OPINION
Mark A. Barnett, Judge
Barnett, Judge: Before the court are cross-motions for summary judgment. PL’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 33-7; PL’s
Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 38; Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. and Def.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to PL’s Mot. for Summ. J. and in Supp. of Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 43. Plaintiff WWRD U.S., LLC, (“Plaintiff’ or “WWRD”) contests the denial of several protests
challenging U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (“Customs”) classification of the subject imports
according to their constituent materials and dutiable at rates ranging from three to six percent
ad valorem. See generally
Summons, ECF No. 1; Compl., ECF No. 15;
see also
PL’s Mem. at 3-5.
Plaintiff contends that the subject imports qualified for duty free treatment pursuant to subheading 9817.95.01 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”)
as “Utilitarian articles of a kind used in the home in the performance of specific religious or cultural ritual celebrations for religious or cultural holidays, or religious festive occasions, such as Seder plates, blessing cups, menorahs or ki-naras.”
See generally
Compl.;
see also
PL’s Mem. at 4, 6-7. Defendant United States (“Defendant” or “the Government”) contends that Customs correctly classified the subject imports.
See
Def.’s Mem. at 1,
3-4.
There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the properties of the subject imports that would preclude summary judgment. The sole issue before the court is whether, as a matter of law, the subject imports are properly classified under subheading 9817.95.01 in addition to the tariff provisions corresponding to their constituent materials. For the following reasons, the court finds that .Customs properly classified the subject imports according to their constituent materials and not under HTSUS 9817.95.01.
Background
I. Material Facts Not in Dispute
The party moving for summary judgment must show “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the mov-ant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” United States Court of International Trade (“USCIT”) Rule 56(a). Movants
should present material facts as short and concise statements, in numbered paragraphs, and cite to “particular parts of materials in the record” as support. US-CIT Rule 56(c)(1)(A);
see also
USCIT Rule 56.3(a)(“factual positions described in Rule 56(c)(1)(A) must be annexed to the motion in a separate, short and concise statement, in numbered paragraphs”). In responsive papers, the nonmovant “must include correspondingly numbered paragraphs responding to the numbered paragraphs in the statement of the movant.” USCIT Rule 56.3(b). Parties filed cross motions for summary judgment and submitted separate statements of undisputed material facts with their respective motions and responses to the opposing party’s statements.
See
Pl.’s SOF; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s SOF; Def.’s Statement of Facts as to Which There Are No Genuine Issues to be Tried (“Def.’s SOF”), ECF No. 43-2; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Statement of Material Facts as to Which No Genuine Issue Exists (“Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SOF”), ECF No. 44-2. Upon review of the parties’ facts (and supporting exhibits), the court finds the following undisputed and material facts.
Plaintiff WWRD is the importer of record. Pl.’s SOF ¶ 2; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s SOF ¶ 2. The subject imports comprise decorative ceramic plates and mugs from WWRD’s “Old Britain Castles” dinnerware collections; decorative ceramic plates and gravy boats from WWRD’s “His Majesty” dinnerware collection; and crystal flutes, punch bowls, and footed hurricane lamps from WWRD’s “12 Days of Christmas” collection.
Def.’s SOF ¶ 1; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SOF ¶ 1;
see also
Pl.’s Mem., Ex.’s A-E (physical samples of plates from Plaintiffs “Old Britain Castles” and “His Majesty” lines of dinnerware, and flutes from Plaintiffs “12 Days of Christmas” line of crystalware); Gluck Deel. ¶¶2-6 (verification of manual filing of 'exhibits). The “Old Britain Castles” Christmas plates and mugs and the “12 Days of Christmas” crystal flutes and punch bowls are “designed to be used to serve food and beverages at Christmas ... dinner.” PL’s SOF ¶ 14; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s SOF ¶ 14.
The “Old Britain Castles Pink Christmas” plates and mugs feature a Christmas tree motif. Aff. of Michael Craig (“Craig Aff.”) ¶¶ 5-8, ECF No. 33-3;
Craig Aff., Ex’s. 1-4, ECF No. 33-4; PL’s Mem., Ex.’s A, B. The plates measure 22cm and 27cm in diameter. Craig Aff. ¶¶ 5-6; Gluck
Decl., Ex. G (summary of subject merchandise). Mugs in the “Old Britain Castles Christmas” collection feature a Christmas tree and Santa Claus motif. Craig Aff. ¶ 9, Ex. 5.
