Wu v. Fonfa

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedJune 26, 2020
Docket2:19-cv-00229
StatusUnknown

This text of Wu v. Fonfa (Wu v. Fonfa) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wu v. Fonfa, (D. Nev. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 * * *

7 JINGLING WU, et al,, Case No. 2:19-CV-229 JCM (BNW)

8 Plaintiff(s), ORDER

9 v.

10 ANDREW FONFA, et al.,

11 Defendant(s).

12 13 Presently before the court is William Weidner, BOFU LLC, Weidner Management LLC, 14 and David Jacoby’s (collectively “the Jacoby defendants”) motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 54). 15 Jingling Wu, et al.,1 (collectively “plaintiffs”) filed a response (ECF No. 58), to which the Jacoby 16 defendants replied (ECF No. 61). 17 Also before the court is Andrew Fonfa, Sahara Investments LLC, Las Vegas Economic 18 Impact Regional Center LLC, (“LVEIRC”) and Eastern Investments LLC’s (collectively, “the 19 Fonfa defendants”) (collectively with the Jacoby defendants, “the developers”) motion to 20 dismiss. (ECF No. 55). Plaintiffs filed a response (ECF No. 58), to which the Fonfa defendants 21 replied (ECF No. 62). 22 Also before the court is plaintiffs’ countermotion for leave to file an amended complaint. 23 (ECF No. 59). The Jacoby defendants filed a response (ECF No. 63), to which the Fonfa 24 defendants joined (ECF No. 64), and plaintiffs replied. (ECF No. 66). 25 Also before the court is the Jacoby defendants’ motion to stay the case (ECF No. 67), to 26 which the Fonfa defendants joined (ECF No. 68). Plaintiffs filed a response (ECF No. 72). The 27

28 1 There are forty individual plaintiffs remaining in this suit. 1 Jacoby defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 73), to which the Fonfa defendants also joined (ECF 2 No. 74). 3 I. Background 4 The instant action arises from a dispute over the terms of an investment. Plaintiffs are 5 Chinese nationals seeking green cards through the EB-5 investment program. (ECF No. 1 at 2). 6 The EB-5 program generally allows foreign citizens to obtain a U.S. green card if they invest 7 $500,000 of lawfully obtained funds into an employment-generating economic enterprise that 8 creates at least ten full-time jobs, subject to other requirements. Id. at 5. 9 Plaintiffs invested in a regional center, the LVEIRC. Id. at 6. Regional centers aggregate 10 investments from multiple EB-5 investors so that the investments can be loaned to pre-approved 11 projects that need large capital outlays, like large-scale construction. Id. In turn, the investors 12 become partners in an LLC. Id. 13 The developers formed the LVEIRC as an LLC to fund the Lucky Dragon Casino & 14 Hotel (“Lucky Dragon”). Id. at 7. The developers solicited donations from each of the plaintiffs. 15 Id. Plaintiffs signed agreements entitling them to refunds if they withdrew their petitions for 16 green cards or were denied green cards through no fault of their own. Id. at 8; (ECF No. 54 at 6). 17 Initially, the developers sought to use only investments collected from the EB-5 program 18 to fund Lucky Dragon. (ECF No. 1 at 8). However, the EB-5 investments alone were 19 insufficient. Id. at 11. The developers then acquired a $45,000,000 loan from Snow Covered 20 Capital, LLC (“SCC”) to account for the shortfall. Id. 21 The developers used the EB-5 investments and the SCC loan to construct Lucky Dragon. 22 (ECF No. 55 at 7). After opening, Lucky Dragon failed to turn a profit. Id. The developers 23 defaulted on their payments to SCC, and the SCC foreclosed on the property. (ECF No. 1 at 13– 24 14). The operating LLCs controlling Lucky Dragon filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and Lucky 25 Dragon’s assets were sold in a foreclosure sale. Id. 26 Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that, as a result of the bankruptcy and foreclosure sale, 27 their investments are no longer “at-risk,” such that they qualify for the EB-5 program. (ECF No. 28 3). By their estimation, this could result in denial of their green cards. See id. 1 The Jacoby defendants and Fonfa defendants separately move to dismiss plaintiffs’ 2 claims. (ECF No. 54; 55). The Fonfa defendants also joined the Jacoby defendants’ motion to 3 dismiss. (ECF No. 56). 4 II. Legal Standard 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows defendants to seek dismissal of a claim 6 or action for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dismissal under rule 12(b)(1) is appropriate if 7 the complaint, considered in its entirety, fails to allege facts on its face that are sufficient to 8 establish subject matter jurisdiction. In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust 9 Litigation, 546 F.3d 981, 984–85 (9th Cir. 2008). Although the defendant is the moving party in 10 a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff is the party invoking the court’s 11 jurisdiction. As a result, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the case is properly in 12 federal court. McCauley v. Ford Motor Co., 264 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing McNutt v. 13 General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)). 14 Federal courts have limited jurisdiction. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 15 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). “A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case 16 unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the 17 Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, “federal subject matter 18 jurisdiction must exist at the time an action is commenced.” Mallard Auto. Grp., Ltd. v. United 19 States, 343 F. Supp. 2d 949, 952 (D. Nev. 2004). 20 [A] plaintiff, suing in a federal court, must show in his pleading, affirmatively and distinctly, the existence of whatever is essential 21 to federal jurisdiction, and, if he does not do so, the court, on having the defect called to its attention or on discovering the same, 22 must dismiss the case, unless the defect be corrected by amendment. 23 24 Smith v. McCullough, 270 U.S. 456, 459 (1926). 25 III. Discussion 26 Article III of the United States Constitution requires plaintiffs to have standing to assert 27 an actual “case or controversy” before the federal courts may assert jurisdiction over the matter. 28 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (citations omitted). In order to establish 1 standing, “[p]laintiffs must demonstrate a ‘personal stake in the outcome’ in order to ‘assure that 2 concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues’ necessary for the proper 3 resolution of constitutional questions.” Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). A 4 plaintiff establishes a “personal stake” in the outcome by demonstrating that “the injury or threat 5 of injury [is] both ‘real and immediate,’” rather than “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” Id. at 102 6 (citations omitted). In short, “[a]bstract injury is not enough.” Id. at 101. 7 In Lyons, the United States Supreme Court held that injunctive relief was not necessary 8 despite plaintiff complaining of Los Angeles police officers’ policy of using chokeholds “in 9 situations where no one is threatened by death or grievous bodily harm.” Id. at 99.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Smith v. McCullough
270 U.S. 456 (Supreme Court, 1926)
McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
298 U.S. 178 (Supreme Court, 1936)
Baker v. Carr
369 U.S. 186 (Supreme Court, 1962)
O'Shea v. Littleton
414 U.S. 488 (Supreme Court, 1974)
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons
461 U.S. 95 (Supreme Court, 1983)
In Re Dynamic Random Access Memory (Dram)
546 F.3d 981 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Mallard Automotive Group, Ltd. v. United States
343 F. Supp. 2d 949 (D. Nevada, 2004)
National Council of La Raza v. Barbara Cegavske
800 F.3d 1032 (Ninth Circuit, 2015)
McCauley v. Ford Motor Co.
264 F.3d 952 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Wu v. Fonfa, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wu-v-fonfa-nvd-2020.