right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct
imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is
responsible." Id. Second, "the party charged with the deprivation
must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor," that
is, one who is in fact a state official, one who "has acted with or
has obtained significant aid from state officials," or one whose
"conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State." Id. at 2754.
In applying this standard to the facts of before it, the Court
in Lugar found the presence of the ex parte attachment statute
sufficient to satisfy the first requirement: "[T]he procedural
scheme created by the statute is obviously the product of state
action [and] is subject to constitutional restraints and properly
may be addressed in a § 1983 action." Id. at 2756. The Court also
found the private defendants' resort to this unconstitutional
procedure sufficient to meet the test's second, "joint
participation" prong. Id. In so doing, the Court expressly
rejected the argument "that in this context 'joint participation'
required something more than invoking the aid of state officials to
take advantage of state-created attachment procedures." Id. This
"low threshold" for establishing state action, at least where ex
parte prejudgment proceedings are involved, Davis Oil Co. v. Mills,
873 F.2d 774, 779 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 937 (1989),
has been recognized by the circuit, see, e.g., Folsom, 681 F.2d at
1037 ("when a § 1983 plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of
a state attachment procedure . . . the private party who sets that
7 attachment scheme in motion is to be considered a state actor"),
and was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Wyatt. 112 S.Ct. at
1830.
The district court held that Cole's invocation of the
Mississippi replevin statute was enough to trigger potential
liability under § 1983. It also assumed, without expressly
deciding, that Robbins, his attorney, had also acted under color of
state law in requesting the writ of replevin. On remand from the
Supreme Court, Cole challenges the district court's determination.
Wyatt has maintained throughout this litigation that Cole's actions
contravened not only federal law (in that the replevin statute
operated to deprive him of his property without due process), but
also state law, contending that Cole filed the complaint in bad
faith, that replevin was improper under state law, and that Cole
refused to return the cattle in violation of a state court order.
Citing Lugar, Cole argues that he cannot be deemed a state actor
because Wyatt's assertion that his conduct was contrary to, not
consonant with, state law and policy locate the source of his harm
in purely private actions for which the state cannot be held
responsible.
This argument is not without merit. The Court in Lugar faced
a similar charge that private defendants' attachment suit was
"'unlawful under state law.'" Lugar, 102 S.Ct. at 2755. In
discussing this claim, the Court made plain that "private misuse of
a state statute does not describe conduct that can be attributed to
the State." Id. at 2756. The choice to invoke the "statute
8 without the grounds to do so could in no way be attributed to a
state rule or state decision"; this act is "contrary to the
relevant policy articulated by the state." Id. at 2755. For this
reason, complaints "alleg[ing] only misuse or abuse of the statute"
do not "present a valid cause of action under § 1983." Id. at
2756. In the wake of Lugar, several courts have recognized and
given effect to this principle. See, e.g., Davis Oil Co., 873 F.2d
at 779-80 (discussing Lugar); Cobb v. Saturn Land Co., 966 F.2d
1334, 1335-36 (10th Cir. 1992); Hoai v. Vo, 935 F.2d 308, 313-14
(D.C.Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1578 (1992); Jones v.
Poindexter, 903 F.2d 1006, 1010-11 (4th Cir. 1990); Collins v.
Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1152-54 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1056 (1990); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Trela, 735 F.2d
257, 262 (7th Cir. 1984).
The district court nevertheless properly held that Cole's
alleged misuse and violation of the Mississippi replevin statute
did not preclude a finding that he acted under color of state law.
Like the plaintiff in Lugar, 102 S.Ct. at 2755-56, Wyatt also
challenged the constitutionality of the state law in asserting that
his property had been taken without due process. Because this
claim centers on the procedures prescribed by the statute itself,
rather than defendant's alleged abuse of them, it plainly
implicates the state and its authority in the deprivation of
constitutional rights. Id. The Lugar Court found state action
present on analogous facts; so do we.
