Wright v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: July 10, 2023
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2021-2072
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DEWAYNE WRIGHT,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-02072 (CJN)

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Dewayne Wright, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, challenges the Social

Security Administration’s determination that he is not disabled and is therefore ineligible for

disability insurance benefits. Before the Court are Wright’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal,

ECF No. 13, and the Acting Commissioner’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance, ECF No. 14.

For the reasons explained below, the Court denies Wright’s motion and grants the Acting

Commissioner’s.

Background

A. Statutory Framework

To qualify for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must

prove that he has (or had) a “disability” as defined in the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1); see 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.315(a)(3), 404.1505(a). A claimant has a disability if he is unable “to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a

continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a).

1 The impairment must be so severe that the claimant “is not only unable to do his previous work

but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20

C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). And a claimant must be disabled within the meaning of the Social Security

Act prior to his “date last insured.” Kyler v. Kijakazi, No. 19-cv-03334, 2022 WL 1165859, at *1

(D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2022) (quotation omitted); see 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.101.

The Administration’s evaluation of a disability claim is comprised of a five-step inquiry:

(1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work; (2) whether the claimant has a

severe physical or mental impairment; (3) whether the impairment equates to a listed disability in

Appendix 1 to the Commissioner’s regulations; (4) whether the claimant is able to return to their

past relevant work, despite suffering the impairment; and (5) whether the claimant can perform

any other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(a)(4), 404.1560(c). Before proceeding to the fourth step, the Administration

evaluates the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC)—“the most” a claimant “can still do”

despite his impairment—to determine if the claimant can do his past relevant work or other work.

Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1). If he can, the claimant is not disabled. See

id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)–(v).

B. Factual Background

Wright’s claim for disability benefits stems from a range of alleged psychological and

physical impairments. Wright’s alleged disability onset date is April 1, 2013, and his date last

insured is September 30, 2019. See Administrative Record (“AR”) at 20, 33, 192. Despite his

earlier alleged onset date, the record lacks any documentation of psychological or physical

2 treatment before 2019.

The first documented psychological treatment in the record is dated February 22, 2019,

when Wright was treated by psychiatrist Dr. Ajirioghene Igbide. Id. at 283–84. Wright reported

an extended history of depression but no past treatment for that condition. Id. at 283. He also

reported substantial alcohol use; at that point, he was drinking two to three half-pints of tequila

daily and would “[e]xperience withdrawals during periods of abstinence including several episodes

of withdrawal-associated seizures.” Id. Dr. Igbide diagnosed Wright with major depressive

disorder as well as alcohol use disorder and prescribed him an antidepressant medication. Id. at

284. Wright continued to see Dr. Igbide for medication management appointments through August

2020, and he reported improvements in his mood associated with reduced drinking. See id. at 291–

98, 373–82. Wright also underwent a consultative examination on September 19, 2019, by Dr.

Marisela Gomez, who noted a diagnosis of mental illness but described Wright as showing no

evidence of “hallucinations,” “delusions,” “impaired judgment,” or “significant memory

impairment.” Id. at 306–09.

As for his physical impairments, the earliest evidence in the record—and the only evidence

from before Wright’s date last insured—is from the same examination by Dr. Gomez. Dr. Gomez

diagnosed Wright with back pain with radiation into his hips and shoulders, left foot pain, bilateral

knee pain and swelling, and high blood pressure. Id. at 309.

Wright began treatment for his physical impairments after his date last insured (September

30, 2019). On January 22, 2020, primary care physician Dr. Edwin Williams saw Wright for a

physical exam and noted medical conditions including hypertension, hyperlipidemia, arthritis in

his right knee, gastro-esophageal reflux disease, depression, Stage 3 chronic kidney disease, and

alcoholism. Id. at 312–13. Dr. Williams also certified Wright’s disability on his application for a

3 disability parking placard, writing that Wright’s mobility was impaired by arthritis of the hips and

back. Id. at 316. The next month, Dr. Margaret MacKeever diagnosed Wright with rupture of the

left posterior tibialis tendon, and Dr. Nicholas Casscells diagnosed Wright with left lumbar

radiculopathy and posterior tibial tendonitis in the left leg. Id. at 318, 321, 326; Compl. Exs. at 4–

5, ECF No. 1-2.

In March 2020, Wright saw nephrologist Dr. Mohammad Khan for treatment related to his

chronic kidney disease. AR at 322–24. Dr. Bryan Murtaugh evaluated Wright’s lower back and

left ankle pain and diagnosed him with left lumbar radiculitis, and at a follow-up visit in May, Dr.