The plates and gravy boat in Plaintiffs “His Majesty” collection feature a “regal tom turkey” surrounded by “nuts, fruits, berries, and vegetables.” Craig Aff. ¶¶ 10-14, Ex.’s 6-10; Pl.’s Mem., Ex. C. The plates measure 20cm in diameter. Craig Aff. ¶¶ 10-13; Gluck Deck, Ex. G.
The “Eileen” flute in WWRD’s “12 Days of Christmas” collection features “the figure of a lady surrounded by hollies and berries symbolizing the ‘Nine Ladies Dancing’ portion of the ‘Twelve Days of Christmas’ song lyrics.” Craig Aff. ¶ 16, Ex. 11; PL’s Mem., Ex. D. The “Glen-more” flute features “the figure of a lord surrounded by hollies and berries symbolizing the ‘Ten Lords A-Leaping’ portion of the ‘Twelve Days of Christmas’ song lyrics.” Craig Aff. ¶ 16, Ex. 12; Pl.’s Mem., Ex. E. The footed hurricane lamp and punchbowl depict various figures from the “Twelve Days of Christmas” song. Craig Aff. ¶¶ 17,18, Ex.’s 13,14.
II. Procedural History
As noted above, this ease involves seven entries of merchandise. Summons at 4; Compl., Ex. 1. The subject imports entered at the Ports of Newark, New Jersey, and New York, New York, on several dates in 2009 and 2010, and Customs liquidated the entries between August 20, 2010, and January 3, 2011. Summons at 4; Compl., Ex. 1;
see also
Entry Documents in Court File.
The following table summarizes the subject imports and their respective tariff provisions assigned by Customs based upon the items’ constituent materials:
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See
PL’s SOF ¶¶ 19-28; Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s SOF ¶¶ 19-23; Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 6(b)-10; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 6(b)-10.
WWRD timely and properly protested, which protests Customs denied. Summons at 1; Compl. ¶ 4; Answer ¶ 4, ECF No. 19; Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 3-4; PL’s Resp. to Def.’s SOF ¶¶ 3-4. WWRD challenges the denial of its protests. Parties have fully briefed the issues. The court now rules on the cross-motions for summary judgment.
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). Jurisdiction is uncontroverted in this case. Compl. ¶ 2; Answer ¶ 2; PL’s SOF ¶ 1; Def.’s Resp. to PL’s SOF ¶ 1.
The Court may grant summary judgment when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact,” and “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477
U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); USCIT Rule 56(a).
The court’s review of a classification decision involves two steps. First, it must determine the meaning of the relevant tariff provisions, which is a question of law.
See Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. United States,
148 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Second, it must determine whether the merchandise at issue falls within a particular tariff provision, as construed, which is a question of fact.
Id.
(citation omitted). When no factual dispute exists regarding the merchandise, resolution of the classification turns solely on the first step.
See id.
at 1365-66;
see also Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States,
195 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
The court reviews classification cases
de novo. See
28 U.S.C. § 2640(a). While the court accords deference to Customs classification rulings relative to their “powér to persuade,”
United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 235, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (quoting
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)), it has “an independent responsibility to decide the legal issue of the proper meaning and scope of HTSUS terms,”
Jedwards Int’l, Inc. v. United States,
40 CIT -, -, 161 F.Supp.3d 1354, 1357 (2016) (quoting
Warner-Lambert Co. v. United States,
407 F.3d 1207, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
It is “the court’s duty to find the correct result,
by whatever procedure is best suited to the case at hand.”
Jarvis Clark Co. v. United States,
733 F.2d 873, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Discussion
I. Legal Framework
The General Rules of Interpretation (“GRIs”) provide the analytical framework for the court’s classification of goods.
See N. Am. Processing Co. v. United States,
236 F.3d 695, 698 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “The HTSUS is designed so that most classification questions can be answered by GRI 1.”
