Wrinkles v. Buss

537 F.3d 804, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 17150, 2008 WL 3319051

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: August 12, 2008
• Docket: 05-2747
• Status: Published

Opinions

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

This case is before the court on collateral review. In 1995, a Vanderburgh County, Indiana, Circuit Court jury convicted Matthew Wrinkles of murdering his wife, his wife’s brother, and his sister-in-law. The jury recommended and Judge Richard L. Young imposed a death sentence. Wrinkles unsuccessfully appealed his conviction and sentence to the Indiana Supreme Court, and thereafter, Judge Carl Heldt of the Vanderburgh Circuit Court denied his request for post-conviction relief. Wrinkles then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. Wrinkles argued that his constitutional rights were violated during the trial and sentencing proceedings because, pursuant to the Indiana trial judge’s blanket policy of restraint, he was required to wear a stun belt that he alleges was visible to the jury.

Wrinkles was barred from raising a direct challenge to the constitutionality of the stun belt because he procedurally defaulted the claim in state court. Wrinkles instead claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), because his counsel failed to object to the imposition of the stun-belt restraint. With respect to the prejudice prong of Strickland, Wrinkles claimed that the jurors saw the stun belt, and that he presumptively suffered prejudice as a result. United States District Judge, John Daniel Tinder, concluded that Wrinkles could not demonstrate prejudice because the jury was not aware of the stun belt.

Wrinkles’s habeas claim hinges on whether the jurors saw the stun belt during the trial and the sentencing proceedings. One passage in the Indiana Supreme Court’s opinion — actually, one sentence — complicates our review. We ultimately conclude that the Indiana Supreme Court made no factual finding regarding the belt’s visibility. The last state-court decision on point — the post-conviction court decision — holds that the jurors did not see the belt. We defer to that finding and agree with the district court that Wrinkles suffered no prejudice from his counsels’ failure to object to the stun belt.

I. History

A. Factual history

By the spring of 1994, the marriage of Matthew and Debbie Wrinkles was coming to an end. On May 3, 1994, police were dispatched to the Wrinkles’ home in response to a report of gunfire. Wrinkles told the responding officers that he and Debbie were having financial and marital problems and that he would kill Debbie if she ever left him. David Plemmons, a witness to the events, would later testify that Wrinkles pointed a gun at Debbie during the argument and the gun discharged when Debbie grabbed it. According to Plemmons, Wrinkles hid the gun when the police arrived, and Debbie and Plemmons “covered” for Wrinkles by lying to the police about the incident. The Indiana Supreme Court later characterized the Wrinkles’ relationship as “stormy and often violent.” Wrinkles v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1156, 1159 (Ind.1997) (“Wrinkles I”), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 861, 119 S.Ct. 148, 142 L.Ed.2d 121 (1998).

In June 1994, Debbie moved herself and the children — Lindsay, age thirteen, and Seth, age eight — to the home of Mark and Natalie Fulkerson, Debbie’s brother and sister-in-law. This move marked the end of Wrinkles and Debbie’s marriage, and Debbie filed for divorce on June 30. A few weeks later, on July 20, Wrinkles and Debbie attended a provisional divorce hearing, during which it was decided that Debbie would have custody of the children and Wrinkles would have visitation rights. Wrinkles and Debbie agreed to a meet at a fast-food restaurant later that day so that Wrinkles could see his children. But Debbie did not show that afternoon as scheduled.

Wrinkles had hit a low point in his life. He had a close relationship with his children and he believed that his estranged wife and her family were conspiring to deny him access to the children. In addition to his marital problems, the automotive-repair business that he ran out of his garage was failing. Several zoning complaints had been made against his business and he was forced to shut down. Wrinkles had also been dependent on methamphetamine for- some time, and this dependence caused him to become easily agitated and paranoid. In addition to his mental and emotional decay, his drug use caused him to wither away physically. Wrinkles’s addiction kept him from sleeping, except sporadically, and he lost sixty pounds in a three-month period.

Wrinkles’s obvious decline had begun to terrify Debbie. Her friend would testify at trial that Debbie had become a “nervous wreck.” Id. at 1159. She had begun to take “medication [and] every time she heard a noise she would jump cause she was scared. And ... she had to sleep with a gun underneath her pillow [because] she was scared” of Wrinkles.

Debbie’s failure to appear with the children at the fast-food restaurant on July 20 set into motion a tragic series of events. Wrinkles called to complain to his divorce attorney, who told Wrinkles that nothing could be done until the next day because the courts had already closed. Wrinkles then called the Fulkerson home to speak with Debbie, but she was not there. Debbie returned Wrinkles’s call later that evening, but she did not get an answer. Eventually, Debbie and the rest of the Fulkerson household turned in for the night on July 20. Given the growing tension in their lives, it was an uneasy rest; both Mark Fulkerson and Debbie had guns with them in their bedrooms.

Wrinkles drove to the Fulkerson home at approximately 2:00 a.m. on July 21, and parked his truck about one block from the home. He was wearing camouflage clothing, had painted his face, and was armed with a .357 magnum revolver and a knife. He climbed over a fence into the Fulker-sons’ backyard. He cut the telephone wires and kicked in the back door, entering the home.

Wrinkles went down the hallway and into the Fulkersons’ bedroom, where he shot Mark Fulkerson four times, killing him in front of his three-year-old son, Matthew. Debbie was awakened by the gunshots. She grabbed her gun and ran to the hallway where she confronted Wrinkles. She fired and hit him in the arm, knocking herself down in the process. At that point, Lindsay Wrinkles had also awakened and had come upon the confrontation between her parents. She saw that her father was about to shoot her mother and she “pleaded, ‘Dad, please don’t shoot Mom.’ ” Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1186 (Ind.2001) (“Wrinkles II"), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1019, 122 S.Ct. 1610, 152 L.Ed.2d 624 (2002). Wrinkles responded by telling Lindsay to “shut up,” and then he promptly shot Debbie.

During the commotion, Natalie Fulker-son made her way to the living room and out the front door, in an attempt to flee. Wrinkles gave chase and caught Natalie on the front porch, shooting her in her face at close range. Natalie died on the porch. Wrinkles fled. The Fulkersons’ ten-year-old daughter, Kimberly, and her 19-year-old cousin, Tracy, ran to neighbors’ houses for help.

