MEMORANDUM OPINION DISMISSING COMPLAINTS OBJECTING TO DISCHARGE AND TO DETERMINE DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBT
JAMES F. SCHNEIDER, Bankruptcy Judge.
In 1992, the plaintiffs filed a complaint, an amended complaint, and a second amended complaint to determine dis-chargeability of debt, which this Court dismissed at trial because the evidence related solely to the general denial of a discharge in bankruptcy, but it was too late to amend the complaint because the deadline had passed for bringing complaints objecting to discharge.
See Wright v.
As
bury,
Adversary Proceeding No. 92-5257-JS. After the second amended complaint was dismissed and while the debtor’s instant Chapter 7 case was still open, the plaintiffs filed the instant complaint objecting to discharge. After a two-day hearing, the Court will dismiss the instant complaint on grounds of
res judicata,
issue preclusion and limitations. The plaintiffs and defendant are
pro se.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On May 3,1991, the debtor, Barry Steve Asbury, filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in this Court. On September 23, 1991, the case was converted to Chapter 7.
The plaintiffs are Stephen M. Wright and Stephen M. Wright, CPA, P.A., the latter a Maryland professional association.
On June 1, 1992, the plaintiffs filed the first complaint entitled “Complaint Objecting to the Dischargeability of a Debt,” which, citing no provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, prayed a determination that “the indebtedness owed by the defendant to the plaintiff is nondischargeable,” and “for a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of Four Thousand One Hundred Sixty-Five Dollars,” incorrectly expressed in numerals as “$1,465.00.”
On September 1, 1992, the complaint was dismissed upon the
pro se
defendant’s motion for failure of the complaint to set forth a jurisdictional statement. Order of September 1,1992 [P. 7],
On October 14, 1992, this Court denied the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration because the amended complaint did not cite the underlying sections of the Bankruptcy Code for the determination of dis-chargeability. Order entered October 14, 1992 [P. 11],
On November 16, 1992, by order [P. 14] of even date, this Court vacated the dismissal and permitted the plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint, entitled “Second Amended Complaint Objecting to the Dischargeability of a Debt” [P. 15], which cited for its authority 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) and (a)(4).
Meanwhile, on March 1, 1994, this Court granted the debtor a Chapter 7 discharge.
On September 22, 1995, the plaintiffs filed a pretrial order [P. 39], which cited subsections of Section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code, rather than Section 523, upon which the complaint was based. Section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth grounds for the denial of a discharge, rather than grounds for determining a debt to be nondischargeable.
At trial on September 25, 1995, this Court dismissed the complaint at the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ case because the only evidence produced by the plaintiff related to grounds for the denial of a discharge, as opposed to the determination of dischargeability. The plaintiffs were represented by counsel at the trial.
On September 20,1996, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland [Nick-erson, J.] reversed and remanded the complaint, holding that this Court should have permitted the plaintiffs to further amend the complaint to set forth a cause of action under Section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code.
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
On February 27, 1997, this matter came on for hearing on remand, at which time the plaintiffs filed a third complaint entitled “Third Amended Complaint Objecting to Discharge of Debtor Pursuant to Section 727 and Objecting to the Discharge-ability of a Debt Pursuant to Section 523 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.” At the hearing, the plaintiffs presented further evidence in support of the argument that the debtor ought to be denied a discharge pursuant to Section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code, for cause, including the debtor’s concealment of assets. At the conclusion of the hearing, the matter was held
sub-curia.
MOTION TO REVOKE DISCHARGE
While a decision was pending on the third amended complaint, on April 9, 1998, the plaintiffs filed the instant motion [P. 82] to revoke/vacate the debtor’s discharge. The motion, which the plaintiffs contended contained newly-discovered information, was found by the Court to be a rehash of the third amended complaint. For the reasons set forth, the third amended complaint and the most recent complaint will be dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The debtor’s discharge which was entered on March 1, 1994, effectively blocked the plaintiff from maintaining the third amended complaint as one objecting to discharge. Such a complaint is fundamentally different from a complaint to determine the dischargeability of a particular debt, which was the original guise in which
the complaint was filed. The function of determining a debt to be nondischargeable merely excepts from discharge a debt held by a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs, while the function of denying a discharge
in toto
has the practical effect of preventing all legitimate debts of a debtor from being discharged in bankruptcy.