Telebrands Corp. v. United States,
36 CIT -, -, 865 F.Supp.2d 1277, 1280 (2012),
aff'd
522 Fed.Appx. 915 (Fed. Cir. 2013). GRI 1 states that, “for legal purposes, classification shall be determined according to the terms of the headings and any [relevant] section or chapter notes.” GRI 1, HTSUS. The court considers chapter and section notes of the HTSUS in resolving classification disputes because they are statutory law, not interpretive rules.
See Arko Foods Intern., Inc. v. United States,
654 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted);
see also Park B. Smith, Ltd. v. United States,
347 F.3d 922, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (chapter and section notes are binding on the court).
“Absent contrary legislative intent, HTSUS terms are to be ‘construed [according] to their common and popular meaning.’ ”
Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. United States,
182 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting
Marubeni Am. Corp. v. United States,
35 F.3d 530, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Courts may rely upon their own understanding of terms or consult dictionaries, encyclopedias, scientific authorities, and other reliable information.
Brookside Veneers, Ltd. v. United States,
847 F.2d 786, 789 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
BASF Corp. v. United States,
35 CIT -, -, 798 F.Supp.2d 1353, 1357 (2011).
II. Overview of Plaintiffs Proposed Classification
The relevant chapter is Chapter 98, titled “Special Classification Provisions.” Plaintiff contends the subject imports are properly classified under subheading 9817.95.01.
See generally
PL’s Mem.; Pl.’s Resp. Subheading 9817.95.01 covers:
9817.95 Articles classifiable in subheadings 3924.10, 3926.90, 6307.90, 6911.10, 6912.00, 7013.22, 7013.28, 7013.41, 7013.49, 9405.20, 9405.40 or 9405.50, the foregoing meeting the descriptions set forth below:
9817.95.01 Utilitarian articles of a kind used in the home in the performance of specific religious or cultural ritual celebrations for religious or cultural holidays, or religious festive occasions, such as Seder plates, blessing cups, menorahs or kinaras .Free.
Subheading 9817.95.01 went into effect on February 3, 2007.
See Michael Simon Design, Inc. v. United States,
609 F.3d 1335, 1337, 1340-44 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (discussing the President’s authority to modify tariff rates by proclamation in response to a challenge to Proclamation 8097, which,
inter alia,
adopted the International Trade Commission’s (“ITC”) recommended amendment to the HTSUS establishing
subheading 9817.95.01);
see also Proclamation 8097,
72 Fed. Reg. 453 (Jan. 4, 2007) (“Proclamation 8097”). Before then, utilitarian items associated with a holiday or festive occasion were classified under heading 9505, HTSUS, which covers “Festive, carnival or other entertainment articles,” as interpreted by the Federal Circuit in a line of cases beginning with
Midwest of Cannon Falls, Inc. v. United States,
122 F.3d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
See Michael Simon Design, Inc. v. United States,
33 CIT 1003, 1004-07, 637 F.Supp.2d 1218, 1220-23 (2009),
aff'd
609 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
In 2007, pursuant to Proclamation 8097, Chapter 95
was amended to add Note l(v), which excludes from Chapter 95 “Ta-, bleware, kitchenware, toilet articles, carpets and other textile floor coverings, apparel, bed linen, table linen, toilet linen, kitchen linen and similar articles having a utilitarian function (classified according to their' constituent material).”
See
Note l(v) to Chapter 95;
see also Michael Simon Design,
33 CIT at 1006-07, 637 F.Supp.2d at 1222-23; Proclamation 8097. A footnote to Note l(v) refers readers to subheading 9817.95.
See
Note l(v) to Chapter 95. According to Plaintiff, subheading 9817.95.01 was added so that certain items remained eligible for duty free treatment in compliance with domestic obligations pursuant to the International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (“Convention”).
See
PL’s Mem. at 10.
Subheading 9817.95 contains two relevant provisions: (1) subheading 9817.95.01, defined above; and (2) subheading 9817.95.05, which covers “Utilitarian items in the form of a three-dimensional representation of a symbol or motif clearly associated with a specific holiday in the United States.” Although Plaintiff originally claimed classification under both subheadings (as alternatives), Plaintiff now limits its argument to subheading 9817.95.01.