Wrinkles was arrested later that morning in a neighboring county and was charged with three counts of murder, pursuant to Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1(1), for knowingly killing his victims. The state filed notice of its intent to seek the death penalty on July 28, 1994. Under Indiana law, the state can seek the death penalty when a defendant commits multiple murders. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(8).

B. Procedural history

Based on their pre-trial investigations, Wrinkles’s attorneys’ theory of his defense centered on the fact that, at the time of the crimes, Wrinkles was in the midst of a very difficult period in his life. The attorneys decided to stress the loss of Wrinkles’s business, the break-up of his marriage, and his perception that Debbie and the Fulkersons were trying to keep his children from him. The defense argued that Wrinkles had broken into the Fulker-sons’ home with the intent of retrieving his children because he feared that he would never see them again — a paranoia magnified by his methamphetamine addiction. The paranoia was further enhanced when, according to Wrinkles, his victims confronted him with guns when he entered the home. Wrinkles also would cast Debbie as the aggressor in their confrontation in the hallway; he would testify that Debbie said, “Die, you bastard, die,” when she shot him. Wrinkles I, 690 N.E.2d at 1159.

This strategy was necessary given the facts of the case. First, there was no dispute that Wrinkles had shot the three victims, and therefore Wrinkles’s motivation for the shootings would be the primary issue at trial. And Wrinkles’s state of mind would likewise be a significant issue for sentencing in terms of whether the death penalty or a lesser sentence was appropriate. In addition, the attorneys concluded that although Wrinkles’s mental state might impact his culpability and sentence, the facts did not support an insanity defense. A neuropsychologist enlisted by Wrinkles’s attorneys concluded that, while Wrinkles suffered from a Mixed Personality Disorder and a Delusional Disorder that became more intense during the weeks leading up to the shootings, and while Wrinkles’s judgment was substantially impaired at the time of the shootings, he was nonetheless sane because he had known what he was doing and was able to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

Before trial commenced, the trial judge informed Wrinkles’s counsel that Wrinkles would have to wear some sort of restraining device — either shackles or a stun belt. The trial court did not make a specific finding that Wrinkles presented a risk of danger, escape, or courtroom disruption. But “the trial court apparently [had] a policy of requiring defendants to wear restraints regardless of whether they [had] previously exhibited any conduct justifying restraints.” Wrinkles II, 749 N.E.2d at 1195. According to the Indiana Supreme Court in Wrinkles II, a stun belt is a restraining device that is placed around an individual’s waist as an alternative to leg-irons or shackles. The battery-powered belt has two prongs that are placed over the wearer’s kidney region. A court bailiff or other law-enforcement officer can activate the belt by a remote control and, once activated, it sends a shock to the wearer that cannot be stopped. The electrical shock travels through the body via blood channels and nerve pathways. The shock knocks down most people, incapacitates them for up to 45 minutes, and causes them to shake uncontrollably. The individual may also have uncontrollable defecation and urination, irregular heartbeats, seizures, and welts, due to the shock. Wrinkles’s attorneys did not object to the mandatory restraint policy. When faced with the choice of shackles or a stun belt, they opted for the latter, reasoning that there was less likelihood that the jury would see the belt during trial.

A jury found Wrinkles guilty of all three counts of murder, and recommended the death penalty; the trial judge sentenced Wrinkles to death. Wrinkles appealed his conviction and death sentence, raising a number of evidentiary claims and challenging both Indiana’s death-penalty statute and his own sentence. He did not, however, appeal the trial court’s blanket policy of requiring him to wear the stun belt at trial. Unpersuaded, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed Wrinkles’s convictions and sentence (Wrinkles I).

Thereafter, Wrinkles filed a petition for post-conviction relief, in which he challenged the constitutionality of the stun belt and raised ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, among other claims. Central to his claim for post-conviction relief were three affidavits from jurors in his trial who claimed to have seen the stun belt. The post-conviction court discounted the reliability of the affidavits and upheld Wrinkles’s convictions and sentence:

The trial court did not strip the presumption of innocence from Petitioner by requiring him to wear the belt. The purpose of the belt is to maintain control over a prisoner without the prisoner appearing restrained. Petitioner did not prove that the belt was visible or that the jury knew about it. The affidavits from three jurors that they knew about the belt from the trial court, the bailiff, and/or newspaper articles read after trial, and Petitioner’s appearance during trial are insufficient. First, the juror affidavits are inconsistent with each other. One juror stated that the jury was not told why Petitioner wore the belt, while another juror averred that the trial court told the jury about the belt to assure the jurors that they would be safe. Second, some of the juror affidavits are inconsistent with bailiff Todd Woodmansee’s affidavit that he did not tell the jury about the belt. Third, both [of Wrinkles’s attorneys] testified that the belt was not visible during trial. Fourth, the juror affidavits were not subjected to cross-examination. Because petitioner did not appear restrained during the trial, he was not stripped of the presumption of innocence.

Vanderburgh Circuit Court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment on Petition for Post Conviction Relief, Wrinkles v. State, No. 82C01-9407-CF-447 (Sept. 3, 1999) (emphasis in original).

After the post-conviction court rendered its decision, Wrinkles filed with that court a Motion to Correct Error, to which he attached new affidavits from additional jurors, who claimed to have seen the stun belt during trial. The post-conviction court did not grant Wrinkles’s motion, nor did it admit the additional juror affidavits into evidence.

Wrinkles then appealed the post-conviction court’s ruling to the Indiana Supreme Court. Relying on Indiana law, the supreme court in Wrinkles II prospectively banned the use of stun belts in Indiana courts. The court was specifically concerned with the mental impact on a defendant who might be afraid about the potential infliction of pain from the belt, and how this mental concern could impact the defendant’s ability to participate in his own defense. Wrinkles II, 749 N.E.2d at 1194.

