[Cite as Woronka v. Woronka, 2011-Ohio-498.]
COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES: VALERIE WORONKA : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. John W. Wise, J. : -vs- : : Case No. 2010-CA-00193 WILLIAM WORONKA : : Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relaltions Division, Case No. 2006-DR-1016
JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 31, 2011
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
EUGENE GILLIS EUGENE O'BYRNE 1592 Windcrest Street N.W. 101 Central Plaza South North Canton, OH 44720 Suite 500 Canton, OH 44702 [Cite as Woronka v. Woronka, 2011-Ohio-498.]
Gwin, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant William J. Woronka appeals a judgment of the Court
of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, of Stark County, Ohio, which
construed the separation agreement appellant entered into with plaintiff-appellee
Valerie Woronka. Appellant assigns a single error to the trial court:
{¶2} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN MODIFYING THE
SEPARATION AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS ADOPTED BY THE PARTIES AND
INCORPORATED BY THE COURT.”
{¶3} The record indicates the parties ended their marriage in October, 2006,
and executed a separation agreement. The agreement provided in pertinent part: “11.
Husband and Wife consent and agree that Wife is to receive one-half of IBEW 401(K)
by use of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO).”
{¶4} On June 17, 2010, the court conducted a hearing on a request for
clarification of the QDRO and the divorce decree. The trial court found the attorney
representing the company clarified that appellant’s IBEW pension account is a Security
Plan Pension, and that a separate 401(K) Plan exists, but it has no value. The court
found the pension accrued during the marriage and has an approximate value of
$30,000.
{¶5} The trial court stated it lacks authority to modify the division of marital
property contained in the final decree, but it does have the power to clarify and
construe the property division in order to effectuate its judgment. The court found the
parties clearly contemplated an equal division of the marital portion of the pension.
The court found the decree incorrectly referred to the pension as a 401 (K) rather than Stark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00193 3
the Security Plan. The court clarified the 2006 decree to require an equal division of
the marital portion of appellant’s IBEW Security Plan through means of a QDRO.
{¶6} Unfortunately, the beginning of the hearing was conducted off the record,
and the documents and transcript before us contain little information. The transcript
refers to correspondence between the parties’ counsels which was not offered into
evidence and is not part of the record on appeal.
{¶7} Appellant concedes the trial court had jurisdiction to clarify and construe
the original property division, but argues the court’s order does not construe the
original property division, but rather modifies it. The trial court cited our decision in
Schneider v. Schneider, Stark App. No. 2009-CA-00090, 2010-Ohio-534. In
Schneider, the divorce decree awarded the ex-wife 50% of the marital portion of the
ex-husband’s accrued benefits in a pension, but when the ex-husband retired he
discovered appellee was receiving one-half of the entire pension, not one-half of the
portion earned during the marriage.
{¶8} The trial court found the ex-wife was entitled to one-half of the total
pension. This court disagreed. We cited Bond v. Bond (1990), 69 Ohio App. 3d 225,
which states a trial court has broad discretion in clarifying ambiguous language
considering not only the intent of the parties, but the equities involved. We found the
divorce decree stated it divided the marital assets and the marital property, and
therefore the benefits to which the ex-wife was entitled must be determined by the
amount of time the parties were married.
{¶9} Appellant cites us to Ruthrauff v. Ruthrauff, Stark App. No. 2009-CA-
00191, 2010-Ohio-887. In Ruthrauff, the parties’ separation agreement provided for Stark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00193 4
equal distribution of the husband’s retirement benefits from U.S. Army. The decree was
granted in 1985. When the ex-husband retired from the military in 2003, the ex-wife
began receiving half of the total benefits. The trial court found the terms of the
separation agreement were clear and unambiguous, and refused to modify the award.
We found if the language of a written instrument is clear and unambiguous, the
interpretation of the instrument is a matter of law and the court must determine the
intent of the parties using only the language employed. Ruthrauff at paragraph 12,
citations deleted.
{¶10} This court agreed with the trial court the language in the separation
agreement was unambiguous. It stated the husband and wife intended to settle, inter
alia, “the past, present and future support of the wife ***” The separation agreement
also provided the wife would share “any” retirement benefits the husband may be
entitled to receive from the U.S. Army. It did not specify she was to receive half of the
marital portion of the pension.
{¶11} On review, this court found the parties’ agreement treated the retirement
benefit as support for the ex-wife. We concluded the trial court did not err in refusing to
alter the decree. We acknowledged the ruling appears to be contrary to Schneider,
supra, but found it was distinguishable because of the specific language of the
respective agreements.