See
Compl. ¶¶ 24-25, 34-35; Pl.’s Mem. at 10-20.
III. The Subject Imports Are Not Classifiable Under Subheading 9817.95.01
1. Parties’ Contentions
In order to be classifiable under subheading 9817.95.01, the subject imports must be: (1) classifiable in subheading 3924.10, 3926.90, 6307.90, 6911.10, 6912.00, 7013.22, 7013.28, 7013.41, 7013.49, 9405.20, 9405.40 or 9405.50; (2) utilitarian; (3) of a kind used in the home; and (4) used in the performance of specific religious or cultural ritual celebrations for religious or cultural holidays, or religious festive occasions. Parties agree the subject imports meet the first three requirements;
how
ever, Parties dispute whether the subject imports meet the fourth requirement.
See
PL’s Mem. at 11-16; Pl.’s Resp. at 4; Def.’s Mem. at 9; Def.’s Reply at 5.
Parties disagree about the scope of the term “ritual,” and whether the dinner meals on Thanksgiving and Christmas, during which Plaintiff contends the merchandise is used, constitute “specific cultural ritual celebrations.”
See
PL’s Mem. at 14-15; Def.’s Mem. at 11-14. Plaintiff asserts that Thanksgiving and Christmas dinners “are specific cultural ritual celebrations.” PL’s Mem. at 15. Defendant counters that “there is nothing ritualistic about Christmas or Thanksgiving dinner”; rather, they are “opportunities for friends and families to get together and share a meal.” Def.’s Mem. at 13,14.
Parties also disagree about the test the court should use to determine whether the subject imports are
“of a kind,
... used in the performance of specific ... cultural ritual celebrations.”
However, because resolution of the first issue disposes of this case, the court does not reach this second issue.
2. The Scope of “Specific Cultural Ritual Celebrations”
As discussed above, classification is generally determined according to chapter headings and relevant section or chapter notes. GRI 1, HTSUS. Section XXII
does not contain any section notes, and the
only allocable chapter note does not inform the meaning of the relevant tariff terms.
Chapter 98 does not contain four-digit' headings, but rather, is a collection of eight- or ten-digit subheadings covering a diverse array of articles. Accordingly, the court considers the common meaning of the phrase “specific ... cultural ritual celebration” and, in particular, the term “ritual.”
See Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
182 F.3d at 1337.
Plaintiff offers several definitions of the term “ritual.” Plaintiff points to
Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary,
which defines “ritual” as “a customarily repeated often formal act or series of acts.” Pl.’s Mem. at 15 (citing
Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
1011 (10th Ed.)). Plaintiff also cites various books and journal articles. First, Plaintiff relies on a 1973 article, “Symbols in African Ritual,” which defines “ritual” as “a stereotyped sequence of activities involving gestures, words, and objects, performed in [sic] sequestered place.” Pl.’s Mem. at 14 (citing Victor W. Turner, Symbols in African Ritual at 123, in Annual Editions: Readings in Anthropology ’75- 76 (1975));
see also
Gluck Deck, Ex. I (copy of the article). Next, Plaintiff offers that a “ritual” is “a type of expressive, symbolic, activity constructed of multiple behaviors that occur in a fixed, episodic sequence, and that tend to be repeated over time. Ritual behavior is dramatically scripted and acted out and is performed with formality, seriousness, and inner intensity.” Pl.’s Mem. at 14-15 (citing Dennis W. Rook,
The Ritual Dimension of Consumer Behavior,
12 J. of Consumer Behavior 251, 252 (1985)). Plaintiff also proposes that “rituals” are “characterized by formalism, traditionalism, invariance, rule-governance, sacral symbolism, and performance.” Pl.’s Mem. at 15 (citing Catherine Bell, Ritual: Perspective and Dimensions 138-69 (1997)).