But the Indiana Supreme Court denied Wrinkles the benefit of its holding. The court held that Wrinkles’s claim was procedurally defaulted because Wrinkles had failed to raise the issue on direct appeal. In addition, the court held that Wrinkles had not suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorneys failed to object to the use of the stun belt at his trial. ■ The court characterized Wrinkles’s attorneys’ choice to acquiesce to the stun belt as a “strategic decision”:

Before trial began, the trial court informed counsel that Wrinkles would have to wear either shackles or a stun belt during trial. Without objection counsel chose a stun belt, and Wrinkles claims they rendered ineffective assistance as a result. We disagree. Although with this opinion we declare that stun belts no longer have a place in Indiana courtrooms, that was not the case at the time of Wrinkles’ trial. Our prohibition is motivated primarily by the potential effect a stun belt may have upon the person wearing the device. However, without the benefit of this declaration, counsel were concerned about the effect on the jurors if they were to observe their client wearing a particular device. Counsel believed that the chance of the jury seeing the shackles was fairly high. On the other hand, counsel opted for the stun belt because they thought that jurors would not be able to see it. Obviously, they were later proven wrong. However, at the time the decision was made, it was a prudent one.

Wrinkles filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. He presented a host of arguments, all of which Judge Tinder, rejected. Wrinkles v. McBride, No. IP 01-1668-C-T/K (D.Ind. May 18, 2005) (Entry Discussing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus). With respect to the constitutionality of the stun belt itself, the district court held that the claim could not be presented under § 2254 because it had been proeedurally defaulted in state-court proceedings. Further, Judge Tinder held that even if the claim had not been waived, it lacked merit. Judge Tinder credited the post-conviction court’s finding that the jurors were not aware of the stun belt and the belt was not visible.

Thereafter, Wrinkles filed a Request for Certificate of Appealability (“C.A.”) on two issues: (1) “Whether [he] was unconstitutionally restrained by virtue of wearing a stun belt at his trial,” and (2) “Whether [his] counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at the ‘guilt phase’ of trial.” Judge Tinder granted Wrinkles a C.A. on the issue of the constitutionality of the use of the stun belt, but denied the request as to his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

On appeal, Wrinkles’s first argues that the district court erred in finding that his stun-belt claim was proeedurally defaulted because the default was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. As for his freestanding constitutional claim, he argues that his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was forced to wear the stun belt without an independent assessment of the need for restraints.²

A. Procedural default

Before analyzing Wrinkles’s substantive § 2254 claims, we must first determine whether Wrinkles proeedurally defaulted his argument that wearing the stun belt violated his constitutional rights. Lee v. Davis, 328 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir.2003) (“As a threshold matter, we must determine whether Lee has proeedurally defaulted his argument_”). The district court decided that Wrinkles had defaulted his argument—a decision we review de novo. Id. As a general matter, considerations of “finality, comity, and the orderly administration of justice” preclude this court from reaching claims that a ha-beas petitioner has proeedurally defaulted in state court. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 388, 124 S.Ct. 1847, 158 L.Ed.2d 659 (2004). The criminal trial is a “decisive and portentous event” and, as such, the state has an interest in ensuring timely compliance with those procedures that permit the jury accurately to “decide, within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or innocence of one of its citizens.” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). For these reasons, a valid state procedural rule constitutes an “adequate and independent state ground” for resolving an issue, precluding this court from doing so collaterally. Id. at 86-87, 97 S.Ct. 2497.

Wrinkles sought federal habeas corpus review of federal-law issues that the Indiana Supreme Court disposed of based on adequate and independent state-law grounds. Specifically, Wrinkles’s “freestanding” stun belt claims—that his rights to a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated when he was required to wear a stun belt without a hearing—were deemed by the Indiana Supreme Court to have been waived as a matter of state law. Wrinkles II, 749 N.E.2d at 1186-87 & 1187 n. 3. The procedural rule cited by the Indiana Supreme Court provides an “adequate and independent state ground” for resolving Wrinkles’s constitutional claims. Indiana courts have long recognized, and the Wrinkles II court reaffirmed, that “[c]laims that are available, but not presented, on direct appeal are waived for post-conviction review unless the claimed error is fundamental.” Id. at 1187 n. 3; see also Adams v. State, 575 N.E.2d 625, 628 (Ind.1991). Thus, the district court was correct to conclude that Wrinkles’s substantive claim was procedurally barred.

B. Excuse for procedural default

To keep his freestanding constitutional claim alive, Wrinkles argues that his procedural default is excusable under the standard set forth in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90, 97 S.Ct. 2497. A defendant may overcome procedural default by showing both “cause” for failing to abide by the state procedural rules, and a resulting “prejudice” from that failure.³ Id. at 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497. Specifically, Wrinkles argues that the freestanding stun-belt claim is procedurally defaulted solely because of his trial attorneys’ ignorance of the law, a fact that renders his counsel ineffective and that provides cause to excuse a procedural default. Murray, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639.

Attorney error rising to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute cause to set aside procedural default. Franklin v. Gilmore, 188 F.3d 877, 883 (7th Cir.1999) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753-54, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Barnhill v. Flannigan, 42 F.3d 1074, 1078 (7th Cir.1994)). When a habeas petitioner seeks to excuse a procedural default through an ineffective-assistance claim, the “cause” and “prejudice” test from Wainwright is replaced by the similar test for ineffective assistance set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 479, 106 S.Ct. 2639 (“So long as a defendant is represented by counsel whose performance is not constitutionally ineffective ... there is no inequity in requiring him to bear the risk of attorney error that results in a procedural default.”); see also Lee, 328 F.3d at 900.

“To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the [petitioner] must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the [petitioner].” Almonacid v. United States, 476 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir.2007) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 ). A “constitutionally deficient performance is one that falls below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Shell v. United States, 448 F.3d 951, 954-55 (7th Cir.2006) (citing Granada v. United States, 51 F.3d 82, 83 (7th Cir.1995)). And to show prejudice, the defendant must prove that “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” Raygoza v. Hulick, 474 F.3d 958, 963 (7th Cir.2007) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). In Wrinkles’s case, if his attorneys’ decision not to object to the stun belt fell short of objectively reasonable performance and prejudiced him, the Sixth Amendment was not satisfied and this court will excuse Wrinkles’s procedural default.