{¶12} In the case before us, the decree states the parties’ intent to settle all their
property rights and interest, both temporary and permanent. Separation agreement,
Page 1. The final paragraph of the decree states that both parties are fully cognizant
and aware of the property and assets of the other party and understand the Stark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00193 5
significance of the agreement. The separation agreement does not refer to the IBEW
Security Plan at all, and it does not list the value of the 401(K).
{¶13} The trial court found the decree incorrectly referred to appellant’s pension
as a 401(K) and the parties intended to divide the Security Plan funds. We do not
agree. The record contains no evidence the parties intended to divide the Security Plan
funds. If there had been no 401 (K) plan, then the language would be ambiguous and
the court could have determined what the agreement referred to, but here, there is a
401 (K) account, even though it is unfunded.
{¶14} We find the language in the separation agreement to be clear and
unambiguous. The separation agreement refers to the parties’ 401 (K) plan, and the
trial court’s decision substituting the Security Plan of a 401 (K) plan was a modification,
not a clarification. We find the trial court abused discretion in finding the parties
intended to split the Security Plan funds rather than the 401 (K) plan funds.
{¶15} The assignment of error is sustained. Stark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00193 6
{¶16} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas,
Domestic Relations Division, of Stark County, Ohio, is reversed, and the cause is
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[Cite as Woronka v. Woronka, 2011-Ohio-498.]
COURT OF APPEALS STARK COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES: VALERIE WORONKA : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. John W. Wise, J. : -vs- : : Case No. 2010-CA-00193 WILLIAM WORONKA : : Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relaltions Division, Case No. 2006-DR-1016
JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 31, 2011
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
EUGENE GILLIS EUGENE O'BYRNE 1592 Windcrest Street N.W. 101 Central Plaza South North Canton, OH 44720 Suite 500 Canton, OH 44702 [Cite as Woronka v. Woronka, 2011-Ohio-498.]
Gwin, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant William J. Woronka appeals a judgment of the Court
of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, of Stark County, Ohio, which
construed the separation agreement appellant entered into with plaintiff-appellee
Valerie Woronka. Appellant assigns a single error to the trial court:
{¶2} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN MODIFYING THE
SEPARATION AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS ADOPTED BY THE PARTIES AND
INCORPORATED BY THE COURT.”
{¶3} The record indicates the parties ended their marriage in October, 2006,
and executed a separation agreement. The agreement provided in pertinent part: “11.
Husband and Wife consent and agree that Wife is to receive one-half of IBEW 401(K)
by use of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO).”
{¶4} On June 17, 2010, the court conducted a hearing on a request for
clarification of the QDRO and the divorce decree. The trial court found the attorney
representing the company clarified that appellant’s IBEW pension account is a Security
Plan Pension, and that a separate 401(K) Plan exists, but it has no value. The court
found the pension accrued during the marriage and has an approximate value of
$30,000.
{¶5} The trial court stated it lacks authority to modify the division of marital
property contained in the final decree, but it does have the power to clarify and
construe the property division in order to effectuate its judgment. The court found the
parties clearly contemplated an equal division of the marital portion of the pension.
The court found the decree incorrectly referred to the pension as a 401 (K) rather than Stark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00193 3
the Security Plan. The court clarified the 2006 decree to require an equal division of
the marital portion of appellant’s IBEW Security Plan through means of a QDRO.
{¶6} Unfortunately, the beginning of the hearing was conducted off the record,
and the documents and transcript before us contain little information. The transcript
refers to correspondence between the parties’ counsels which was not offered into
evidence and is not part of the record on appeal.
{¶7} Appellant concedes the trial court had jurisdiction to clarify and construe
the original property division, but argues the court’s order does not construe the
original property division, but rather modifies it. The trial court cited our decision in
Schneider v. Schneider, Stark App. No. 2009-CA-00090, 2010-Ohio-534. In
Schneider, the divorce decree awarded the ex-wife 50% of the marital portion of the
ex-husband’s accrued benefits in a pension, but when the ex-husband retired he
discovered appellee was receiving one-half of the entire pension, not one-half of the
portion earned during the marriage.
{¶8} The trial court found the ex-wife was entitled to one-half of the total
pension. This court disagreed. We cited Bond v. Bond (1990), 69 Ohio App. 3d 225,
which states a trial court has broad discretion in clarifying ambiguous language
considering not only the intent of the parties, but the equities involved. We found the
divorce decree stated it divided the marital assets and the marital property, and
therefore the benefits to which the ex-wife was entitled must be determined by the
amount of time the parties were married.
