Wright v. State Accident Insurance Fund

709 P.2d 755, 76 Or. App. 479, 1985 Ore. App. LEXIS 4300
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedNovember 20, 1985
DocketWCB No. 80-11470; CA A32668
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 709 P.2d 755 (Wright v. State Accident Insurance Fund) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wright v. State Accident Insurance Fund, 709 P.2d 755, 76 Or. App. 479, 1985 Ore. App. LEXIS 4300 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).

Opinion

WARREN, J.

Claimant seeks review of a Workers’ Compensation Board order which held that the Evaluation Division had no jurisdiction to determine the extent of disability due to his pulmonary condition.

Claimant, a firefighter, filed a claim for compensation due to chest pains which prevented him from working. There apparently arose a question as to whether his condition was physical or psychological in origin. SAIF denied the claim; the referee determined that it was compensable and that he qualified under the “fireman’s presumption.”

Pending SAIF’s appeal to the Board on the compensability question, the Workers’ Compensation Department issued a determination order awarding 25 percent permanent partial disability for psychological illness. The Board upheld the referee’s order as to compensability. On SAIF’s petition for review, we reversed, holding that the “fireman’s presumption” had been overcome by the evidence. Wright v. SAIF, 43 Or App 279, 602 P2d 1086 (1979). Our decision was reversed by the Supreme Court, Wright v. SAIF, 289 Or 323, 613 P2d 755 (1980), and on remand we affirmed the Board. 48 Or App 867, 618 P2d 18 (1980). Shortly thereafter, claimant filed a request for a hearing on the issue of the extent of physical disability due to the pulmonary condition. The referee held that he was permanently and totally disabled but then vacated her order and remanded the claim to the Evaluation Division for the issuance of a determination order. On SAIF’s and claimant’s petitions for review, the Board held that the Evaluation Division had no jurisdiction to rate or to consider the extent of claimant’s disability, because the department had already issued a determination order on extent of disability which was not timely appealed.1 The Board relied on SAIF v. Maddox, 295 Or 448, 667 P2d 529 (1983).

[482]*482Claimant asserts that there has been no determination of the extent of his physical disability, because, at the time the determination order was issued, the compensability of his condition was still under appeal. SAIF argues that the determination order awarding 25 percent disability for psychological illness also disposed of claimant’s contention that he suffered from a physical disability. We agree. He has filed only one claim. While the compensability of that claim was under appeal, the department issued a determination order on extent of disability based on all the information it had before it, including medical records pertinent to the physical component of his disability. Although the determination order did not separately address the physical component, it necessarily determined that all of claimant’s disability arising out of the claim was due to psychological illness. He is not entitled to a second determination order. Day v. SAIF, 63 Or App 722, 725, 665 P2d 1253 (1983).

In the alternative, claimant argues that he is entitled to a hearing on the determination order of May 3, 1979. He contends that the one-year limitation of ORS 656.268(6)2 was tolled pending SAIF’s appeal on the issue of compensability. In SAIF v. Maddox, supra, the Supreme Court held that the compensability of a claim need not be determined finally before the extent of disability may be litigated and that a determination of the extent of disability would not be stayed pending an appeal on compensability. The Board here relied on Maddox in holding that claimant was required to appeal the determination order. Although we do not agree that Maddox is directly applicable, we hold that by virtue of ORS 656.268(6) claimant was required to seek a hearing on the determination order within one year of its issuance. He did not do so.3

Affirmed.

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Related

Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Roller
737 P.2d 625 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1987)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
709 P.2d 755, 76 Or. App. 479, 1985 Ore. App. LEXIS 4300, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wright-v-state-accident-insurance-fund-orctapp-1985.