Wrinkles’s ineffective-assistance claim was preserved for collateral review. Lee, 328 F.3d at 901 (citing Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000)). The Indiana Supreme Court reached — and ultimately rejected — Wrinkles’s claim as an excuse for his procedural default. In reviewing the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision, we are deferential towards its legal and factual conclusions. Raygoza, 474 F.3d at 963; Neumann v. Jordan, 84 F.3d 985, 987 (7th Cir.1996) (“In reviewing the state court proceedings, we presume that the factual findings of the state court are correct if those findings follow a hearing on the merits and are fairly supported by the record.”). Likewise, the Indiana Supreme Court’s legal conclusions will be upheld unless they resulted in a decision that was “(1) contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. Substandard performance by counsel

Wrinkles argues, and we agree, that his counsel’s performance at trial fell below prevailing norms of professional behavior. The Indiana Supreme Court correctly identified Strickland as the governing law; thus, Wrinkles will only gain relief if the court unreasonably applied the standard to the facts of his case. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). In evaluating the reasonableness of the Indiana Supreme Court’s application of Strickland, we must ask whether the court was “objectively unreasonable,” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), meaning that its reasoning falls outside of the “ ‘boundaries of permissible differences of opinion.’ ” Raygoza, 474 F.3d at 964 (quoting Hardaway v. Young, 302 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir.2002)).

The Indiana Supreme Court held that Wrinkles’s counsels’ decision not to object to the stun belt at trial was strategic and thus adequate. The supreme court first noted that the Indiana trial court had a stated “policy” of “requiring defendants to wear restraints regardless of whether they have previously exhibited any conduct justifying restraints.” Wrinkles II, 749 N.E.2d at 1195. The trial court had given Wrinkles’s attorneys the choice of wearing shackles or the stun belt at trial. Because they thought that “the chance of the jury seeing the shackles was fairly high,” Wrinkles’s attorneys chose the stun belt. Id. The supreme court characterized this as a “strategic decision” because, unlike shackles, Wrinkles’s attorneys “thought the jurors would not be able to see” the belt. Id. In addition, because the trial court would have overruled any objection to the stun belt — per its stated restraint “policy” — Wrinkles could not demonstrate that his trial would have been any different if his attorneys had objected. Id. (“[E]ven though the trial court’s policy would not likely withstand appellate scrutiny if the issue were presented, it is apparent that at least at the time of Wrinkles’s trial, an objection to wearing restraints would not have been sustained by the trial judge even if made.”). Thus, the supreme court concluded, the decision was strategic and Wrinkles could not show a substandard performance by his trial counsel. We disagree.

At the time of Wrinkles’s trial, it was well established that a trial court could not restrain a criminal defendant absent a particularized justification. In Illinois v. Allen, the Supreme Court held that a defendant could forfeit his Sixth Amendment right to be present and unrestrained at his own trial. 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). The Court sanctioned the use of physical restraints “as a last resort,” id. at 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, and articulated a framework for handling “obstreperous” defendants that tied the trial court’s response to the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct, id. at 343-42, 90 S.Ct. 1057. The Court applied this framework next in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976), in which the defendant appeared before the jury in prison garb. Unlike Allen, which recognized “the substantial need to impose physical restraints upon contumacious defendants,” the Court in Estelle decided that forcing “an accused to wear jail clothing further[ed] no essential state policy.” Id. at 505, 96 S.Ct. 1691.

Again in Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986), the Supreme Court applied this framework when evaluating the presence of armed guards at a defendant’s trial. The Court concluded that the presence of armed guards was not the “sort of inherently prejudicial practice that, like shackling, should be permitted only where justified by an essential state interest specific to each trial.” Id. at 568-69, 106 S.Ct. 1340. The need for a particularized justification had not gone unnoticed by Indiana courts either. The Indiana Supreme Court held in Coates v. State, that particularized reasoning must support a decision to restrain a defendant, going so far as to require that “the facts and reasoning supporting the trial judge’s determination that restraints are necessary must be placed on the record.” 487 N.E.2d 167, 168-69 (Ind.1985).

In Wrinkles’s case, his attorneys did not object to the use of the stun belt because they concluded that the trial court was going to require restraints no matter what. But these cases make clear that particularized reasoning must support any decision to restrain a defendant. In light of the wealth of caselaw prohibiting the trial court’s blanket policy, by standing mute, Wrinkles’s counsel failed to provide adequate legal assistance. Failing to object when a trial court presents two impermissible options — shackles or a stun belt, neither supported by individualized justification — cannot be an objectively reasonable tack under prevailing norms of professional behavior. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (“Counsel, however, can also deprive a defendant of the right to effective assistance, simply by failing to render ‘adequate legal assistance.’ ”); see also Barrow v. Uchtman, 398 F.3d 597, 605 (7th Cir.2005) (holding ignorance of relevant law objectively deficient under Strickland); Dixon v. Snyder, 266 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir.2001) (same). Counsels’ choice between two unconstitutional options is not a strategic choice worth defer-enee. Accordingly, the Indiana Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland’s first prong.

2. Prejudice

Standing alone, the attorneys’ failure to request an inquiry into the justification for the stun belt is not ineffective assistance. Some prejudice is required before a trial counsel’s performance falls below the constitutional minimum. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-692, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Without demonstrating prejudice, Wrinkles cannot receive relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, id., or on the basis of his freestanding constitutional claims regarding the stun belt, because the latter claim was procedurally defaulted at the state level.

Wrinkles argues that he was prejudiced because, in his opinion, the jurors were aware that he was restrained by the stun belt and were thus more inclined to view him as a dangerous person. In turn, he argues, the jurors were more likely to determine that he had the requisite mindset to commit murder, instead of a lesser crime, and were more willing to vote for the death penalty. If the jurors did see the stun belt during trial, then Wrinkles could demonstrate prejudice. See Allen, 397 U.S. at 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057; Roche, 291 F.3d at 482-83; Harrell v. Israel, 672 F.2d 632, 635 (7th Cir.1982) (“[Cjourts must guard against practices which unnecessarily mark the defendants as a dangerous character or suggest that his guilt is a foregone conclusion.”). Thus, Wrinkles’s habeas petition hinges on the belt’s visibility; the belt’s visibility is a question of fact that was resolved by the state post-conviction court and upheld by the Indiana Supreme Court.

