Wright v. Stover

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedSeptember 2, 2021
Docket3:21-cv-00479
StatusUnknown

This text of Wright v. Stover (Wright v. Stover) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wright v. Stover, (S.D. Ill. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

BRIAN WRIGHT, #Y27977, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 21-cv-00479-JPG ) SARAH STOVER and ) WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER GILBERT, District Judge: Plaintiff Brian Wright, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) who is currently incarcerated at Western Illinois Correctional Center (“WICC”), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the Complaint, Plaintiff claims that he was denied medical treatment for a serious knee injury he sustained at Lawrence Correctional Center on or around May 16, 2019. (Doc. 1). When he reported the injury to Nurse Stover, she misdiagnosed Plaintiff’s patellar tendon tear as arthritis. She issued him crutches and Tylenol and disregarded his ongoing complaints of pain. When he transferred to WICC in July 2019, Plaintiff learned that he actually required urgent knee surgery in May 2019. Because he did not receive it, Plaintiff required two surgeries and “cadaver parts” to restore function. (Id.). Plaintiff now seeks money damages from Nurse Stover and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (Wexford). (Id.). The Complaint is subject to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Section 1915A requires the Court to screen prisoner complaints and filter out non-meritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations are liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). Discussion Based on the allegations summarized above, the Court finds it convenient to designate the following claim in the pro se Complaint:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim against Nurse Stover for denying or delaying Plaintiff adequate medical treatment for his patellar injury at Lawrence in 2019.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim against Wexford for denying or delaying Plaintiff adequate medical treatment for his patellar injury at Lawrence in 2019.

Any claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed herein is considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly.1 Count 1 A prison medical staff member violates the Eighth Amendment when he or she responds with deliberate indifference to an objectively serious medical condition. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). The decision to ignore a medical condition that is obviously in need of treatment supports a claim of deliberate indifference. Dixon v. County of Cook, 819 F.3d 343, 350 (7th Cir. 2016) (deliberate indifference claim stated against prison physician and nurse who knew of prisoner’s chest tumor but offered only non-prescription pain medication and discharged him from the prison’s hospital). The decision to delay surgery can also rise to the level of deliberate indifference, depending on the seriousness of the medical condition, the ease of providing treatment, and the pain resulting from the delay. Burns v. Fenoglio, 525 F. App’x 512 (7th Cir. 2013) (eight month delay in performing surgery to remove painful hip tumor supported

1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). claim of deliberate indifference at summary judgment); Smith v. Knox Cnty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Even a few days’ delay in addressing severely painful but readily treatable condition suffices to state a claim of deliberate indifference”). The allegations support a deliberate indifference claim against Nurse Stover for disregarding or delaying diagnosis and treatment of Plaintiff’s patellar injury. Count 1 shall receive further review against the nurse.

Count 2 Wexford is a private corporation that employs medical staff to provide inmate medical care at prisons. Presumably, Plaintiff named Wexford as a defendant for this reason, although he does not explain why. The corporation cannot be liable on this basis alone. Respondeat superior liability is not recognized under § 1983. Shields v. Illinois Dept. of Corr., 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Iskander v. Village of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982)). Wexford is only subject to liability for deliberate indifference if an unconstitutional policy or practice of the corporation caused the constitutional deprivation. Because Plaintiff identifies no policy or custom attributable to the private corporation, Count 2 against Wexford shall be dismissed without

prejudice. Pending Motion Plaintiff’s Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3) is DENIED without prejudice. See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (articulating factors court considers when evaluating motions for counsel). An indigent plaintiff seeking representation by court-recruited counsel must demonstrate: (a) reasonable efforts to locate counsel on his own; and (b) an inability to litigate the matter without representation. Id. Plaintiff discloses no efforts to find an attorney on his own. He should attempt to find counsel by contacting at least three (3) attorneys or law firms and then providing the court with evidence of his efforts. Plaintiff also discloses no significant impediments to self-representation. He has received some college education and demonstrated his ability to prepare and file coherent pleadings to date. Although his request for counsel is denied at this time, he may renew this request by filing a new motion if he deems it necessary to do so as the case proceeds. Disposition

IT IS ORDERED that the Complaint (Doc. 1) survives screening. COUNT 1 is subject to further review against Defendant SARAH STOVER, and COUNT 2 is DISMISSED without prejudice against WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to TERMINATE Wexford Health Sources, Inc. as a party in CM/ECF and ENTER the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. With regard to COUNT 1, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendant SARAH STOVER: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint (Doc. 1), and this Memorandum and Order to Defendant’s place of employment

as identified by Plaintiff.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Anthony N. Smith v. Knox County Jail
666 F.3d 1037 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Donald F. Greeno v. George Daley
414 F.3d 645 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)
Pruitt v. Mote
503 F.3d 647 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service
577 F.3d 816 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Earnest D. Shields v. Illinois Department of Correct
746 F.3d 782 (Seventh Circuit, 2014)
Kevin Dixon v. Cook County, Illinois
819 F.3d 343 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
Burns v. Fenoglio
525 F. App'x 512 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)

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Bluebook (online)
Wright v. Stover, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wright-v-stover-ilsd-2021.