9 With respect to Robbins, the district court held that "[w]hile
an action strictly within the scope of representation of a client
does not normally constitute an act under color of state law, an
attorney is still a person who may conspire to act under color of
state law in depriving another of secured rights." Tower v.
Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920-23 (1984); Russell v. Milsap, 781 F.2d
381, 383 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 826 (1986). See
Hoai, 935 F.2d at 313 n.5. Cf. Watertown Equipment Co. v. Norwest
Bank Watertown, N.A., 830 F.2d 1487, 1496 (8th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 1723 (1988). Wyatt has not asserted that Robbins
performed any acts lying outside the scope of his representation of
Cole. The district court, however, assumed that Robbins acted
under color of state law and Robbins himself concedes this point in
his brief. We will therefore assume, without deciding, that
Robbins as well as Cole may be held liable under § 1983 for Wyatt's
constitutional injury.
III.
Bound by our prior decision in Folsom Investment Co. v. Moore,
681 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1982), this panel affirmed the district
court's grant of qualified immunity to Cole and Robbins. See 928
F.2d at 721-22. The Supreme Court reversed, but, as we noted
above, see supra, at p.5-6, indicated that "principles of equality
and fairness" may suggest that private defendants "should have some
protection for liability," id. at 1833, and expressly declined to
foreclose the possibility that a showing of good faith would defeat
a § 1983 action brought against individuals such as Cole and
10 Robbins. Id. at 1834. The five Justices who either concurred or
dissented were more forthright in their support of a standard that
would relieve private parties who reasonably relied on a state
statute of liability. See id. at 1835-37 (Kennedy, J., joined
Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 1838-39 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by
Souter & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). When read together, we believe
that the question left open by the majority was largely answered by
these separate opinions. We accordingly hold that private
defendants sued on the basis of Lugar may be held liable for
damages under § 1983 only if they failed to act in good faith in
invoking the unconstitutional state procedures, that is, if they
either knew or should have known that the statute upon which they
relied was unconstitutional. We also find that Wyatt has failed to
meet this standard and therefore affirm the district court's
judgment.
As the Court stressed in Wyatt, it has consistently
recognized that Congress, in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
legislated against a background of common-law tort liability. 112
S.Ct. at 1831; id. at 1835 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See, e.g.,
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637-38 (1980); Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556-57 (1967); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
187 (1961). Thus, while § 1983 "creates a species of tort
liability that on its face admits of no immunities," Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976), the Court has read the
provision "'in harmony with general principles of tort immunities
and defenses rather than in derogation of them.'" Malley v.
11 Briggs, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1095 (1986) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at
418)). At the same time, because the process of drawing positive
inferences from legislative silence is always accompanied by a
certain amount of uncertainty, the Court has only "look[ed] to the
common law for guidance," and has not "assume[d] that Congress
intended to incorporate every common-law immunity into § 1983 in
unaltered form." Malley, 106 S.Ct. at 1095. The conclusion that
Congress intended to incorporate a specific defense should follow
only after determining that "a tradition of immunity was so firmly
rooted in the common law and was supported by such strong policy
reasons that 'Congress would have specifically so provided had it
wished to abolish the doctrine.'" Owen, 445 U.S. at 637 (quoting
Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555)).
The Court in Wyatt identified malicious prosecution and abuse
of process as the common-law causes of action most analogous to
Wyatt's claim under Lugar and therefore focused its inquiry on the
elements of these torts. While differing as to the legal
consequences of their common finding, all of the Justices agreed
that plaintiffs seeking to recover on these theories were required
to prove that defendants acted with malice and without probable
cause. See 112 S.Ct. at 1832 n.2 ("a plaintiff's malicious
prosecution or abuse of process action failed if she could not
affirmatively establish both malice and want of probable cause");
id. at 1835 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In both of the common law
actions, it was essential for the plaintiff to prove that the wrong
doer acted with malice and without probable cause"); id. at 1838
12 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("it was plaintiff's burden to
establish as elements of the tort both that the defendant acted
with malice and without probable cause" (emphasis added). See
generally Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 194 (1878); 2 C.