The post-conviction court determined that Wrinkles had not demonstrated that the jurors had seen the stun belt or that Wrinkles had otherwise been affected by it. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the post-conviction court. Wrinkles contends, however, that the supreme court made an implicit factual finding that the belt was visible to the jury. He bases his argument on a statement in Wrinkles II that indicates that Wrinkles’s attorneys “were later proven wrong.”⁴ This sentence follows the court’s discussion of the attorneys’ decision not to challenge the trial court’s imposition of the stun belt-restraint:

Before trial began, the trial court informed counsel that Wrinkles would have to wear either shackles or a stun belt during trial. Without objection counsel chose a stun belt, and Wrinkles claims they rendered ineffective assistance as a result. We disagree. Although with this opinion we declare that stun belts no longer have a place in Indiana courtrooms, that was not the case at the time of Wrinkles’ trial. Our prohibition is motivated primarily by the potential effect a stun belt may have upon the person wearing the device. However, without the benefit of this declaration, counsel were concerned about the effect on the jurors if they were to observe their client wearing a particular device. Counsel believed that the chance of the jury seeing the shackles was fairly high. On the other hand, counsel opted for the stun belt because they thought that jurors would not be able to see it. Obviously, they were later proven wrong. However, at the time the decision was made, it was a prudent one.

Wrinkles II, 749 N.E.2d at 1195.

Wrinkles believes the “Obviously, they were later proven wrong” sentence amounts to a finding of fact by the Indiana Supreme Court that the jurors saw the stun belt. We disagree with that interpretation of the sentence. To begin, we do not believe the Indiana Supreme Court would have made a factual finding in this manner, especially as it affirmed the post-conviction court and did not overturn any of the post-conviction court’s factual findings. More importantly, we do not read this statement to reveal anything about the stun belt’s visibility. Rather, the statement reflects the Indiana Supreme Court’s opinion that Wrinkles’s attorneys could not be faulted for having taken into account only the potential visibility of a particular restraint in deciding whether to object to a court’s use of the restraint — because Indiana law at the time focused on the harm stemming from visible restraints.

a. Indiana law on factual findings

In the “deferential and limited review” of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, “state court factual findings are presumed correct.” Williams v. Bartow, 481 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir.2007). On the issue of the belt’s visibility, the state post-conviction court considered three juror affidavits, affidavits from the trial bailiff, and testimony from Wrinkles’s attorneys to decide whether the jurors saw or knew about the stun belt. The court discredited the juror affidavits. The affidavit of one juror stated that at the time she served on the jury, she was aware that Wrinkles was wearing a stun belt — she said it “looked like a cumberbund [sic].” However, she said she was unsure how she learned of the stun belt, and that she may have learned of it through a newspaper article she read after the trial. Another juror said in his affidavit that he was aware that Wrinkles was wearing a stun belt during his trial, and that he believed the trial judge told the jurors about the stun belt to give the jurors confidence in their safety. A third juror, in contrast, said that he thought the bailiff told the jury about the stun belt, but he said the jury was not told why Wrinkles was wearing the belt. The post-conviction court held that the affidavits were insufficient because they were inconsistent with each other — calling into question their credibility — and because they contradicted the bailiffs testimony, as* well as Wrinkles’s attorneys’ testimony. The bailiff swore in his affidavit that he “never communicated to any of the jurors at any time during the trial that [Wrinkles] was wearing a rack belt.”

After it had rendered its judgment denying Wrinkles’s request for post-conviction relief, the post-conviction court denied Wrinkles’s subsequent motion to correct error, motion to reopen the evidence, and request for leave to amend his petition for post-conviction relief. Wrinkles proffered with each of these pleadings copies of four more juror affidavits. (A fifth affidavit was attached to a motion to supplement the motion to reopen the evidence.) However, these affidavits were never admitted into evidence by the post-conviction court, and there is no indication whatsoever that the Indiana Supreme Court weighed the additional affidavits as part of its analysis in Wrinkles II.

Notably, Wrinkles did not raise as issues on appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court the post-conviction court’s denial of his post-judgment motions and request for leave to amend his petition based on the additional juror affidavits. In Indiana, a motion to correct error does not allow a party to present evidence it merely neglected to present at trial, Roach v. State, 695 N.E.2d 934, 940 n. 1 (Ind.1998), and a motion to reopen the evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge, Walker v. State, 587 N.E.2d 675, 677 (Ind.1992). A judge typically does not abuse his discretion in refusing to reopen evidence “when it plainly appears that such evidence could have been offered earlier,” Preuss v. McWilliams, 141 Ind.App. 602, 230 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ind.Ct.App.1967), or when the proffered evidence is cumulative, Oxendine v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., Inc., 423 N.E.2d 612, 623 (Ind.Ct.App.1980). The additional affidavits Wrinkles sought to have admitted into the evidentiary record of the post-conviction court were never admitted — they remain mere attachments to state-court motions and thus should not form the basis of a federal habeas decision.

Having not appealed the post-conviction court’s refusal to admit the additional affidavits into evidence, Wrinkles’s reliance on the additional affidavits in his post-conviction appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court seems analogous to the petitioner’s reliance on similar affidavits in Patton v. State, 537 N.E.2d 513 (Ind.Ct.App.1989). In Patton, the petitioner felt that because his attorney had failed to present the evidence to the trial court, “he should be allowed to present it by affidavits with his Motion to Correct Errors.” Id. at 516. The Indiana Court of Appeals explained that Indiana Trial Rule 59(H)(1), dealing with motions to correct error, “was not designed for this purpose.” Id. The Patton court went on to conclude that the affidavits “were not properly before the trial court as evidence outside the record” — they did not qualify as newly discovered evidence and Patton had neglected to submit them at trial. Id. Because the affidavits were not properly before the Indiana Court of Appeals, the Patton court declared: “we cannot consider them in reviewing the trial court’s action.” /¿.(emphasis added).