See Toth v. Ham (In re Ham),
174 B.R. 104, 107-08 0Bankr.S.D.Ill.1994). Dischargeability of debt is governed by Section 523
of the
Bankruptcy Code, while objections to dis- 727.
charge are authorized by Code Section
A creditor seeking to determine the dischargeability of a debt pursuant to Section 523(c) must file a complaint within sixty (60) days after the first date set for the Section 341 meeting of creditors or seek an extension of time to object before the limitation period has expired. Fed. R.Bankr.P. 4007(c).
Section 523(c) requires that a creditor seek a determination of nondischargeability as to debts arising under Section 523(a)(2),(4),(6) and/or (15). 11 U.S.C. § 523(c);
see also In re Jeffrey,
169 B.R. 25, 26 (Bankr.D.Md.1994). Because there is no “sufficient identity” between an objection to discharge pursuant to Section 727 and a request for determination of the dischargeability of a debt pursuant to Section 523, a timely-filed complaint that only sets forth one of the two causes of action may not be amended to include the other cause of action after the expiration of the limitations period.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION DISMISSING COMPLAINTS OBJECTING TO DISCHARGE AND TO DETERMINE DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBT
JAMES F. SCHNEIDER, Bankruptcy Judge.
In 1992, the plaintiffs filed a complaint, an amended complaint, and a second amended complaint to determine dis-chargeability of debt, which this Court dismissed at trial because the evidence related solely to the general denial of a discharge in bankruptcy, but it was too late to amend the complaint because the deadline had passed for bringing complaints objecting to discharge.
See Wright v.
As
bury,
Adversary Proceeding No. 92-5257-JS. After the second amended complaint was dismissed and while the debtor’s instant Chapter 7 case was still open, the plaintiffs filed the instant complaint objecting to discharge. After a two-day hearing, the Court will dismiss the instant complaint on grounds of
res judicata,
issue preclusion and limitations. The plaintiffs and defendant are
pro se.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On May 3,1991, the debtor, Barry Steve Asbury, filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in this Court. On September 23, 1991, the case was converted to Chapter 7.
The plaintiffs are Stephen M. Wright and Stephen M. Wright, CPA, P.A., the latter a Maryland professional association.
On June 1, 1992, the plaintiffs filed the first complaint entitled “Complaint Objecting to the Dischargeability of a Debt,” which, citing no provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, prayed a determination that “the indebtedness owed by the defendant to the plaintiff is nondischargeable,” and “for a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of Four Thousand One Hundred Sixty-Five Dollars,” incorrectly expressed in numerals as “$1,465.00.”
On September 1, 1992, the complaint was dismissed upon the
pro se
defendant’s motion for failure of the complaint to set forth a jurisdictional statement. Order of September 1,1992 [P. 7],
On October 14, 1992, this Court denied the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration because the amended complaint did not cite the underlying sections of the Bankruptcy Code for the determination of dis-chargeability. Order entered October 14, 1992 [P. 11],
On November 16, 1992, by order [P. 14] of even date, this Court vacated the dismissal and permitted the plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint, entitled “Second Amended Complaint Objecting to the Dischargeability of a Debt” [P. 15], which cited for its authority 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) and (a)(4).
Meanwhile, on March 1, 1994, this Court granted the debtor a Chapter 7 discharge.
On September 22, 1995, the plaintiffs filed a pretrial order [P. 39], which cited subsections of Section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code, rather than Section 523, upon which the complaint was based. Section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth grounds for the denial of a discharge, rather than grounds for determining a debt to be nondischargeable.
At trial on September 25, 1995, this Court dismissed the complaint at the conclusion of the plaintiffs’ case because the only evidence produced by the plaintiff related to grounds for the denial of a discharge, as opposed to the determination of dischargeability. The plaintiffs were represented by counsel at the trial.
On September 20,1996, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland [Nick-erson, J.] reversed and remanded the complaint, holding that this Court should have permitted the plaintiffs to further amend the complaint to set forth a cause of action under Section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code.
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
On February 27, 1997, this matter came on for hearing on remand, at which time the plaintiffs filed a third complaint entitled “Third Amended Complaint Objecting to Discharge of Debtor Pursuant to Section 727 and Objecting to the Discharge-ability of a Debt Pursuant to Section 523 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.” At the hearing, the plaintiffs presented further evidence in support of the argument that the debtor ought to be denied a discharge pursuant to Section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code, for cause, including the debtor’s concealment of assets. At the conclusion of the hearing, the matter was held
sub-curia.