{¶9} Appellant cites us to Ruthrauff v. Ruthrauff, Stark App. No. 2009-CA-
00191, 2010-Ohio-887. In Ruthrauff, the parties’ separation agreement provided for Stark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00193 4
equal distribution of the husband’s retirement benefits from U.S. Army. The decree was
granted in 1985. When the ex-husband retired from the military in 2003, the ex-wife
began receiving half of the total benefits. The trial court found the terms of the
separation agreement were clear and unambiguous, and refused to modify the award.
We found if the language of a written instrument is clear and unambiguous, the
interpretation of the instrument is a matter of law and the court must determine the
intent of the parties using only the language employed. Ruthrauff at paragraph 12,
citations deleted.
{¶10} This court agreed with the trial court the language in the separation
agreement was unambiguous. It stated the husband and wife intended to settle, inter
alia, “the past, present and future support of the wife ***” The separation agreement
also provided the wife would share “any” retirement benefits the husband may be
entitled to receive from the U.S. Army. It did not specify she was to receive half of the
marital portion of the pension.
{¶11} On review, this court found the parties’ agreement treated the retirement
benefit as support for the ex-wife. We concluded the trial court did not err in refusing to
alter the decree. We acknowledged the ruling appears to be contrary to Schneider,
supra, but found it was distinguishable because of the specific language of the
respective agreements.
{¶12} In the case before us, the decree states the parties’ intent to settle all their
property rights and interest, both temporary and permanent. Separation agreement,
Page 1. The final paragraph of the decree states that both parties are fully cognizant
and aware of the property and assets of the other party and understand the Stark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00193 5
significance of the agreement. The separation agreement does not refer to the IBEW
Security Plan at all, and it does not list the value of the 401(K).
{¶13} The trial court found the decree incorrectly referred to appellant’s pension
as a 401(K) and the parties intended to divide the Security Plan funds. We do not
agree. The record contains no evidence the parties intended to divide the Security Plan
funds. If there had been no 401 (K) plan, then the language would be ambiguous and
the court could have determined what the agreement referred to, but here, there is a
401 (K) account, even though it is unfunded.
{¶14} We find the language in the separation agreement to be clear and
unambiguous. The separation agreement refers to the parties’ 401 (K) plan, and the
trial court’s decision substituting the Security Plan of a 401 (K) plan was a modification,
not a clarification. We find the trial court abused discretion in finding the parties
intended to split the Security Plan funds rather than the 401 (K) plan funds.
{¶15} The assignment of error is sustained. Stark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00193 6
{¶16} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas,
Domestic Relations Division, of Stark County, Ohio, is reversed, and the cause is
remanded to the court for further proceedings in accord with law and consistent with
this opinion.
By Gwin, P.J., and
Wise, J., concur;
Farmer, J., dissents
_________________________________ HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
_________________________________ HON. SHEILA G. FARMER
_________________________________ HON. JOHN W. WISE WSG:clw 0112 Stark County, Case No. 2010-CA-00193 7
Farmer, J., dissenting
{¶17} I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion because of the state of
the record in this case. Pursuant to Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories (1980), 61 Ohio
St.2d 197, we should presume the validity of the trial court's proceedings.
{¶18} As noted by the majority in ¶6, the beginning of the hearing was held off
the record. This leaves open the following issues:
{¶19} (1) Was the 401(K) in existence at the time of the divorce?
{¶20} (2) Where the monies of the 401(K) transferred into the Security Plan
Pension?
{¶21} We might guess at the actual happenings by reading between the lines of
the trial court's findings of fact contained in its June 21, 2010 judgment entry:
{¶22} "***The parties received a divorce on August 14, 2006 which adopted a
Separation Agreement entered into between the parties. The Separation Agreement
provides, 'Husband and Wife consent and agree that Wife is to receive 1/2 of IBEW
401K by use of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO).' Attorney Piatt clarified
that the IBEW pension held to the benefit of the Defendant is a Security Plan pension
and that a separate 401(K) plan exists without any value. The Defendant acknowledges
that the pension accrued during the marriage and has an approximate value of
$30,000."
{¶23} Without any clarification via an App.R. 9(C) statement, I would affirm the
trial court's decision pursuant to Knapp, supra.
___________________________________ HON. SHEILA G. FARMER [Cite as Woronka v. Woronka, 2011-Ohio-498.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
VALERIE WORONKA : : Plaintiff-Appellee : : : -vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY : WILLIAM WORONKA : : : Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 2010-CA-00193
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the judgment of
the Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, of Stark County, Ohio, is
reversed, and the cause is remanded to the court for further proceedings in accord with
law and consistent with this opinion. Costs to appellee.
_________________________________ HON. JOHN W. WISE