If under state law the Indiana Supreme Court would not have looked at the additional affidavits in its direct review of the post-conviction court’s findings, see Roach, 695 N.E.2d at 940 n. 1; Walker, 587 N.E.2d at 677; Preuss, 230 N.E.2d at 792, certainly we are not at liberty to weigh them on collateral review under § 2254, where our review is limited to arguments that were adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and arguments that were not procedurally defaulted, id. § 2254(b). Here, Wrinkles did not appeal the post-conviction court’s refusal to admit the additional affidavits into evidence. Absent a reversal of the post-conviction court’s rulings on these affidavits by the Indiana Supreme Court, and absent any indication by the Wrinkles II court that it nonetheless decided to consider the additional affidavits, we are not free to engage in an independent assessment of the affidavits’ weight and the affiants’ credibility.

The Wrinkles II opinion itself suggests that the Indiana Supreme Court adopted the post-conviction court’s findings of fact in toto. The supreme court acknowledged the post-conviction court’s factual findings and identified the standard of review called for under Indiana law:

In the present case, the post-conviction court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana PosWConvietion Rule 1(6). A post-conviction court’s findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error — that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

Wrinkles II, 749 N.E.2d at 1188. After reviewing the post-conviction court’s findings and conclusions of law with respect to each of Wrinkles’s arguments on appeal, the Wrinkles II court ultimately declared that Wrinkles “failed to prove that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the post-conviction court.” Id. at 1203. It then affirmed the post-conviction court’s denial of Wrinkles’s petition for relief. Id.

The Wrinkles II court did not reverse the findings of the post-conviction court, either explicitly or implicitly. The Indiana Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that a post-conviction court’s findings of fact are accepted unless “clearly erroneous,” and that the “postconviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses.” Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind.2004); Davidson v. State, 763 N.E.2d 441, 444 (Ind.2002); Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 1208, 1210 (Ind.1998) (emphasis added); see also Stewart v. State, 517 N.E.2d 1230, 1231 (Ind.1988) (“The judge who presides over the post-conviction hearing possesses exclusive authority to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses. The reviewing court will therefore not set aside the trial court’s ruling on a post-conviction petition unless the evidence is without conflict and leads solely to a result different from that reached by the trial court.”) (emphasis added). The Indiana Supreme Court in Wrinkles II did not suggest in any way that it considered the additional affidavits that had never been admitted into the evidentiary record. Nor did the court say it was engaging in a de novo re-weighing of the evidence in Wrinkles II — indeed it appears it would not have done so as a matter of Indiana law. See Fisher, 810 N.E.2d at 679; Davidson, 763 N.E.2d at 444; Woods, 701 N.E.2d at 1210. Finally, nothing in the Wrinkles II opinion indicates that the Indiana Supreme Court was overturning the post-conviction court’s factual findings, or that those findings were clearly erroneous.

b. Our reading of “Obviously, they were later proven wrong.”

Despite a degree of ambiguity surrounding the “Obviously, they were later proven wrong” sentence in Wrinkles II, we conclude that the Indiana Supreme Court was commenting on the process by which Wrinkles’s attorneys decided not to object to the stun-belt restraint — as opposed to commenting on the belt’s visibility. In the disputed passage, the court first explained that it had just invalidated the use of stun belts based on a type of prejudice unavailable to Wrinkles’s counsel at the time of trial — the “potential effect . \. upon the person wearing the device.” The court then set out the choice of restraint facing Wrinkles’s attorneys at trial in light of the only theory of prejudice then available— the “effect on the jurors.” Lastly, the court explained why, based on this latter theory of prejudice, counsel’s decision to choose the stun belt was a “prudent one” even though the attorneys were “later proven wrong” to examine their choice solely based on “the effect on the jurors.”

In rejecting Wrinkles’s claim that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel, the court stated, in relevant part:

Before trial began, the trial court informed counsel that Wrinkles would have to wear either shackles or a stun belt during trial. Without objection counsel chose a stun belt, and Wrinkles claims they rendered ineffective assistance as a result. We disagree. Although with this opinion we declare that stun belts no longer have a place in Indiana courtrooms, that was not the case at the time of Wrinkles’ trial. Our prohibition is motivated primarily by the potential effect a stun belt may have upon the person wearing the device. However, without the benefit of this declaration, counsel were concerned about the effect on the jurors if they were to observe their client wearing a particular device. Counsel believed that the chance of the jury seeing the shackles was fairly high. On the other hand, counsel opted for the stun belt because they thought the jurors would not be able to see it. Obviously, they were later proven wrong. However, at the time the decision was made, it was a prudent one.

Wrinkles II, 749 N.E.2d at 1195 (citations omitted).

The last few sentences of this quoted section — particularly the sentence “[ojbvi-ously, they were later proven wrong” — are not entirely unproblematic. One could read this second-to-last sentence as referring back to the court’s statement that “the jurors would not be able to see it,” with the “it” referring to the stun belt. So read, this could be seen as an implicit finding that the jurors had in fact seen the stun belt and that Wrinkles’s attorneys “were later proven wrong” about their contrary assumption. In turn, this would suggest that the stun belt may have prejudiced the defendant.

We cannot conclude that this is the appropriate reading for two reasons: (1) the quoted section is more consistent with a discussion of the choice facing Wrinkles’s attorneys in light of the then-established prejudice associated with restraints; and (2) Indiana law as well as subsequent guidance by the Indiana Supreme Court sheds light on the more plausible reading. Parsing the above-quoted section, the paragraph begins:

Before trial began, the trial court informed counsel that Wrinkles would have to wear either shackles or a stun belt during trial. Without objection counsel chose a stun belt, and Wrinkles claims they rendered ineffective assistance as a result. We disagree. Although with this opinion we declare that stun belts no longer have a place in Indiana courtrooms, that was not the case at the time of Wrinkles’ trial.