Murtaugh also diagnosed Wright with lumbar spondylosis. Id. at 360–63.

The following March, physician assistant Casey Baumgardner diagnosed Wright with

osteoarthritis with a medial meniscus tear in his left knee. Id. at 10. Due to advanced varus

tricompartmental degenerative arthritis in his left knee, Wright had knee replacement surgery in

April 2021. Compl. Exs. at 16–18. Follow-up reports by Dr. Casscells through July 2021 reflect

further diagnoses of gout and pes planovalgus. Id. at 8–10.

Finally, in February 2022, Dr. Esperanza Guillermety performed tests due to Wright’s

complaints of numbness in his hands and neck discomfort and assessed bilateral radiculopathies,

and Dr. Mark Lin diagnosed Wright with anesthesia of skin, cervical radiculopathy, spondylosis,

and monoclonal gammopathy. Pl.’s Mot. J. Reversal (“Pl.’s Mot.”) Exs. at 1–4, ECF No. 13-1.

C. Procedural History

Wright filed a protective worksheet on April 30, 2019, and a disability insurance benefits

application on May 2, 2019. AR at 162–68. He reported the following conditions: depression;

back injury; inability to stand for too long; arthritis; ankle injury; emotional disturbance; and

weight loss due to lack of appetite. Id. at 196. The Administration denied Wright’s application

4 on January 13, 2020, and later denied his request for reconsideration. Id. at 103–11.

Wright then requested a hearing before an administrative law judge and reported changes

to his medical conditions, including hallucinations; poor sleep; forgetfulness; anxiety; obsessive-

compulsive disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder; chronic kidney disease; back, knee, and leg

pain; stiffness and muscle spasms in his neck; and left knee and ankle swelling. Id. at 112, 214–

21, 224–32. On November 13, 2020, a hearing was held before an ALJ, who reviewed evidence

in the record and heard testimony from Wright and a vocational expert. Id. at 20, 38–77.

The ALJ issued his decision on December 11, 2020. Id. at 17–33. The ALJ determined

that, although Wright exhibited severe impairments of substance use disorder, depression, and

unspecified arthropathies, he did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met

or equaled the severity of a listed disability under the Act’s regulations. See id. at 23–26. The

ALJ found that the remaining impairments—hypertension, hyperlipidemia, left ankle injury, back

injury, arthritis, knee pain and swelling, chronic kidney disease, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive

disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and muscle spasms in his neck—were either not severe or

lacked objective medical evidence. Id. at 23–24. The ALJ further concluded that Wright retained

the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b); that he was capable of

performing his past relevant work as a messenger/outside deliverer as well as other work; and that

overall, he was not disabled prior to his date last insured. Id. at 26–33. The Appeals Council

denied Wright’s request for review on June 13, 2021. Id. at 1–4.

On July 23, 2021, Wright filed this suit, seeking review of the Administration’s disability

determination. See Compl., ECF No. 1. Among the attachments to his complaint were certain

medical records, including the records of his visits to Dr. Casscells in February and March of 2020,

and again in June and July of 2021; a follow-up visit with Dr. Williams in July 2021; and records

5 reflecting his knee surgery in April 2021 and related follow-up later that year. Compl. Exs. at 4–

22. Wright alleged in a supplemental filing to his complaint that he suffers from arthritis, joint

pain, and back pain; that he recently had knee replacement surgery on his left knee due to arthritis;

that he might need knee replacement surgery on his right knee; and that he has a cyst on his right

thumb that may need to be removed. Pl.’s Suppl., ECF No. 3.

Wright then filed his Motion for Judgment of Reversal. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 13. Along

with the motion, he filed medical records from his visits with Dr. Guillermety and Dr. Lin in

February 2022. The Acting Commissioner filed her Motion for Judgment of Affirmance and

opposed Wright’s motion, arguing that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that

Wright was not disabled before his date last insured. See Def.’s Mot. J. Affirmance (“Def.’s

Mot.”), ECF No. 14; Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 15. The Court then issued an order reminding Wright

of his deadline to file, in accordance with the existing scheduling order, ECF No. 12, his opposition

to the Acting Commissioner’s motion and his reply in support of his own motion. See Order, ECF

No. 16. The order also advised Wright that “[t]he Court’s local rules require a party opposing a

motion to serve and file a memorandum of points and authorities” by the specified deadline, “or

the court may treat the motion as conceded.” Id. at 1 (citing LCvR 7(b)). It further stated that

“any unopposed arguments a defendant has advanced in support of its motion may be treated as

conceded.” Id. Despite this notice, Wright did not file any additional briefs, nor has he otherwise

participated in this matter.