Addison, Law of Torts § 1, p. 65 (1876); J. Bishop, Commentaries on
Non-Contract Law § 242, at 97 (1889); T. Cooley, Law of Torts 184
(1879); 1 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts 311 (1956); Note,
Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A
Historical Analysis, 88 Yale L.J. 1218, 1219 (1979).
The majority in Wyatt concentrated on the immediate issue at
hand--whether the purposes and policies underlying § 1983 would be
served by transforming essential elements of the plaintiff's case
at common law into a defense of qualified immunity to be asserted
by defendants. The Court held that they would not. 112 S.Ct. at
1833-34. Justice Kennedy and, at least to some extent, Chief
Justice Rehnquist accepted the majority's holding, but then moved
on to consider the precise contours of the good faith doctrine
they, along with the three other Justices who joined their
opinions, believed would be available to Cole and Robbins on
remand.
They agreed that plaintiffs, not defendants, bore the burden
of proof on the questions of malice and probable cause, 112 S.Ct.
at 1837 (Kennedy, J., concurring), and that, since plaintiffs were
required to prove both at common law, a defendant could avoid
liability under § 1983 by showing the absence of either. 112 S.Ct.
at 1838-39 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy and
13 Chief Justice Rehnquist also agreed that the probable cause inquiry
could not be wholly equated with qualified immunity, since the
Court had previously identified the Harlow Court's "replac[ement]
of the inquiry into subjective malice so frequently required at
common law with an objective inquiry into the legal reasonableness
of the official action" as a "complete[] reformulat[ion] [of]
qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied at common
law." Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3042 (1987) (citing
Harlow, 102 S.Ct. at 2736-39). See 112 S.Ct. at 1839 n.2
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("There is perhaps one small
difference between the historical common law inquiry and the modern
qualified immunity inquiry. At common law, a plaintiff can show
the lack of probable cause either by showing that the actual facts
did not amount to probable cause (an objective inquiry) or by
showing that the defendant lacked a sincere belief that probable
cause existed (a subjective inquiry)").
Justice Kennedy emphasized the importance of the subjective
inquiry into malice, stating that, "[u]nder common law . . . if the
plaintiff could prove subjective bad faith on the part of the
defendant, he had gone far towards proving both malice and lack of
probable cause." 112 S.Ct. at 1836 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The
justification he offered to support the prominence of this inquiry,
however, cut both ways. On the one hand, he indicated that the
examination of private defendants' actual knowledge of the validity
of the law might lead to a finding of liability in circumstances
where public officials would be shielded by qualified immunity.
14 112 S.Ct. at 1836-37 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("It seems
problematic to say that a defendant should be relieved of liability
under some automatic rule of immunity if objective reliance upon a
statute is reasonable but the defendant in fact had knowledge of
its invalidity"). On the other hand, given this emphasis on what
private actors actually know, rather than what they should know,
private defendants might establish probable cause and avoid
liability even though a right was "clearly established." Anderson,
107 S.Ct. at 3038. See 112 S.Ct. at 1837 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("the existence of a statute thought valid ought to allow a
defendant to argue that he acted in subjective good faith and is
entitled to exoneration no matter what the objective test is").
A private defendant's good faith is especially significant
because Harlow's qualified immunity standard is far more demanding
than the objective component of the common law probable cause
inquiry, since private actors are not charged with the same amount
of knowledge regarding the law as public officials. As Justice
Kennedy noted, "there is support in the common law for the
proposition that a private individual's reliance on a statute,
prior to a judicial determination of unconstitutionality, is
considered reasonable as a matter of law." Id. at 1837 (citing
Birdsall v. Smith, 122 N.W. 626, 627 (Mich. 1909)). In addition,
"'[t]he layman's ignorance of the law has been taken into account
in the almost universal holding that probable cause is established
where the prosecution was instituted with the advice of counsel.'"
Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261, 1267 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting
15 Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts § 119 (5th ed. 1984)). See also
Bishop, § 236, at 93-94; Cooley, at 183-84; 1 Harper & James, at
313-14, 322. Aside from these bright-line rules, the Court
recently provided additional guidance on the contours of the
probable cause inquiry in Real Estate Investors v. Columbia
Pictures, 113 S.Ct. 1920 (1993), where it revisited this issue in
the context of antitrust sham litigation. There, the Court held
that "[p]robable cause to institute civil proceedings requires no
more than a 'reasonabl[e] belie[f] that there is a chance that [a]
claim may be held valid upon adjudication.'" Id. at 1929 (quoting
Hubbard v. Beatty & Hyde, Inc., 178 N.E.2d 485, 488 (Mass. 1961)
(alterations in original)); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 675,
Comment e, pp. 459-60 (1977) ("In determining probable cause for
initiation of civil proceedings, all that is necessary is that the
claimant reasonably believe there is a sound chance that his claim
may be held legally valid upon adjudication").
In light of these considerations, we think that private
defendants, at least those invoking ex parte prejudgment statutes,
should not be held liable under § 1983 absent a showing of malice
and evidence that they either knew or should have known of the
statute's constitutional infirmity. The record in this case
discloses that the Mississippi replevin statute invoked by Cole,
while perhaps placed in "legal jeopardy" by our decision in Johnson
v. American Credit Co., 581 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1978), see 928 F.2d
at 721, remained good law at the time of his suit. Moreover, there
is evidence that Cole relied on Robbins' advice in filing his
16 complaint in replevin. We need not, however, rely on the
categorical common-law rules cited above to find that probable
cause supported Cole's resort to the state procedures, for, as we
stated in our prior opinion, "[w]e need not conclude that a private
actor is entitled to rely on any statutory relic, regardless of its
current absurdity," in order to hold "that reliance upon the
statute by the private actors was not an act of unreasonable
ignorance." 928 F.2d at 721-22.3
Having concluded that Cole's and Robbins' invocation of the
Mississippi statute was not objectively unreasonable, we turn to
consider whether they in fact believed the statute to be
constitutionally valid at the time of the suit. Wyatt contends
that Cole's professed good faith reliance on the replevin
procedures is undermined by the existence of several facts tending
to show that Cole filed the complaint out of malice. Wyatt alleges
that Cole threatened to use "political influence" to secure the
return of his cattle, had no grounds under state law for bringing
his action in replevin, and refused to restore the property seized
in violation of a state court order.
We will assume for purposes of decision that Wyatt's account
of these events is true. We do not see, however, how these
allegations detailing Cole's misuse and abuse of state procedures
3 Wyatt argues that Robbins, as an attorney, should be held charged with a greater knowledge than other private defendants. We disagree. As we indicated in our first opinion, Robbins "is subject to the same standard of good faith as Cole because the relevant distinction is between persons acting privately and those acting for the state. " 928 F.2d at 722 n.5.
17 bear on whether he in fact believed the Mississippi statute to be
constitutionally infirm. It is this narrow question, not whether
Cole exhibited a generalized "malice" by filing suit for improper
reasons, that is relevant in determining whether probable cause
lies. As we noted above, see supra, p. 8-9, state law claims are
not cognizable under § 1983. Wyatt seeks to hold Cole liable for
damages for invoking the statute that led to the deprivation of his
property without due process. Unless we may infer defendant's
knowledge of federal law from his alleged violations of state law,
the latter have no bearing on the probable cause inquiry. In the
absence of any evidence that either Cole or Robbins had actual
knowledge of the replevin statute's constitutional infirmity, we
hold that the district court properly barred Wyatt's damage claims
against them.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's