749 N.E.2d at 1195. The issue before the court was whether Wrinkles’s counsel “rendered ineffective assistance” when “[wjithout objection counsel chose a stun belt” after “the trial court informed counsel that Wrinkles would have to wear either shackles or a stun belt during trial.” In the immediately preceding paragraphs of the opinion, the supreme court had just held that “stun belts no longer ha[d] a place in Indiana courtrooms.” But this did not end the inquiry because “that was not the case at the time of Wrinkles’ trial,” when the counsel rendered their assistance. In prospectively banning stun belts, the court had relied on a form-of prejudice that was unproven at the time of Wrinkles’s trial. The supreme court continued:

Our prohibition is motivated primarily by the potential effect a stun belt may have upon the person wearing the device. However, without the benefit of this declaration, counsel were concerned about the effect on the jurors if they were to observe their client wearing a particular device.

Id. In Wrinkles II, the court reasoned that the prejudice from a stun belt resulted not from the jury being able to see the defendant in restraints, but from “the potential effect a stun belt may have upon the person wearing the device.” This form of prejudice marked a departure from preexisting case law, which had only discussed prejudice in terms of the defendant’s visibility before the jury in restraints. Id. at 1193-95; see also Stephenson v. Indiana, 864 N.E.2d 1022, 1029, 1032 (Ind.2007) (discussing reasonableness of counsel’s choice “given that the case law addressing the issue had largely focused on the visibility of the restraint, and not, as Wrinkles later pointed out, on the belt’s potential effect on the defendant’s demeanor and ability to participate in the defense”). Understandably then, “without the benefit of this declaration, [Wrinkles’s] counsel were concerned” instead with the more established form of prejudice associated with restraints: “the effect on the jurors if they were to observe their client wearing a particular device.”

The question then became whether effective counsel would have accounted for the new form of prejudice just identified in banning stun belts. But the supreme court said no; the failure to object was not ineffective assistance. In reaching this conclusion, the court first recreated the decision facing Wrinkles’s counsel in choosing the restraint to be used:

Counsel believed that the chance of the jury seeing the shackles was fairly high. On the other hand, counsel opted for the stun belt because they thought the jurors would not be able to see it.

Wrinkles II, 749 N.E.2d at 1195. In other words, after assuming that they need only consider the effect on the jurors, the attorneys chose the stun belt because it posed the least risk of being seen by the jurors when compared to the shackles.

Immediately following the court’s articulation of these two options and the rationale behind the attorneys’ choice, the court continued,

Obviously they were later proven wrong. However, at the time the decision was made, it was a prudent one.

Id. This first sentence refers back to the court’s statement that “counsel opted for the stun belt because they thought the jurors would not be able to see it.” Wrinkles’s attorneys opted for the form of restraint that they thought would minimize prejudice — the “effect on the jurors.” But the court had just held that its decision was instead “motivated primarily by the potential effect a stun belt may have upon the person wearing the device,” not the “effect on the jurors.” Thus, “[o]bviously, they were later proven wrong” to have evaluated the choice of restraint through the lens of juror-prejudice alone. Nonetheless, because the attorneys could not be faulted for failing to predict the form of prejudice announced in Wrinkles II, “at the time the decision was made, it was a prudent one.”

Placing Wrinkles II within the larger context of Indiana law — both procedural law and a subsequent interpretation laid out by the Indiana Supreme Court — reinforces this reading. When reviewing a state-court decision in federal courts, the resolution of potentially dispositive ambiguities occasioned by a state-court finding should be resolved, where possible, by reference to that state’s law. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982) (direct review); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978) (collateral review); Rivera v. Sheriff of Cook County, 162 F.3d 486, 489 (7th Cir.1998) (collateral review post-AEDPA). Thus, in an analogous situation, the Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to examine the state’s procedural law closely, or to certify questions to the state’s highest court when necessary, Greene, 437 U.S. at 26 n. 8, 27, 98 S.Ct. 2151, or to examine subsequent decisions that may shed some light on the issue at hand, Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 46-47, 102 S.Ct. 2211.

Here, Indiana procedural law and a subsequent supreme court decision support the conclusion that the above reading of Wrinkles II is the proper one. First, as discussed above, it is implausible to view the “Obviously” statement as an implicit factual finding by the the supreme court. Under Indiana law, the supreme court would not have examined additional affidavits contained in a motion to correct error. And the rest of Wrinkles II is more consistent with a blanket affirmance than with an affirmance despite a factual finding contrary to the post-conviction court’s. This latter scenario is especially unlikely given that the supreme court was reviewing only for clear error.

But more importantly, this court must credit the Indiana Supreme Court’s later interpretation of Wrinkles II in resolving the ambiguity contained in the disputed passage. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 46-47, 102 S.Ct. 2211 (“Any ambiguity in Tibbs I ... was resolved by the Florida Supreme Court in Tibbs II,” which “binds this Court.”). Although it is not often that an ensuing state supreme court decision affects a disputed finding in a previous decision, it is not unprecedented. This scenario arises with some regularity when reviewing whether a defendant’s retrial following a state appellate court’s reversal of a conviction raises double jeopardy concerns. And defendants frequently raise these claims before federal courts on collateral review. See, e.g., Rivera, 162 F.3d at 489. If the state appellate court reversed because the evidence in the first trial was insufficient, double jeopardy attached and retrial is improper. But if the appellate court reversed simply because the defendant’s first conviction was against the “weight of the evidence,” the defendant’s retrial is constitutional. In deciding which basis the state appellate court relied on in reversing, federal courts must often parse the appellate court’s decision against the backdrop of the state’s procedural law and ensuing case law. Id. (“[Sjtate courts should themselves determine the right way to understand their pronouncements.”).

A scenario comparable to the case at hand presented itself to the Supreme Court in Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. at 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211. There, the Florida Supreme Court’s first decision reversing Tibbs’s conviction did not obviously rest on either the “insufficiency” or the “weight of the evidence.” But a second Florida Supreme Court opinion following Tibbs’s retrial clarified matters; the earlier reversal had been based on the “weight of the evidence.” One issue before the Supreme Court on appeal from this latter decision was whether the initial reversal had been based instead on the “weight of the evidence.” The Supreme Court affirmed the defendant’s conviction following retrial, noting that the Florida Supreme Court’s “construction of its prior opinion binds this Court.” Id. at 46-47, 102 S.Ct. 2211. Because “[a]ny ambiguity in Tibbs I ... was resolved by the Florida Supreme Court in Tibbs II,” id., the Court had to give effect to the decision — meaning that the defendant’s retrial had been proper.