MOTION TO REVOKE DISCHARGE
While a decision was pending on the third amended complaint, on April 9, 1998, the plaintiffs filed the instant motion [P. 82] to revoke/vacate the debtor’s discharge. The motion, which the plaintiffs contended contained newly-discovered information, was found by the Court to be a rehash of the third amended complaint. For the reasons set forth, the third amended complaint and the most recent complaint will be dismissed.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The debtor’s discharge which was entered on March 1, 1994, effectively blocked the plaintiff from maintaining the third amended complaint as one objecting to discharge. Such a complaint is fundamentally different from a complaint to determine the dischargeability of a particular debt, which was the original guise in which
the complaint was filed. The function of determining a debt to be nondischargeable merely excepts from discharge a debt held by a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs, while the function of denying a discharge
in toto
has the practical effect of preventing all legitimate debts of a debtor from being discharged in bankruptcy.
See Toth v. Ham (In re Ham),
174 B.R. 104, 107-08 0Bankr.S.D.Ill.1994). Dischargeability of debt is governed by Section 523
of the
Bankruptcy Code, while objections to dis- 727.
charge are authorized by Code Section
A creditor seeking to determine the dischargeability of a debt pursuant to Section 523(c) must file a complaint within sixty (60) days after the first date set for the Section 341 meeting of creditors or seek an extension of time to object before the limitation period has expired. Fed. R.Bankr.P. 4007(c).
Section 523(c) requires that a creditor seek a determination of nondischargeability as to debts arising under Section 523(a)(2),(4),(6) and/or (15). 11 U.S.C. § 523(c);
see also In re Jeffrey,
169 B.R. 25, 26 (Bankr.D.Md.1994). Because there is no “sufficient identity” between an objection to discharge pursuant to Section 727 and a request for determination of the dischargeability of a debt pursuant to Section 523, a timely-filed complaint that only sets forth one of the two causes of action may not be amended to include the other cause of action after the expiration of the limitations period. To countenance such untimely amendments would nullify the limitations mandated by Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004(b) and 4007(c).
In re Ham,
174 B.R. at 108.
The granting of a discharge in bankruptcy does not affect a pending complaint to determine dischargeability of debt, because the relief requested in the complaint is that one or more debts be excepted from discharge.
See
Fed.
R.Bankr.P. 4007.
However, because the granting of a discharge is incompatible with a pending complaint to completely deny a discharge, a complaint objecting to discharge may not be maintained after a discharge has been granted, without first seeking to strike the discharge if the Code permits.
See
Fed.R.Bankr.Proc. 4004(a).
In this case, the Bankruptcy Code provides no basis for the plaintiff to strike the debtor’s discharge, or to amend the complaint to set forth a distinctly different cause of action which by the date of trial was time-barred.
In his opinion, Judge Nickerson cited with approval the decision of the Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in the case of
In re Southmark,
88 F.3d 311 (5th Cir.1996), which listed the factors to be considered in deciding whether to grant leave to amend a complaint: “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment.”
Id.
at 315.
In the case at bar, this Court notes thp presence of four of the five factors militating against permitting the amendment. The amendment of the complaint at trial was futile because of the long-expired deadline for filing complaints objecting to discharge, and the fact that a discharge had been granted. The debtor/defendant would obviously be prejudiced by such an amendment, especially because he was without counsel. The plaintiffs, although represented by counsel, consistently failed to properly amend the complaint until it was too late to do so. Their undue delay in amending the complaint
after trial
at the invitation of the U.S. District Court should not be permitted.
Because the evidence produced by the plaintiffs related solely to the denial of discharge, as opposed to the determination of the dischargeability of the plaintiffs’ debts, the third amended complaint will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Likewise, the most-recently filed complaint is found to be a nearly-identical recitation of the same allegations brought in the earlier complaints, albeit with much more excruciating detail in the litany of
numbers and dates. In an abundance of caution, the cdurts have given Mr. Wright four or five bites at the apple on what amounts to a lost cause of collecting a $4,000 debt. This was the last bite. The latest complaint will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
COSTS TO BE ASSESSED TO THE PLAINTIFF.