Wuelling Ex Rel. Wuelling v. Brown

341 S.W.3d 157, 2011 Mo. App. LEXIS 555, 2011 WL 1564374
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedApril 26, 2011
DocketED 95218
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 341 S.W.3d 157 (Wuelling Ex Rel. Wuelling v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wuelling Ex Rel. Wuelling v. Brown, 341 S.W.3d 157, 2011 Mo. App. LEXIS 555, 2011 WL 1564374 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

OPINION

CLIFFORD H. AHRENS, Judge.

Timothy Brown (Father) appeals the Amended Family Court Order, Judgment and Decree of Paternity entered after trial. Father contends that the trial court erred by imputing a gross monthly income of $5,679 in calculating his child support obligation using Form 14. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

Father and Wendy Wuelling (Mother) began living together in 2001. Their son, I.E.B. (Son) was born in October 2006. Father moved out of the family home in 2008. Son continued to live with Mother. Since the separation, Father has maintained an active relationship with Son. He takes Son to daycare every day. Son has had approximately fifteen overnight visits with Father.

Father holds a mechanical engineering degree from the University of Missouri-Rolla. In January 2009, Father involuntarily lost his job at Ambitech Engineering, where he earned $65,400 in 2007 and $79,031 in 2008. Father was one of approximately 100 employees laid off due to the economic recession. Following his discharge, Father began working part-time at the Home Depot for $9.00 per hour.

At trial, Father testified that he has been looking for jobs since the day he was laid off. To make himself more marketable, he taught himself to use a new software program. He received a $60,000 job offer in Atlanta but turned it down “so I could stay close to my son.” He testified that he sent out approximately 100-150 resumes and went on a few interviews. He also produced a variety of rejection letters from his job search. Neither party presented expert testimony regarding Father’s marketability or the St. Louis job market. Mother presented no evidence relevant to the imputation of income to father.

Both parties submitted a proposed Form 14. Mother stated Father’s monthly gross income as $5,729. Father stated his income as $5,517 (based on his previous earnings as an engineer), but his Statement of Income and Expenses indicated a then-current monthly income of $1,229 consistent with his employment at Home Depot. In its order, the family court imputed Father’s gross monthly income as $5,679. Subsequently, Father made a motion for a new trial or amended judgment and was granted leave to submit a new Form 14, which listed his income as $3,833. The family court retained its original imputation of $5,679 and entered an amended judgment containing only slight modifications from its original judgment. Father appeals, asserting that the trial court erred by imputing his income at $5,679.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a non-jury case under Rule 73.01(c). The trial court’s judgment will be sustained unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against *159 the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976); Neal v. Neal, 281 S.W.3d 330, 337 (Mo.App. E.D.2009). We defer to the trial court’s determinations of credibility and view the evidence and inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the judgment. Neal, 281 S.W.3d at 337. Questions of law are matters reserved for de novo review by the appellate court, and we therefore give no deference to the trial court’s judgment in such matters. H & B Masonry Co., Inc. v. Davis, 32 S.W.3d 120, 124 (Mo.App.2000).

DISCUSSION

Father asserts two sub-points: (1) that the trial court erred as a matter of law by penalizing him for declining a job offer in Atlanta and (2) that the evidence does not support the court’s finding that Father failed to use his best efforts to obtain local employment.

In proper circumstances, a trial court may impute income to a party according to what that party could earn by using best efforts to gain employment suitable to his or her capabilities. Krepps v. Krepps, 234 S.W.3d 605, 612 (Mo.App. W.D.2007). Imputation is only proper where the trial court concludes from the evidence that the “parent has the capacity to earn more but voluntarily refuses to do so.” Id. Courts impute income in situations where a person loses his job involuntarily but does not in good faith attempt to gain new employment. Silverstein v. Silverstein, 943 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Mo.App.1997). What constitutes the appropriate circumstances to impute income is fact-dependent and must be determined case-by-case. Smith v. Smith, 969 S.W.2d, 856, 859 (Mo.App.1998).

In support of his position that the trial court improperly considered the Atlanta job offer, Father relies on Payne v. Payne, 206 S.W.3d 379 (Mo.App. E.D.2006). There, the trial court imputed income to the father based on national job market data despite expert witnesses’ consensus on the absence of local positions (other than with the company that terminated him). This court reversed, reasoning that “courts do not interfere to compel spouses to obtain employment which will generate the maximum possible income.” Id. at 385. Rather, the court referred to Comment H to Form 14 directing courts to consider “available opportunities in the community.” 1 Id. (emphasis in original) Here, the trial court found as follows:

Father admitted that it is not unusual for engineers to obtain employment outside the State of Missouri but did not sufficiently explain why he failed to do so. Evidently, Father understood that he had to seek employment outside of the St. Louis Metropolitan area for work in his field of education and training, and that limiting his search to the St. Louis area may not be his “best efforts” in obtaining employment. Had Father accepted the Atlanta employment offer, *160 his annual gross income would have been at least in the “low 60s.”

To the extent that the trial court relied on the Atlanta offer in its assessment of best efforts and salary expectation, Payne compels us to conclude that the court erred. 2

We are left, then, with the question of whether the court’s imputation of income to Father is supported by the evidence regarding Father’s local job search. Father testified that he sent out 100-150 resumes, both within and without his specific area of engineering expertise and many for less pay, and that he went on several interviews and was in contact with a few headhunters. He also adduced several rejection letters from potential local employers — a sample from dozens of such letters, he testified. Mother offered no rebuttal evidence on this issue, and, unlike Payne, neither party adduced expert testimony as to appropriate prospects for Father in the St. Louis market.

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Bluebook (online)
341 S.W.3d 157, 2011 Mo. App. LEXIS 555, 2011 WL 1564374, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wuelling-ex-rel-wuelling-v-brown-moctapp-2011.