In Stephenson v. Indiana, 864 N.E.2d 1022 (Ind.2007), the Indiana Supreme Court provided similar guidance. In Stephenson, the court compared the decision made by Wrinkles’s counsel in choosing the stun belt with the same decision made by Stephenson’s during his trial. In so doing, the court explained its rationale in Wrinkles II:

At the time of Stephenson’s trial in 1996 and 1997, no Indiana ruling had addressed the use of stun belts. As in Wrinkles, counsel cannot be faulted for selecting the belt over more visible shackles, given that the case law addressing the issue had largely focused on the visibility of the restraint, and not, as Wrinkles later pointed out, on the belt’s potential effect on the defendant’s demeanor and ability to participate in the defense.

Id. at 1032. The court went on to characterize the decision made by Wrinkles’s attorneys as a “tactical decision.” The “only real issue” in Wrinkles’s trial was sentencing, so “[t]he decision to challenge the belt [there] arguably fell into the tactical range, balancing the likelihood of success against the risk of alienating the judge by challenging an announced ‘policy.’ ” Id. Because in Stephenson’s case, guilt was “vigorously disputed,” a “tactical” classification could not apply. The- court went on to hold that the “use of a stun belt, if perceived by the jury, produces all the results that shackling does.” After a careful examination of the post-conviction record, the Stephenson court concluded that the jurors had been aware of the stun belt. Nonetheless, the court upheld Stephenson’s convictions and death sentence because he had not demonstrated the requisite amount of “prejudice” to establish his ineffective-assistance claim.

This discussion of Wrinkles II in Stephenson indicates that the above reading is the appropriate one. The section discussing the Wrinkles II decision tracks the Indiana Supreme Court’s reasoning in the exact manner discussed above. The court recreated the decision facing Wrinkles’s attorneys in light of the established form of prejudice at the time. The court again recognized that Wrinkles’s attorneys viewed their decision at trial in light of the “visibility of the restraint,” and not the “belt’s potential effect" on the defendant’s demeanor and ability to participate -in the defense.” And just as it had in Wrinkles II, the court concluded that Wrinkles’s counsel could not be faulted for failing to predict the prejudice the court would credit in banning the stun belt.

Even with the benefit of this reading, the Indiana Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland in evaluating Wrinkles’s attorneys’ performance in Wrinkles II. The failure to object itself fell below what is expected under professional norms, regardless of the theory of prejudice. A blanket policy of restraint cannot be squared with the case law at the time of trial. But notwithstanding the propriety of the court’s conclusion, it is evident that the court did not make a finding that the jurors had seen the stun belt. Instead, the court in Wrinkles II was reconstructing the decision made by Wrinkles’s counsel based on the then-established form of prejudice associated with the stun belt.

In light of the nature of the court’s reasoning in Wrinkles II, the discussion in Stephenson, and the implausibility under Indiana law of the Indiana Supreme Court making implicit factual findings, we conclude that the Indiana Supreme Court did not make a finding of fact that the jurors had seen the stun belt. The controlling findings of facts are those set forth by the state post-conviction court and adopted by the Wrinkles II court. These findings of fact determined that the jury did not see the stun belt. Additionally, Wrinkles has not presented us- with any evidence to demonstrate that the stun belt affected his abilities to properly participate in his own defense. Without evidence that the jurors saw the stun belt, or that he was otherwise affected by the stun belt throughout trial, Wrinkles cannot demonstrate prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. He therefore cannot show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, so he cannot demonstrate the requisite cause and prejudice necessary to overcome his procedural default. Guest, 474 F.3d at 930. Thus, this Court is procedurally barred from examining his freestanding stun-belt claim and must deny the writ.

III. Conclusion

The decision of the district court is Affirmed.

2 . Wrinkles also seeks an expansion of the C.A. to include his non-stun-belt ineffective-assistance-of-counsel arguments. For the reasons stated by the district court, we deny his request to expand the C.A. to include the additional claims on appeal. See Herrera v. United States, 96 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir.1996).

3 . The Supreme Court has recognized an additional way to avoid procedural default if the default would result in a "fundamental miscarriage!] of justice.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). See generally 6 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure 64-65 (2d ed.2004). A miscarriage of justice exists in the "extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639. In the capital context, one can show "actual innocence” through "clear and convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state law.” Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992). Wrinkles has not, and cannot, make any claim of innocence. As for his sentence, although Wrinkles has not raised this issue, this analysis closely mirrors our analysis under the prejudice prong of Strickland.

4 . Wrinkles also claims that the Indiana Supreme Court recognized that the stun belt was "conspicuous to at least seven jurors.” However, Wrinkles takes this quotation in Wrinkles II out of context. The full sentence is one of three in a paragraph the Indiana Supreme Court uses solely to summarize Wrinkles's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument with respect to the stun belt. The entire sentence reads: “Wrinkles asserts that utilization of the stun belt, which was conspicuous to at least seven jurors, undermined his presumption of innocence and made him appear dangerous and uncontrollable in front of the jurors who would help decide whether he would live or die.” Wrinkles II, 749 N.E.2d at 1192 (citing Appellant's Br. at 29; Appellant's Reply Br. at 11). The sentence begins with “Wrinkles asserts.” The preceding sentence in the paragraph, which introduces Wrinkles’s argument, begins with, “Wrinkles contends.” The subsequent sentence starts with, "He claims.” Taken in context, it is clear that the Indiana Supreme Court was merely presenting Wrinkles's argument, including his argument that the belt was visible to seven jurors.

We cannot fathom the notion that, in the middle of three paraphrasing sentences, the Wrinkles II court would have perfunctorily inserted a clause containing a factual finding, without indicating it as such. Courts often present a party's argument in order to present the issue it will proceed to consider, and it is apparent that the Indiana Supreme Court was doing this in Wrinkles II. Consequently, we reject Wrinkles’s argument that this clause is a finding of fact by the Wrinkles II court that the stun belt was visible to jurors.