Plaintiff seeks to establish that “Christmas and Thanksgiving dinners are specific cultural ritual celebrations, involving the same motifs, themes and celebrations each year.” Pl.’s Mem. at 15. Plaintiff contends that Christmas is a “vigorous ritual occasion ... prescribing] the consumption of special food and drink at ceremonious occasions.” PL’s Mem. at 15 (quoting Rook, supra). Plaintiff asserts that “[preparing or attending Christmas dinner has been recognized as an unwritten rule,” PL’s Mem. at 15 (citing Theodore Caplow,
Rule Enforcement Without Visible Means: Christmas Gift Giving in Middletown,
89 Am. J. of Sociology 1306, 1312-13 (1984)), and that Thanksgiving and Christmas dinners “often involve festive table settings.” PL’s Mem. at 15 (citing
A Thanksgiving Tablescape with a View
(Sept. 28, 2016, 1:02 PM), http://betweennapsontheporch. net/thanksgiving-tablescape-with-johnson-brothers-hismajesty-dishware/);
see also
Gluck Deck, Ex. H (copy of the webpage).
Though proposing similar definitions of the term “ritual,” Defendant argues that the dinners associated with Thanksgiving and Christmas lack “formal actions and words that are repeated every year in the same fashion by everyone who celebrates those events,” and instead are opportunities to share a meal. Def.’s Mem. at 13. Defendant points to
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary,
which defines “ritual” as (1) “the established form for a ceremony,” such as “the order of words prescribed for a religious ceremony,” and (2) “a ritual observance,” such as “a system of rites,” “a ceremonial act or action,” or “any formal and customarily repeated act or series of acts.” Def.’s Mem. at 11-12 (quoting
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary
992
(1979)). Defendant also relies on an online dictionary defining “ritual” as “[a] ceremony in which the actions and wording follow a prescribed form and order.” Def.’s Mem. at 12 (quoting
Ritual,
http://www..thefree dictionary.com/ritual).
Plaintiff responds that Defendant has interpreted the term “ritual” too narrowly, and the sources Plaintiff supplied “define the term[ ] in less religious and more general terms.” Pl.’s Resp. at 12. Plaintiff cites to an online dictionary in support of its argument that “customary, traditional, annual dinners” are “central and important” to Thanksgiving and Christmas. Pl.’s Resp. at 12 (citing
Ritual,
https://www. vocabulary.com/dictionary/ritual);
see also
Decl. of Daniel J. Gluck, Esq. in Supp. of Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. and Pl.’s Reply in Further Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ J. (“Gluck Suppl. Deck”), Ex. M (copy of webpage containing the dictionary definition), ECF No. 44-1. That definition suggests an interpretation that roughly equates “ritual” with “routine” or “tradition.”
See
Gluck Suppl. Deck, Ex. M (defining “ritual” as “a ceremony or action performed in a customary way,” and providing the example of a family “hav[ing] a Saturday night ritual of eating a big spaghetti dinner and then taking a long walk to the ice cream shop”) (emphasis omitted). It further suggests that the term “ritual” can describe “any time-honored tradition, like the Superbowl, or Mardi Gras, or Sunday morning pancake breakfast.” Gluck Suppl. Deck, Ex. M
There is little question that Thanksgiving and Christmas are both cultural holidays and the dinners associated with them are widely-observed cultural celebrations performed on or around those holidays. That, however, is not the question before the court. The subheading in question requires the performance of a “specific ... cultural ritual celebration.” As discussed by both parties, rituals generally encompass specific scripted acts or series of acts that are customarily performed in an often formal or solemn manner. The plain language of subheading 9817.95.01 does not support broadly interpreting the term “ritual” as any event that occurs on a regular basis.
Thanksgiving and Christmas— like other cultural or religious holidays— recur annually, as do the celebrations associated with them. However, if subheading 9817.95.01 was intended to cover utilitarian items used in the home during religious or cultural celebrations, whenever they routinely occur, and whatever they might entail, the term “ritual” could have been omitted altogether. It is well settled “that a statute must, if possible, be construed in such a fashion that every word has some operative effect.”
United States v. Nordic Village Inc.,
503 U.S. 30, 36, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992);
see also China Diesel Imports, Inc. v. United States,
18 CIT 1086, 1090, 870 F.Supp. 347, 351 (1994) (“Courts are required to give effect to each word of a statute, whenever possible.”). The term “ritual” only serves a purpose in this subheading when interpreted to mean the performance of prescribed cultural or religious acts.