Legal Standards

If an individual seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security, the district court “sits in what is essentially an appellate role when it reviews the

Commissioner’s disability determination.” Pond v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-912, 2023 WL 3816687,

6 at *2 (D.D.C. June 5, 2023) (quotation omitted). Review occurs “under the familiar substantial

evidence standard.” Saunders v. Kijakazi, 6 F.4th 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2021); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

“The Commissioner’s determination must be based on substantial evidence in the record and

correctly apply the relevant legal standards.” Saunders, 6 F.4th at 4 (quotation and brackets

omitted). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion”—it “requires more than a scintilla, but can be satisfied by

something less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (quotations omitted).

When seeking judicial review, “the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the

Commissioner’s decision is not based on substantial evidence or that incorrect legal standards were

applied.” Lane-Rauth v. Barnhart, 437 F. Supp. 2d 63, 64 (D.D.C. 2006). The Court must also

apply the harmless-error rule, meaning that even if it “perceive[s] error,” it “will affirm the

Commissioner’s decision unless the error is prejudicial.” Saunders, 6 F.4th at 4.

Analysis

The grounds on which Wright seeks reversal of the Acting Commissioner’s disability

determination are murky. In the filings that he has submitted to the Court, Wright emphasizes his

alleged physical and psychological impairments and stresses that he is “unable to work.” Pl.’s

Suppl.; Pl.’s Mot. at 1, 3–4. But the Court’s role is not to determine for itself whether Wright is

disabled. See Butler v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 992, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Instead, it is to assess

whether the ALJ’s conclusion that he is not disabled is “based on substantial evidence and a correct

application of the law.” Id. This framework “does not grant the district court a roving commission

to review ALJ decisions in a vacuum.” Cooper v. Berryhill, No. 16-1671, 2017 WL 4326388, at

*4 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2017). For that reason, courts properly limit themselves to addressing only

the challenges to the ALJ’s reasoning that individuals seeking judicial review actually raise. See,

7 e.g., Butler, 353 F.3d at 999–1006 (stating that the plaintiff “raises four challenges to the ALJ’s

decision” and analyzing each in turn); see also Cooper, 2017 WL 4326388, at *4 (faulting the

defendant for failing to respond to the “four issues articulated by Plaintiff”). While the substantial

evidence standard is “thoroughgoing,” the Court’s review is no more sweeping than the allegations

of error that a plaintiff brings to the Court’s attention. Butler, 353 F.3d at 999.

Wright’s reasons for seeking reversal are even more difficult to parse because of his failure

to respond to the Acting Commissioner’s motion and opposition (despite the Court’s order

expressly warning him about the potential consequences of failing to respond), in which the Acting

Commissioner thoroughly defended the ALJ’s decision under the substantial evidence standard.

Because Wright did not articulate any argument as to why the ALJ’s decision was not supported

by substantial evidence in his own motion—and failed to oppose the Acting Commissioner’s

contention that the substantial evidence standard is satisfied—the Court concludes that Wright has

forfeited this argument. In none of Wright’s filings did he advance any argument that the ALJ’s

decision lacked the support of substantial evidence. Deeming arguments forfeited, even where a

party is pro se and “held to less stringent . . . forfeiture standards,” is particularly appropriate

where “those arguments entail fact-intensive inquiries.” Elliott v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 596 F.3d

842, 851 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Page v. Berryhill, 688 F. App’x 7, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Because

disability cases of this sort are so fact-intensive and fact-dependent, the standard of review poses

a high bar to clear in order to overturn the agency’s decision.”).

The Court is mindful of its duty to liberally construe the filings of pro se litigants and to

read them as a whole. See Schnitzler v. United States, 761 F.3d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Though

even a liberal reading of Wright’s submissions does not point to any particular reason why the

ALJ’s decision should be reversed, those submissions, including the attachments to his complaint

8 and motion, suggest to the Court that he may be seeking remand to the Administration on the basis

of new medical records that postdate the ALJ’s disability determination (although he did not

explicitly state as much in any filing). After all, the Court “may at any time order additional

evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that

there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate

such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). But in the absence of

any argument by Wright that the evidence he attached is material to evaluating the extent of his

impairments before his date last insured (and because the records were created substantially past

his date last insured and therefore are not clearly material on their face), the Court concludes that

Wright has not made the showing required to warrant a remand on this basis.

* * *

For these reasons, Wright’s Motion for Judgment of Reversal is DENIED, and the Acting

Commissioner’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance is GRANTED. An order will issue

contemporaneously with this opinion.

DATE: July 10, 2023 CARL J. NICHOLS United States District Judge