Indeed, subheading 9817.95.01 speaks of “the performance of
specific ...
cultural ritual celebrations.” In support of its argument that Thanksgiving and Christmas dinners involve ritualistic performance, Plaintiff offers nothing more than the highly
non-specific
“consumption of special food and drink,” and, perhaps, the use of “festive table settings.”
See
PL’s Mem. at 15 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs examples do not persuade that Thanksgiving and Christmas dinners are “specific cultural ritual celebrations.”
The exemplars included in the subheading support this interpretation. Subheading 9817.95.01 covers “[u]tilitarian articles of a kind used in the home in the perform-
anee of specific religious or cultural ritual celebrations ...,
such as Seder plates, blessing cups, menorahs or kinaras.”
In classification cases, the statutory construction rule of
ejusdem generis
(“of the same kind”) requires that the subject imports “possess the essential characteristics or purposes that unite the articles enumerated
eo nomine
in order to be classified under the general terms.”
Sports Graphics, Inc. v. United States,
24 F.3d 1390, 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). As Defendant explains, a Seder plate is used during Passover to hold six symbolic foods, a menorah is a candelabrum used during Hanukkah, both Jewish celebrations, and a kinara is a candelabrum used during Kwanzaa, which is a “secular seven-day festival in celebration of the African heritage of African Americans.” Def.’s Mem. at 12-13 (citations omitted).
Unlike the subject imports, which are merely decorative items used to serve food and beverages or provide lighting,
see
Def.’s SOF ¶ 1; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SOF ¶ 1; Pl.’s Mem., Ex.’s A-E, the exemplars play a particular role within the sequence of activities that form the respective religious or cultural ritual celebrations,
see
Def.’s Mem. at 12-13.
Although the exemplars do not necessarily indicate the limits of subheading 9817.95.01, they are consistent with, and, therefore, support, the court’s consideration of “ritual” as determinative here.
One final point merits attention. Plaintiff suggests that classifying the merchandise according to its constituent materials and not under subheading 9817.95.01 results in a “breech [sic] [of the Government’s] treaty obligations under the [Convention]” because they would no longer be eligible for duty free treatment. Pl.’s Mem. at 10. Assuming
arguendo
the merchandise would have qualified for duty free treatment prior to February 2007, the requirement for substantial rate neutrality applies to the ITC when it is recommending changes to the HTSUS.
See supra
note 19; 19 U.S.C. § 3005(d)(1)(C). Substantial rate neutrality does not factor into this court’s mandate to apply the GRIs to determine the correct classification.
See N. Am. Processing Co.,
236 F.3d at 698.
Moreover, had the intention been to cover articles under subheading 9817.95.01 that previously would have qualified as “festive articles” under heading 9505 and the Federal Circuit’s interpretation thereof, subheading 9817.95.01 could have been drafted to more closely parallel subheading 9817.95.05.
See
Sub-
heading 9817.95.05, HTSUS (covering “[u]tilitarian items in the form of a three-dimensional representation of a symbol or motif
clearly associated with a specific holiday
in the United States”) (emphasis added);
Park B. Smith,
347 F.3d at 927 (“Chapter 95 requires that the article satisfy two criteria: (1) it must be
closely associated with a festive occasion
and (2) the article is
used or displayed
principally during that festive occasion.”) (citing
Midwest of Cannon Falls,
122 F.3d at 1429) (emphasis added). The plain language of subheading 9817.95.01 requires more than that the article is “closely associated” with a holiday or that it is “used” in some capacity during the celebrations; rather, subheading 9817.95.01 requires that the article is “used ... in the
performance of specific ... cultural ritual celebrations.”
Accordingly, the court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs appeal to substantial rate neutrality.
In sum, the court finds that the dinners associated with Thanksgiving and Christmas are not “specific ... cultural ritual celebrations” within the meaning of subheading 9817.95.01. Accordingly, the subject imports are not classifiable under subheading 9817.95.01. Upon review of Parties’ statements of undisputed facts and supporting exhibits, the court holds that Customs correctly classified the subject imports according to their constituent materials.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court holds that Customs correctly classified the subject imports. The court denies Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and grants Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Judgment will be entered accordingly.